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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
l . The Problem . 
The problem of the dissertation is to determine the sig-
nificance of the psychological state of dread in the exist-
enti;al philosophies of SDren Kierkeg a.rd1a d Mart in Heidegger. 
The concept of dresd , or anxiety (as the German word Angs~ is 
often translated.) , is .of contemporary importance .. in psycho-
~ , 
logy. In addition, the existential .philosophy, which looms 
. 
large in th current European philosophical see~~· is popula~ 
ly attributed to these two philosophers. Both of these con-
si~eratio~s serve to make the problem both timely and inter-
esting. 
These two men are chosen to represent the sphere of the 
dissertation because the one, SK, is said to be the father 
of existentialism, while Heidegger is fast becoming very in-
flueutia.l in this stream of thought . Also, both have a. decided 
interest in psychology as a. basic element of their 'philosophje s. 
The dissertation problem is especially directed at thls dimen-
sion in so far as it is composed of elements of human exper-
ience which are observed in the emotional feeli g of dread, ar 
are directly affected by it. Heidegger is said to have received 
muc.h from SK directly and also to be largely independent in 
l. ,T hroughout the dissertation ' SK' will be generally sub-
stituted for Kierkegaa.rd 's full name . 
his mode of analytical thought . The relationship of these 
two philosophers in their respective conclusions concerning 
the stated problem will be the conclusion of this disserta-
tion. 
2. Previous Literature. 
The previous research in this par Gicular problem has 
been very limited. The only work which combines the thought 
of SK and Heidegger in any detailed aspect- appears to be the 
short dissertation o~Annemarie Vogt at the Univ.ersity of 
Giessen in 1936, Da.s Problem des Selbstseins bel Kierkegaa.rd 
und Heidegger. This work has a. brief chapter ox:.: the phenom-
epon of Angst . The importance of the conce~~ in the thinking 
of , these two men is asserted and several parallel passages 
in the works of SK and Heidegger are adduced and given comm-
ent. 
In the last two decades there has been considerable re-
2 
search into the religious perspective of Kierkegaard. Safierb 
The Philosophy of S&ren Kierkegaard1 is a rather complete su~ 
vey of SK's philosophic writings. There are many current bio-
graphical sketches of SK and many current articles wr itten in 
reference to his influence upon contemporary r ligioue thought. 
Two brief considerations of his view of dread are to be found 
in the current literature. 0 e is the discuss ion of SK as the 
historical source of this phase of psychology in Rollo May 's 
1 .. For publication data and for explanation of footnote abbrev-
iations, see bibliography. 
book, The Meaning of Anxiety, and the other is in Mowrer's 
text concerning Learning Theory and Personality Dynamics. 
The significant points of both of these discussions are in-
cluded in the body of the dissertation . 
Heidegger has not received so much attention as SK, but 
~e has become the topic of much riting and discussion in 
Europe. Two accounts of his thought that are extensively 
utilized in the work of this dissertation are Werner Brock's 
introduction to Heide,gger's Existence and Being (which is ·the 
·' 
- ' publisher 's title for a group of ~eidegger•s essays) published 
. 
in 1949 and Joseph M~ller •s Existenzialphilosophie und Kath-
. .:.'.-
olische Theologie (1952). 
The principal sources for the dissertation are SK's 
Journals, Concluding Unscientific Postscri~ ·t, The Sickness 
unto Death, The Concept of Dread, and Either/Or. The chief 
sources for Heidegger are Sein und Zeit, Existence and BeiiJ..g,, 
and as 1st Metaph~1k7 
1. Method of Investigation. 
The dissertation begins with a characterization of ex-
istential philosophy which is rooted in Kierkegasrd and 1 
given impetus in the philosophy of Heidegger . This is not in-
tended as an exhaustive analysis of this school of thought, 
but , rather , a brief historical survey with the de otation of 
the ele~ents of a 'common core' of existentialism . The philo-
-' 
ophy of SK is next presented in an attempt to understand his 
theory of the individual • . This is followed by an investigation 
3 
of the experience of dread in this individual and its im-
plication for him in SK 's works. Heidegger is treated in the 
s~e fashion in the next two chapters. The philosophies of 
the two men are analyzed and detailed ith a view to pr~ar­
ing a philosophic background and setting for their specific 
psychological perspectives . ·Finally a comparison of the two 
men·as to their views of the oonoept of dread and its sig-
nificance for th$ir thought is given, along with a summary 
statement of the progress of the dissertation. 
·' 
,j 
\ 
CHAPTER TWO 
EXISTENTIALISM 
l. Introduction. 
The philosophy of existence is heralded as the leading 
philosophical option on the European continent and is being 
given a great deal of atte tion in other parts of the world 
in the contemporary sc~ne. idespread attention is given to 
its exp· n ~t· ·• Their bco_!ts, plus commentaries a.qd criticisms 
o~ their books, are to be found on the popular reading shelf 
i n public libraries as well as on the desks of •erious philo-
sophers. "Existenz is in vogue today; it is the Zeitgeist."l 
The reception of this philosophy has not been entirely 
cordial, however, and there are many who either ignore this 
presently vigorous movement, or else respond with scornful 
ridicule. This oppositio is not surprising in vie of the 
zealous attacks upon traditional philosophy that have been 
made by the existentialists. 
In a world which has become a world with bewildering 
speed, the first step for Existentialism is to rescue 
the existent from the disintegrating effects of pub-
licity, from the inertia of things, and from docile 
socialness, in order to start him off on the search 
for human existence. In order to set man up again on 
his axis, it wrenches his roots just as a dislocated joint is twisted in order to get it back in place. An 
operation i volving such violence ca ot be performed 
without risk of wrong movements being made . History 
teaches us that any disturbance of equilibrium always 
l. Carnell, PVSK, 74. 
5 
6 
begins with an ontburs t of counter violence . 1 
An attempt to survey some asn ~' cts of t 'le histori cal 
foundations of tbis phi l osoryhy , as well as an attempt to 
ascertain some common core to whi ch the various exis tentialists 
adhere, will be the scope of this chan ter . 
m There is a real problem involved in determing just what 
" 
existentialism is . This term is one of the most obscure 
words in pres~nt philosophical terminology . It is used to 
' 
represent a current theolog ical reaction; to denote a metho-
; 
ological apr roach to a systemat.ic philosonhy; as an excuse 
· for not attempting such a system; as a widespiead term to 
f n clude tbe current non- conformist express ions in hilosophy, 
li'tera ture , and ar t; and e ven as a ta g by which to abuse or 
to show contempt for someone . There is sufficient reason 
in this gene ral confusion for philosophers to t end to deny 
any affiliation with this school even if t hey might adhere to 
its basic premises (that is , if it can be said to have any ) . 
2 . The Source . 
The name ' existentialism' came from t he thinking and 
II 
writing of a Dan ish theologian , Soren Kierkegaard . He was in 
a definite and int ense reaction against the speculative philo-
sophy of Hege l , and the sanctimonious condition of the Danish 
state church Hegel , a ccording to SK , had built a beautiful 
philosophical palace but himself lived in a hovel beside it . 
l. Meunier , EP , 68- 69 . 
He had carefully accounted for all of the aspects of reality 
except himself and , hence, was a pitiful figure. Hegel iden-
tified thought and being and made his sweeping statements sub 
specie aeternitat'is , ignoring the fact that man is a. ere ~ure 
caged in by himself and having an avenue of knowledge only in 
himself. There may be an objective system of reality for God 
but for insignificant man there could only be subjective ob-
jectivity. SK demand~d that men pay more than lip service to 
the ego-centric prediokment. Hegel had an intrio~te and care-
fu~ly thought out system of i nterrelationships that included 
~11 of reality and comprised the Absolute. SK p ~d homage to 
1 
this as a problem of thought, but he was unrelenting in his 
7 
harsh criticism of it as a system to end all systems and an 
Absolutely Certain Mediation for all of the problems of man. 
For SK man is a fragment and not a system~ 
On the other hand, the church was attempting to solve 
all the infinite and eternal problems of man with historical 
investigations and traditional concepts . SK believed that these 
attempts were , a. t best, mere accumulations, not toward certa:1n-
ty, but toward a meagre substi tute--proba.bili ty. This may be 
all very well in terms of a.n historical discipline, but folly 
in terms of a. basis for eternal happiness. The contradiction 
1 . SK, CUP, 558 . "If he (Hegel) had written his hole Logic 
and declared in the preface that it was only a thought-
· · e~eriment (in which, however, at many points .he had shirk-
ed soroe things) he would have been the greatest thinker 
' that ever lived . Now he is comic." 
/ 
between human aspiration and longing and finite and sinful 
abilities must be coped with . The resolution of this contra-
diction could only come through inwardness in human experi-
ence. Truth is subjectivity; objec~ivity is nonsense. Any-bas-
is for r ligious hope will be found by the existing human who 
does not contradict his own existence, but rather seeks this 
inwa.tdness with iufinite passion . For SK, the basic contra-
diction of the exist~ng man is not slyly done away with in the 
synthesis which breaks-the law of contradiction Chich he sup-
po~ed Hegel to have done) , but is instead resolve~ in the Ab-
solute Paradox of eternity invading time in the ~rson of Jes-
us .Christ . 
The experience of Kierkegaard is an assiduous vindi-
cation of the irre,t •iona.l and the immediate, as exist-
ence, a.s life, as faith, as personality, against the 
universal vaJ.ues of reason, which, in their claim to 
universal validity, absorb a d annul what is singular 
in each individual .l 
3 . Ex is tenz • 
It is with a. good deal of temerity that one proceeds to 
discover and record the meaning of existence in th~ works of 
SK and l ater existential ists. That one would attempt to do so 
would, no doubt, appe ar as both a tragedy and a comedy to SK 
who wanted no disciples for fear of misinterpretation and/or 
systematization. He even anticipated t he difficulty of such 
an .~ndeavor and retorted , "If one were to offer me ten dollars 
I would not undertake to explain t he riddle of existence."2 
• 
l . Ruggiero, .E:Jd , __ 21. 
2 . SK, CUP, 403. 
9 
The term is of decided importa ce in SK's writing and 
it makes him the reputed fous !1 origo of contemporary exist-
entialism.1 SK entered the philosophical scene at an age in 
which the united effort was to attain objective reality, 
hether idealistic or mat rialistic, and he issued a chall-
enge for philosophy to rethink its prcblem2 and to reconsider 
the whole tren4 of philosophy and religion . He had no desire 
to formulate a new trend , however, and Jean ahl asserts that 
SK would have r~j ected .. the term ' philosophy of xi stence ' , 
refused the ' existentialist ' title, and "doubtless in his 
I 
Cb~istian humility he would have refused the name existentt"3 
. ether t he Kierk gaardian challenge ca be said' t o be respons-
ib£e for odern existential philosophy will ' epend l ar gely o 
his' use of •e xistence' a d its cor sequences. He used a touch 
of irony to i nvi te a probi ng of t his concept: "My philosophy 
is at least easy to u d rstand, for I have o ly one principle 
and I do ot even proceed from that.n4 
K was a realist and had no intention of denying he 
existence of the external world i the traditional s se of 
•exist in6J . In fact, it was horribly real and was to a degree 
the stimulus for Existenz . 
The whole of xistence fri ghtens me, from the smallest 
fly to the mystery of the Incarnation; everythi! is 
unintelligible to me, most of all myself: t he whole 
of existence is poiso ed in my sight, particularly 
myself .5 
1 . Croxall, KS, 5S. 
2 .• Cf . Th!mte, PRK, 206 . 
3 . ahl, SHE, 33. 
4 . SK, E/0, I, 31 • 
5 . SK, J K, 275. 
This unintelligibility in Which the factual existences 
dissolve into ideal essenoes1 and are no longer beings gave 
rise to the dictum that "subjectivity is truth, subjectivity 
is reality . "2 
10 
It is apparent that SK used 'existence' in two different 
senses as he developed his theory. The first sense r ferS' to 
'factual' existence which signifies the general concept of 
being. This admits of r o qualitative distincti o 
scholastic tradition. -
as in the 
, 
In the case of factual existence it is meaningless 
to speak of more or less of being . A fly,, when it 
exists , has as much being as God; the s~upid remark 
that I have here set down has as much factual exist-
ence as Spinoza's profundity; for factual existence is 
subject to the dialectic of Hamlet; to be or not to 
be.3 
This tradi tiona.l view of exis tenoe covers: all of rea.li ty. It 
pr~vides exp anation for his referenoea to the existence of 
roses, flies, a1d potatoes, references which might at first 
appear to be in contradiction to his general thesis. 
"Nature as the spatial order , has only an i mmediate 
existenoe."4 The investigation of this Kantian space concept 
is r stricted to immediacy in sense perception . The at tendant 
unavoidable errors make physical study at best only capable 
of producilg a. series of unintelligible approximation , so SK 
had little interest in applying the scientific method for a 
voc-at ion. 
-' 
l . 'SK,PF,33· 
2 • SK' CUP I 306 • 
3 '. SK, PF, 32. 4 SK, PF, 64. 
The second, and most important, use of •existence' for 
SK has a closer etymological reference and it signifi s the 
emerging or ' becoming ' character of SK's categori s. 
11 
Existence ·Comes before thought he cries. Not Des-
nartes ' cogito ergo sum, but sum ergo cogito is tbe 
right order he declares. Let then the ballet of blood-
less categories (as Bradley calls the abstractions of 
philosophy) b come a full blooded experiential mode 
of thinking ,_ fecidiug, acting . Primum vivere, deinde 
philosophati. 
The ensuiug experiential activity turns in an inward dir-
ection and the underst&nding of reality will be a an active 
process i nstead of as a state of be,.ng This unde'rstanding 
will be a realization rather than a contemplation·. Significant 
~ . 
existence is that which has reference to a quality of human 
expe~ience and then only to a particular qua.li ty. " 'To Exist' , 
in the case of man , is not just •to be ', it means the special 
quality of living' and acting as a man in the self-consciousness 
2 
of one's eternal destiny" This quality "influenc · s his whole 
attitude to life; not only his thought, but also his decisions, 
his actions, and his immortality. It covers the whole dogma 
of the human soul."3 
Since man is an intermediary being between the eternal 
life in the Idea, or God, and the state of non-existence, SK 
felt that this i termediary term 'existence ' fitted him well--
signifying imperfection in comparison with God and perfection 
l. ·Croxall, KS, 63. 
2. Martin , KMD, ~5. 
3 . . Croxall, KS, 5g. 
in reference to not existing at all .l 
The concept of existence, like the Heraolitean flux, is 
difficult to deal with; any attempt to isolate it or to rasp 
it by thought abrogates it. Like the desert mirage whioh~~is-
appears when one get~ to it, or the omorrow that never quit 
comes, existence may s em to be properly ref rred to as some-
thing which cannot be thought. "But the difficulty persists, 
in that exist nee itself comb ir es thinking with existing , in 
so far as the thinker 
.. 2 
xists ." 
r 
K is trying o solve the persist nt philoso~hical prob-
lem of the •one• and he 'many' d the attempt ~11 succeed 
12 
in.so far as •existence' succeeds. By properly existing the 
many , may b related to the one through the religious cone pt 
of 'salvation' . It is a synthesis of the i1fi ite · d the 
finite, ad the existi g individual must b both .3 The ideals 
of th true , the good , a d the b autiful are equally essent-
ial to the human existence , and are unifi d in existence rath-
er than thought . Deplorin~ the pantheistic sublimat ion of the 
individual into the many, SK insisted that the one, if at all, 
was wholly other. 
inoe all human bei gs participate o some degree in ex-
istence, it is often disregard d, or treated as an unimport-
ant commonplace. But , says SK, existence will be he all im-
portant thing for each man some day. It will have a ma~nified 
! 
1 . SK , CUP, 293 . 
2. K, CUP, 274-. 
3. SK, CUP, 350 .• 
import, like the haart at the time of a coronary thrombosis. 
Everythii g will depend on the quality of existence that one 
chooses. Existing, then, must be ranked as the only real 
accomplishment and the true goal of life. 
But, really to eXist, so as to i terpenetrate one's 
existence with consciousness, at one and the same 
time eternal and as if far removed from existence, 
and yet also present in existenc and in the process 
of becoming: that is truly diffioult.l 
The process of existence must not be construed as a 
.. 
13 
philosophical system, .however, and must never be . systematized. 
Reality may be a system for God an~ have the fruits of the 
. 
logician's highest expectation in its couclusive . finality, 
.:.."'--
but existence must always be regarded as becoming, and emerg-
ing, and, hence, the precise opposite of final1ty .2 To think 
• 
existence sub specie aeternitatis may be a divi e prerogative 
but it is a ridiculous attempt for an existing individual. 
One who proclaims success in abrogating the law of co~tra­
diction, but who employs it in the process of abrogation, 
is no less silly than the systematic philosopher who views 
existence (which is essentially movement) from an ~ternal 
perch from which movement is inconceivable. 
The method of adva.n.ce in determL ing t he existential re-
lations and their characteristics is always w.lth the preeup-
poe~~n of the existing ildividual in mind . To ask a living 
man if he exists is nonsense; for existence itself is superior 
t~ any demonstration of it and it is stupid , in any case, to 
1. SK, CUP, 273. 
2. SK, CUP, 107. 
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ask for proof. Rather, the inference from essence to exist-
ence is a leap.1 
Thus I always reason from existence, not to ard ex-
istence, whether I move in the sphere of palpable 
sensible fact or in the realm of thought I do not 
for example prove that a stone exists, but that some 
existing thi g is a stone. The proc dure in a court 
of justice does not prove that a criminal en sts, 
but that the accused, M1ose existence is given, is a 
criminal. hether we call existence an accessorium 
or the eternal prius, it is never subject to demon-
stratio .2 
llt 
Thus one sees that·· SK has not brought for h _a new insight 
i to philosophy. He merely brought all his efforts to bear up-
on'what Plato disregarded in ocra es--the d lphic epigram. 
It blossoms with a full impact in SK and becomes 'choose thy-
self' as an existing individual. The traditioral explanations 
of the confronting object which have produced the epistemo-
logical and metaphysical mazes will have little or no signif-
ioanc for the existing individual. 
From he standpoint of reason, it ( h object) is 
paradox and absurdity, this object is not a concept 
as the idealists thi k, ot a thi g, as the pantheists 
and materialists believe; but a Person and a ubject, 
omeone, a Thee ••• this i finite Subject, no doubt, is 
the Transcendental. But the gulf which consequently 
interpose~ itself between Him d me can be closed by 
love. Existentialism, he , is indeed a realism, but 
a realism of Love.3 
lt. The Successors of SK. 
The foregoi g co sideratiols are the factors in the con-
oep~ of Existenz for SK. From this coLcept comes the plethora 
1. SK, CUP, 3S, n. 
2. 'SK, PF, 31. 
3. Jolivet, ITK, 106. 
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of philosophers az d ·their ideas which constitute the school 
of philosophy known as contemporary existentialism. The exact 
extent of the impact of SK upon this modern group is difficult 
to determine and much debated. hat he is a basic source ie 
generally admitted, 
SK and his unique doctrine of Existenz>under the circum-
eta.nc'es in which it arose, would seem destined to be 'little 
noted nor long remembered'. It was i4 radical opposition to 
the popular philosophical and theological views o~ the day . 
I ' 
The_relative obscurity of the Danish language was also a large 
factor i1 the limited spread of his views. Howevet, his cry 
of !anguish' was not unheeded. Almost a century later dead 
orthodoxy and naturalistic liberalism in religious circles, 
• 
along with the general upheaval of two major international 
wars , have set the scene in which his writings are receiving 
notable interest d popularity. His motiv s are clearly pre-
sented by a host of thinkers on the contemporary scene, though 
the language is of a more technical nature. In addition, much 
of the religious content is emptied from his concepts. 
Though only about 60 co~ies of the book (Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript) wer sold during Kierkegaar~ s 
lifetime, he was bold to predict for it an extraord-
inary future; the sigqs are gathering that this pre-
diction will oome to pass, and the abandonment by 
present-day German theologians generally of the trad-
itional reliance upon idealism as a basis for ~heo­
logy, in order to explore the possibilities of the 
'existential dialectic' of the Postscript , together 
with the influence of these ideas upon such philosoph-
ers as Jaspers and Heidegger , not to speak of ma,uy 
others, constitutes a beginning of fulfillme t for 
Kierkegaard ' s expectation .l 
There have been many tangents proceeding from SK ' s 
basic thoughts and this has led some to believe that he has 
no connection with contemporary existentialism . He was, of 
course, primarily a theologian and his 'e·xistence ' was com-
Pl.etely garbed in rel i gious concepts: . It is undeniable, how-
everj that the spirit of SKis the leading spirit of the move-
ment Rnd many feel that he is more than an 'adopted father'. 
This philosophical per pective is crystallized in , a stream of 
-
writing which has been published in~ermittently since the time 
of SK and es~ecially in the first half of the tw~ntieth cen-
tuz:y . 
In very general terms, this stream might be described 
as a reaction of the philosophy of man against the 
excesses of the philosophy of ideas and the philosophy 
of things. For it, the fundamental problem of philo-
sophy is not so much existence in the widest sm se 
as the existence of man .2 
5. Elements of Existentialism. 
SK .used the term •existential dialectic ' to refer to the 
strife in the life of the awakened human being. For this rea-
son the general philosophical viewpoint that grew out of this 
perspective is called, for weal or for woe, 'existentialism' . 
This neologism is derived from the substantive •exist-
ence' from which has recently been derived the ad-jective •existential', to which has been added the 
suffix ' ism '. This suffix, in ge eral, indicates a 
recognition of a certain primacy • • • Existentialism, 
then, is prese ted as a theory that affirms the prim-
l . ·Swenson, rt., (1936), xxv. 
2 . Meunier, ~ &P, 2. 
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acy, or prio~ity, of existence. But in relation to 
what is this priority affirmed? In relation o ess-
ence.l 
To define existentialism as a philosophical concept 
would be a co tradiction in terms. In SK's figure, it would 
, _ 
be like get·ting disciples to promote the doctrine that one 
ought ot to have disciples. Its esse ce is that it has no 
essence. Thus it is obvious that an explanation of existent-
ialism is no easy task. But the concept may be intelligible 
even if it is not full~ definable or completely a~ticulated. 
"Hence we must assume that existence is understood by virtue 
of a trans-rational act, an 'encounter' ."2 
For him (SK) the word •existence' denotes chiefly 
that mode of being which is characteristic of man, 
or, even more narrowly, that passionately intensified 
form of human life which makes "the mind susc ptible 
to experiencing a crisis, and3through crisis, exist-ence (or Transcendent Bing). 
ith this general perspective in mind, one may observe a few 
factors which are common to all the different forms of the 
philosophy of existence. 
i. Priority over Essence. 
All exist ntialists, of course, hold to the primacy of 
existence. This is popularly presented as the definition of 
t e ~ovement itself: 'the philosophy which holds that exist-
ei:J:cfe-fs prior to essence.' This is not unique to existential-
ism although it is the central thesis of the movement. Many 
1. Foulqui , Exi, 8. 
2. ~uhn, Art., 407. 
3. Kuhn, Art., 409. 
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philosophers have held this view in one manner or another . 
Thomistic philosophy in its epistemological quest would fol-
low this pattern though it s eems hardly fitting to call the 
angelic doctor an existentialist~ (However, Maritain and~il­
son do just that~. Others use this premise as a methodolog-
ical approach to a metaphysical inquiry, while the more con-
sistent existentialists, like Sartre, say this and mean it in 
the full ontological se~se . The primacy of existence over 
essence is then seen to be a common aspect of exi'stentialism 
bu~ not exclusive to it. 
ii. A Prerogative of Man. 
In existentialism as a theory, one sees that nno valid 
philosophic question can be asked and answered unles~ both 
' 
the question and answer take into account the concrete exist-
ence of the queationer.n1 For the existentialist 
Existence is not a state, but an act , the actual tran-
sition from possibility into reality; as the etymology 
of the word indicates, to exist is to take leave of 
what one is in order to establish oneself on the level 
of that which formerly was only possible ••• it is not 
sufficient to pass from one stat to another in order 
to exist •• • the modifications of matter are implicit in 
their causes, and in physical phenomena there is not 
that newness. of arriving that constitutes becoming . 
True becoming and true existence presupposes liberty . 
It follows that existence is the ~rerogative of man .2 
Thus man may , in a sense, choose his essence . The great 
majority of men are content to dwell in the •aesthetic ' s ·tage 
of life, however, and attempt to resist the inexorable fact 
1. Reinhardt, TER, 17 . 
2. Foulquie, Exi, 4'-50 
that as men they must exist . That is to say, they must make 
make decisions freely ~d responsibly which will determine 
their very being. 
iii . Facta of Knowledge are Depe dent upon a Knowing Subjeot . 
Another basic viewpoint of this philosophy is that there 
is no knowledge independent of a knowing subject . There is no 
system of tightly fitt d cognitive connections which are ly-
ing in wait for some .in~elleotual philosopher to discover and 
to flaunt before the worl~. Whatever the proper v.iew of log-
; 
ioStl inquiry, it is surely not this or ssly real.istio view. 
T~e scientific method endeavors to reduce the h~ element 
of ·contribution in investigation as near to nil as possible, 
but the proper existential view is to reduce to zero anything 
. 
that is foreign to the human contribution . Thinking is only 
valid in so far as it is ' inward', subjective , self-conscious 
thought . Any attempts at vain abstraction hich is apart from, 
and not affected by, man s a striving, roping being who mu~ 
make temporal decisions with infinite passion (for, at least 
in SK's view, they have eternal significance) are impossible 
follies . An objective order d a subjective human being are 
two mutually contradictory spheres between which mediation 
through logical thought is impossible. The ensuing frustration 
may be co~soled by inwardness whereas further frustration will 
resu~t from all attempts of Aufh ben. 
iv: A Human Category. 
Exist nee is a purely human category. There is a loose 
19 
( 
20 
use of the term by which one refers to stones, doorknobs , and 
a,ther i terns of ·the phenomenal realm, but authentic existence 
can only be realized in and by the solitary individual. As 
SK often said, "The crowd is the lie, the individual is my" 
categoryt"1and Sartre emphatically and ironically exclaims 
that hell is other people •2 The existence of others· is a real 
problem for the existentialists, for interpersonal communi-
cation presents .great difficulties when must go inward in the 
quest for truth. Not only ~ must existence be recognized as 
distinct from, and infinitely far from, an objeot~ve order, 
..;..# ... 
but neither can it be based upo the knowledge arid relation-
s~ip of other existents. 
Communi ca·tion has c:ons istently been one of the major 
problems in t he philosophies of .existence . Indirect 
in Kierkegaard, direct and striving in Jaspers, div-
ided into 'authentic' and 'inauthentic ' in Heidegger, 
••• clumsy and failing in Sartre, co~munication is al-
ways there at least as a. problem~ 
Therefor , a. philosophy of existence must proceed upon the 
basis of a solitary individual a.s the sole category of refer-
ence, 
v. Human Finitude, 
Human finitude and the imminence of death are also com-
mon emphases of existentialism. The ominousness of non-exist-
ence, the certainty of its arrival, and the helplessness ei-
ther to understand it or to prevent it make existence a diffi-
·' 
l. •SK, LW, 4-18. 
2. Sartre, 
3. Ruggiero, E~i, 19. 
cult thing for whioh to struggle. upon these bases, however, 
the search for a possible metaphysical ground must be con-
ducted. 
vi. Anguish. 
Another general characteristic of existentialism is the 
significance of anguish. This is th vague combination of 
fear, dread, and guilt which driv s the existin individual 
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to decision. He _must make choices (the delphic epigram be-
come~--'Choose Thyself') which will d termine hi~: whole future 
and he knows not what or hov1 to choose. If he hes1 tates and 
.;,. · .. 
r sists a choice, the anguish of ennui, melancholy, and des-
pa!r pushes him alo g. Ruggiero's observation may illumine 
this' fact. 
Because it is not a ge eric expression of the spirit-
ual crisis through whioh e are passin but a nihil-
istic solution of the crisis itself, we ca~not help 
noting amo g its promoters a sad sense of torment and 
a.nguish.l 
This anguish seems to be rooted in the fundament al ir-
rationality of external reality. Man cannot explain himself. 
Existence is the irreducible, and it is its own verification. 
In addition, the existentialist has no norms of life and de-
cision upon which he may rest, for h must make his own. 
6. Recapitulation. 
These foregoing characteristics of the philosophy of ex-
istence may not be exhaustive of the com~o factors of the 
l. Ruggiero, Exi, 19. 
movement and, on the other hand, one or more of them may be 
felt to be excluded from so~ of the existential writings. 
However, they seem to mais a common core for the leaders· of 
the contemporary existeutial spirit and ~he ones Who pre~ded 
and influenced them. 
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Existentialism is a philosophy of man. The phenomenolog-
ical 'analysis of man's experience is its method with a contin-
ual heed paid to the ego-centric predicament. That which is 
incidental and accidental _in many esseutialistic ~hilosophies 
, 
is .central in the existential view. · The reaction of SK has 
d~vel~ped into an amorphous yet influe.tial schoo~. 
Existentialism bases its whole structure upon man's free-
dom· and his subsequent responsibility for h~ d stiny. It may 
• 
be framed in either a theistic or an atheistic setting. Man's 
bas1o decisions color and determins his •existence •. Exist-
entialism is a protest rather than a carefully constructed 
philosophical system. It is a protest against abstract and 
impersonal thcught as well as minor subjective factors vhile 
it exalts personality and emphasizes man's in er lff • "Philo-
sophically, existentialism is nearer to personalism than to 
any other system; but it lacks the coherence, the inclusive-
ness, and the structure requisite to a system."1 SK, however, 
gloried in this deficie oy, for he believed that system and 
finality were synonymous. 
Existentialism is the theory that reality must be inter-
1. Brightman, ITP, 315. 
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preted in terms of human experienceq For it significant 
human experience is revealed in the emphasis upon t hese psy-
chologi cal moods that motivate man 1 s dec i s ions in this inter-
~ 
pretation . The disser tation will comprise an at t emp t to 
analyze these underlying factors in the ' existence ' of man in 
the .theories of SK and Heidegger . 
Out of Kierke gaard 's rather crJ~tic philosophy of reli-
gion emerges a .group of premises which characterizes the 
philosophies of existen ce. This group comprise~· the priori ty 
of exist ence over essence , existence as a prero~ative of man , 
:.. ~ .. 
cogniti ve facts as de p en dent upon a subj e ct, existen ce as 
. 
~ human category , human finitude, and finally , an aweful 
' em~tional s i tuation which conditions any existen tial act . 
Thls lat ter factor is e sp ecially pertin en t to the disserta -
tion in so far as it is clarified an d articulated as the 
state of dread . 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EXI STING INDIVIDUAL 
1. SK the Mano 
s8ren Aabye Kierkegaard was born on May 5 1 1813 in 
Copenhagen, Denmark, where he spent the greater part of his 
life· and where he died in 1855. He is the best known and 
most influential -lit.era_ry and philosophical fi gure that thie 
country has produced. He cons i dered himself a 'genius in a 
, 
market town' but most of the towns-people consid~red him one 
Qf the eccentricities of the day. In his short :.·life SK wrote 
some twenty-nine books of varying size, style, and worth. He 
felt that his mission was to make it difficult to be a 
• 
Christian. SK was ra i sed in an evan gelical Christian environ~ 
ment which was influenced by the Moravian Pietists and he re-
acted violently to both the 'dead orthodoxy' of the state 
church, and its uncritical acceptance of •Hegelian systemati 
zation'. 
Any biographical attempt is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation and is rather unnecessary in the light of the 
extensive biographical material that has been published on 
SK in the last two decades. Walter Lowrie, who has most ex-
tensively translated SK's writings into English, has prepared 
two excellent works on SK: Kierkegaard (1938), and A Short 
Li~e of Kierkegaard (1946), which are more than adequate for 
biographical information. In order to gain a better under" 
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standing of SK 1 s who l e relationship to the concep t of the dread , 
howev er , it is appropr iate to mention t he four c riti cal i n ci -
dents in SK 1 s life . These seem to be t he de t erminan ts of his 
l ife and t hey i nf luen ced both dire ctly and indirectly tne bu lk 
of his wri ting . Dread, for Kierke gaard, was no t only a s g -
nifican t con c ept f o r his sys tem of thought , but also was an 
intense persona l dimension . 
i . A Confession o 
- ' 7 i,s i' onfession was one that fK ' s father made to"· him jus t 
, 
before he died a t which time they we r e reconc lep from a T.~re -
viou~ rift . This confession conf~rmed i n SK th~ me lan choly 
ttlat had cha racterized his father a ll through his l ife . This 
11 s:J.len t despai r ''l was due to an act done during his boyhood 
days in Jutland . SK wri tes of it in his Journals . 
How te rri Lle about t he man who once as a l ittl e boy , 
while herding t he flocks on the h~aths o~ Jutla~d , 
suffered greatly in hunger and in want , stood upon 
a hi l l and cursed God , and t he man was unable to 
for ge t it even when he was eight y - t wo years oldt2 
Shortly a ft er this act , fortune changed for SI'" 1 s fathe r , 
and he became a pr osper ous merchan t after moving to Couenhagen . 
He believed fortune to be a curse from r;od for his blasphemy and 
the ensuing me lan choly was tran sferred to SIC . SK, deeply in-
fluenced by the religious sensitivity of his f ather , belie ved 
t he curse was his portion in a ccordarce wi th a scrip t u ral in-
.. · 
junction3 and his l ife and its dec:l sions were carried out unde r 
1 . SK , JSK, 76 . 
2 . SK , JSK , 150 . 
3 . Exodus 20:5 "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon t he 
chi l dren ( AV) . 
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the pressure of an over-powering despair - "my melancholy •• ~ 
she is the most faithful mistress I have known, what wonder 
that I must be ready to follow her at any moment of the day. 1 
ii. A Broken Engagement. 
At the age of twenty-seven, SK became engaged to Regina 
Olsen, the daughter of a state councilor. But after a period 
t 
of deliberation and indecision, believing that the curse or 
melancholy forbade :him __ to marry, SK broke off the engagement., 
He wrote and thought muc~ about this incident i~' an attempt 
; 
to justify his actions. He believed that he st$.11 loved her 
and tel t relief only after she had married. SK:·~was extremely 
grateful to his father and Regina,for only through his exper" 
ieQces with them could he have accomplished so much. 
If I were asked how I was educated to be an author, 
my relation to God apart, I should answer: by an old 
man whom I thank most of all, and by a young girl to 
whom I owe most of all--and to that which must have 
existed as a possibility of my nature: a mixture of 
age and youth, of the severity of winter and the 
mildness of summer--; the one educated me with his 
noble wisdom, the other with her loving lack of 
understanding.2 
iii. Being Attacked. 
One of the great cr•ises of SK 1 s life was his affair with 
the Corsair, a weekly paper, which was lampooning most of the 
public figures of the day. M. Goldschmidt , an admirer of SK, 
was its editor and few were escaping its impertinent criticism. 
SK,• however, was praised while all his acquaintances suffered. 
He invited an attack by the Corsair , hoping to break the pub-
le SK, JSK, 90. 
2e SK, JSK, xi. 
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lication, but he suffered instead by the vigorous caricaturing 
that he received and he became the laughing-stock of Copen-
hagen. This hurt SK deeply and it made him a martyr in his 
own eyeso 
And so I do not complain, though it might seem a 
sad fate that I, who would have earned a large 
fortune in any other country, and have been con 
sidered a genius of the first rank with far-reach-
ing influence, that I , by having been born in a 
demoralized provincial town quite naturally became 
a sort qfvilla.ge idiot, notorious, insulted by 
every street urchin.l 
He hoped to receive forgiveness of _God through his martyrdom, 
consequently, so he sought to 'rejoice in tribution'. 
A:..·· 
iv. Attacking. 
The last great crisis in SK's life was also in reference 
to local Danish journals. Through two, The Fatherland and 
the Instant, SK made a bitter attack upon the established 
church of the stateo These articles are compiled 1n Attack 
on Chriatendom,and they show the concentrated energy by which 
SK spent the last nine months of his life. His violent essays 
repudiated the church as an institution full of hypocrisy in 
which there were no Christians. For him "'Christendom' is 
the betrayal of Christianity; a 'Christian world ' is ••• apos-
tasy from Christianity."2 
These four incidents are the historical events which 
ma~ perhaps give a better light by which to re gard SK'a phil-
osophy and primary psychological category of dread. To many 
1. SK, JSK, 301. 
2 . SK, AUC , 33. 
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these may be merely ~ncidents in a colorful life, but they 
molded the whole life and thought of the impressionable and 
oversensitive SK. 
2o SK's Anthropology. 
It is important to underst~nd SK'a anthropological perm 
spective. His view of man colors his entire philosphy,and 
it is necessary orientation ~or the study of the concept of 
dread. He accepted .-trichotomic theory of manlwhich is 
considered by many Chr stian theologians to be the scriptural 
,. 
te~c~ing concerning man.2 The view holds that man is composed 
of three parts: body, soul, and spirit (this is ~~lso believed 
to.be an extra~biblical development of Plato's tripartite 
soul). The body is the material aspect of the human individual 
• 
and the soul is the i~aterial part . Man shares these two 
parts with the animal world. The spirit is e divine spark 
which sets man apart from all other living beings. SK did 
not consider the spirit to be a third 'faculty', but rather 
the SJ711thesis of the body and the soul. Man is 11 a synthesis 
of soul and body; but he is at the same time a syn'thesis of 
the temporal and the eternal".3 Th~ spirit is the eternal 
dimension of man , the imago dei, which essentially differen-
tiates man from the &~imal kingdom. This is his divine di-
mensi on. "Kierkegaard accepts the fun dame 1. 'G ~ 1 assu.111ption 
1. SK, CD, 39. 
2. I Thess. 5:23. 
3o SK, CD, 76. 
that the human soul is rooted in God , designed to live in 
harmony with God , and that it has its highest and most com~ 
prehensi ve unity in God·. "1 
i. Body. 
Kierkegaard. gave little consideration to the human body 
in his writings . This material organism was significant as 
the vehicle of the soul . It is in an interactive relation 
with the soul . SK b"eli-eved the body and soul to be out of 
harmony , and this led to -acts of sin, or transgr~ssions of 
,. 
trre laws of God's revelation . The inordinate demands of the 
physiological organism induced the free, immateHal dimension 
o.f man to make improper choices . The body is not of great 
importance in SK' s thought, however, for the cause of these 
inordinate drives, and the solution of the problems arising 
from them, lies outside the body . 
ii. Soul. 
It is necessary to understand SK's orthodox Christian 
29 
herita ge in order to understand his view of man. His pre ... 
suppositions involved a s ubstantial soul which could survive 
a dying body ~nd could exist in a cripnled condition in heaven 
until the second advent of Christ. At this time the indivi-
dual is completely 'saved' by receiving a new body , a trans-
formed body, though, nevertheless, one with some sort of 
identity with the old one. 
t " 1. Thomte, KPR , 110 . 
The soul is the part of men which is closely correlated 
to the body and which gives the body a general dynamic teleo-
logical aim1 as a living organism. The soul is the seat of 
~-
the basic thought processes that are necessary for the survi-
val of the organism. These processes are both conscious and 
unconsciousv Up to this point SK's view of man would be 
' 
hardly disti.nguishable from the higher animals. Tho soul has 
a structural unity similar to the body. The body's structure 
·' 
is made up of material elements,while it is presumed that SK 
wo~ld offer some such factors as entelechies to account for 
the soul's basic structure. 
~te soul~~ is not particularly important in SK's 
' psyehological deliberations and has little of significance 
to do with the dynamics of mental activityv It receives its 
importance only in that it is the field of action of the 
third, and most important dimension of man ~ the spirit. 1 
iii.. Spirit .. 
Man is a multi-dimensional synthesis. A synthesis of 
body and soul, "of the infinite and finite, of the temporal 
and eternal, of freedom and necessity."2 The synthesizing 
factor is the spirit which is 'from above'. The spirit is 
the result of a divine act in the creation of man as a 
special creature which has the imago dei<» The spirlt is not 
properly considered as a structural entity to make a third 
lq For an exhaustive discussion of this 'soulish' dimensi.on 
of SK's view of man , the work of J~D. Copp should be 
consulted. · 
2, SK, SD , 17. 
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unity entailed in man. It is rather a synthesis of body and 
soul into a personal unity . 3pirit also synthes zes man's 
temporal existence with the eternal demand and need of his 
life . 
(1) Synthesis A. 
Body is the most obvious datum in regarding man . There 
is little need to defend this factor Materialistic biologists 
stop at this point and say that this is all that man is. SK 
repudiates this theory an€ in s ists that there is ··a lack in , 
defining and understanding man if he is considere;d only as a 
m terial1.stic entity . The soul is neces s ary to s 'ccount for 
m9:n as a dis crete or e;anl sm that s rad cally different from 
' thi~gs such as trees or stoves. The soul is the animating 
principle in man, mostly rationality , that defines him as a 
discrete entity in the world . This would distinguish him from 
the inanimate but not from animals . Man and the animals can 
do many similar things - - they can travel , play , and even 
decide which trail to walk upon . SK believes that there is 
an essential difference, however , and this 1s personality~ 
Man alone has moral obligation, the imperative 'ought ' 9 that 
molds his course of action in the production of significant 
decisions . This is to be explained by spirit . This spirit , 
in terms of conscience which comes from Godl , is the deter-
minantof this synthesis of body and soul which makes man more 
l o SK, JSK, 153~. 
than a mere animated organism. 
It is really the conscience which constitutes a 
personality . Personality is an individua l de -
cision , substanti~ted by being known to God in 
the possil;>ility of the consc ence ., For the con.-. 
sc ence may slumber , but the constitutive factor ~­
is its poss bility ••• Nor is the consciousness 
of the decision , self-consciousness , the con-
stitutive factor , in so far as that is merely 
the relation within which the dec sion is related 
to itself, whereas th~ co-knowledge of God is the 
determining factor , the confirmation . l 
Spirit is the hi gh~r functioning of the soul in self~ 
examination , self- conscio~sness, and self-transce.ndence 
Spi.ri t is "the power of man's under-standing over himself .•~2 
Spirit is the essence of man. 
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Spirit posits the antithetical disharmony of the soul 
ancr body , and thus makes man 1 s spirituality both an advantage 
• 
and a disadvantage ., It is advantageous because it enables 
him to relate himself to his creator , but a bane in that it 
reveals the conflict of body and soul , which abrogates the 
relation with the eternal. 
The spirit is essentially the factor whi_ch not only 
relates soul and body by synthesis , but also reveals "itself 
to its own self . u3 This self-conscious reflection is the 
unique ability of spirit o This God - given higher function of 
the soul serves as a third term or synthesis of the antithesis 
existing between material , determined body and immaterial , 
purp9sive soul . This self- reflection in thought is existen-
1 o SK, JSI: , 161 . 
2., SK, JSK, 429 . 
3 o SK, SD, 17 . 
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tial thinking. Only those creatures which can think self 
consciously can qualify as existing beings . 
SK accepts without argument that this self- relating 
spirit , or self , could not be self- cons t t·J.t~ng, and , as he 
sees it , the task of the spirit then becomes that off nding 
its own relation to the power ~hich constituted it . The need 
for this results from synthesis A, for rean as personalit be -
comes aware of ideals that are possj.b~lities of f_reedom~ This 
crea tea a problem, for he i P A11cumbered with a firH te body th.a t 
1...--:~ 
opera tes b ne ces sit p.Qt .. J'reedom 
:.•,. 
Synthesis A defines man as a "synthesis of the souli sh 
and the bodily . But a synthesis is unthinkable if the two 
. 
are not united in a third factor . This third factor is the 
spirit ~>"l The problem resulting from this th.ird factor re -
quires the second synthesis of sp~r t for resolution. 
( 2 ) S yn the s i s :E:, " 
SK gives a succinct statement of this synthesis . 
As for the latter synthes s, t evidently ls not 
fash oPed in the same v;ay as th.e former . In the 
former c~::tse tl...e two f actors were soul an body, 
and the soiri t was a th rd tE>:r•n , but was a th rc1 
term in such a sense that there could not pro erly 
be &"fly question of a s~rnthes _s until the spirit 
was posjted . The other synthesis has only two 
factors : the teruporal and the eternal . Vw"here s 
the tl: ... lr term? And f there is no thlrd term, 
there is really no synthesis ; for a synthes s of 
that which is a contrad iction cannot be completed 
as a synthesis without a third tern e2 
1 ." SK , C , 39 . 
2 . 2K , C , 76. 
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The two syntheses are conditioned by the problem of time 
and eternity. The great need is to find a m~ans of mediating 
time and eternity in man . The synthesis of body and soul 
causes the problem to arise and synthesis A presents the pos -
sibility of mediation in mana Synthesis B questions the 
actu~lity of th s mea ation .. However , in man's freedom which 
the spirit provides there seems to be a ground for apility 
to do this. Kierkegaa!d's problem is how that this may be 
.• 
accomplishedo His philos~ophy attempts to show t . at this is 
. 
accomplished by the existential 1 mor11.ent 1 , or the . 'instant' , 
which is "an atom of eternity . "l This is the experi-=:l!1Cing of 
eternity in time and ~ay be effected through a decisive act 
of will to passionate inwardness. The meaning and significance 
of this 'leap' vnll become clear in the progress of the 
di a serta ti on. 
The f1mctioning of spirit in the two syntheses is an 
ambiguous -~ tension of dividing , relating the two factors of 
each synthesis and SK developed his psychology from the 
perspective of this constant dialectic. 
6. The Philosopher. 
In Chapter Two , SK's place as the historical forerunner 
of the existential movement was briefly treated. A further 
d~yelopment is in order. To know the motivation of man , we 
_! 
must first know something of his actions and decisions • 
• 
1. SK, CD, 79~ 
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Here SK ' s philosophical category will be revealed in some 
detail for a two- fold purpose: (1) to explain SK's philoso-
phical first premise--the existing individual , and (2) to 
develop some of the aspects of human activity for which dread 
must serve as a matrix . 
i . The Existing Individual . 
If the existent individual is to attain the subjective 
truth which SK claims is reality , he must make the proper 
perspectival approach to it . To do this it is n~cessary to 
r 
understand SK' s doctrir.o 0f the lndi vidual and '.r ;eal subject-
i vity ' o Croxall senses its importance as the t~ue category 
of ·existential structure in the Kierkegaard Studies . 
'~egatively , K' s cry against the tyranny both of newspapers 
and the ballot- boxes is; 'The crowd is the lie1 1 Positively, 
•• he preached his great doctrine of the Existing Individual.l 
Contrary to popular belief , valid data are not possible 
from any other category. The objective thinker must settle 
for sense perceptions with their ineradicable errors , his-
torical facts which at best can only lay claim to approxi -
mation and relative probability, or speculative results 
which are only certified sub specie aeternitatiso This re-
sults in the hopeless skepticism of the Sophists , SK believed , 
and he wanted to avoid this if it were at all possible. He 
saw the 'systematizers' gain the world-soul but lose their 
1." Croxall, KS , 66 . 
own souls. "The individual is my cate gory"l,said SK, and he 
sought to attain a knowledge with un deniable certitude from 
the investigation of this existent tndividual. Much of ~te's 
~-
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thought was developed from Socrates and the dialectical method 
that he used . urn the Socratic view each individual is h1iS 
own center, and the entire world centers in him, because his 
self-knowledge is a knowledge of God."2 With SK there seemed 
to be only two p.ossi1:5le ·· sources for obtaining knowledge--
.• 
externally and internally~ The former was, at i~s apex , re -
ple-te w1 th opinions and unsubstantiated speculat-ion and this 
left 0nly the internal source. Some might feel this to be a 
barren field for reaping. SK, however , would remind one that 
glearlinga are at least superior to erripty granaries and , fur -
ther, that an inward look into the individual who exists will 
reveal abundant fruit for he is fearfully and wonderfully made. 
1Ie is not pleading for subjective arbi trarlnes~ in the realm 
of knowledge , but just the opposite, for knowledge can only 
c be safeguarded by a qualitative dialetic of inwardness and 
"' 
not the quantitative dialectic of objective reference . 3 
This doctrine is important not merely for epistemologi -
cal reasons, however . SK felt that it was necessary 
boldly to oppose an immoral confusion which, philo~ 
sophically , and socially , would demoralize the in-
dividual with the help of 'mankind' or a fantastic 
idea of society ; a confusion which wills to teach 
1 o , SK, SLW , 418; cf . '?OV , 105 ff . 
2 . SK, PF , 7o 
3 . SK, CUP , 463 . 
an ungodly contempt for what is the first condi -
tion of all religiousness , namely , to be a single 
indi vidud'l man . 1 
37 
This category must be used in any philos ophical consid-
eration and then only so long as it conforms with the charac-
teristics of an existence which is always becoming. The meta 
physical sense cannot be applied , therefore, for by his very 
nature no man exists metaphysically "2 "There, then, in this 
doctrine of the tndi~id~al , we have the axis • •• on which 
Kierkegaard's existentla~ philosophy turns within its own 
, 
religious orbit . "3 Personal experience, SK instated, is the 
only datum for philosophical inquiry. 
lie Existing Thought . 
. ... ,. 
The knowing spirit is an indi vidual existing spirit for 
SK and every human being is such an entityo The continual 
forgetting of this maxim is responsible for the confusion of 
philosophical thought which SK evaluated the history of 
philosophy to be.4 One's mode of thought is an important 
aspect in interpreting reality , and one must be well aware 
of the pitfalls if he is to arrive at truth. 
Abstract thinking was not without importance for SK. 
But it had validity just so long as the question of existence 
was not raised . ~~ere existence was concerned, SK con8idered 
abstract thought a pitiful procedure, thought without a thinker, 
1. SK, POV, 128 ., 
2., SK, CUP, 110 . 
3 . Croxall, KS, 70. 
4 . SK, CUP, 169. 
and as futile as the killing of a guinea pig in order to dis 
cover the basis for its lifeo To give credence to abstract 
thought in this realm of discourse is just as absurd as de~ 
nying the vall ity of thought in general would be--like trying 
to keep the 86th story of the Empire State Building intact 
whil~ completely r~ing the first 85 stories. 
The difficulty that inheres in existence, with 
which the existing individual is confronted, is 
one that never_really comes to expression in the 
language of abstr~ct thought much less r~ceives 
an explanation. Because abstract thought is 
sub specie aeterni it ignor'es the concret,e and 
and the temporal, the existential procesa, the 
predicament of the existing individual a~ising 
from its being a synthesis of the temporal and 
the eternal situated in existence.l 
Thu~, when the individual attempts to think of any definite 
thing "it is just what abstract thought abstracts from"2 and 
as an objective existent it slips irretrievable from him just 
like a ship passing by in the night. One cannot gain truth 
sub specie aeternitatis when he is unable to elude the fetters 
of his sub specie temporalis condition. This fact, which 
caused him to react so violently to Hegel and the rest of 
the 'systematizers ', undergirded SK and furnished the antithes-
is for his entire dialectical journey. 
The so-called 'pure thought' falls under the same con~ 
demnation as abstract thought and is nothing more than the 
... 
latter in exhaustive conclusion. This Hegelian concept fails 
to' explain its relation to a thinking subject and ignores the 
lo SK, CUP, 26~. 
2. SK, CUP, 267. 
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ethical activity , and thus contradicts existence . l SK often 
uses the ironic illustration of the objective thinker who 
builds a beautiful palace with his abstract philosophy and 
then must live in a hovel beside ito "Spiritually tmderstood , 
a man's thought must be the building in which he lives--or 
all is mad . 11 2 SK had li-ttle patience with those who, like 
Spinoza with his difficulty with the finite modes, can beau-
tifully explain everything but themselves. Th .re can be n o 
~ x:!.sting remain er to a system of p .tre thought--'jlot e ven 
s uc'h a. llt t l -::!l" n ikln a.s the ex istjng H r r 'P:r>of e, ~or who writes 
tne system. "3 One who attempts to back out. of this predica~ 
. 
ment and admit at the end of the trail tha t the conclusion is 
' lacking makes hlmself ridiculous for 11if the conclusion is 
lacking at the end, it also is lacking in the beginning, and 
this should, therefore have been .said in the beginning . tt4 
Because objective thought in its abstract, pure, and 
speculative modes is indifferent to its only possible basis 
for validity- -the existent, thinking individual, SK posits 
a subjective mode of thought which will afford an essential 
expression for thought and will produce knowledge which is 
compatlble w1 th the truth of existence . 
While objective thought is indifferent to the think-
ing subject and his existence, the subjective thinker 
is as an existing tndividual essentially interested 
in his own thinking, existing as he does in thought . 
l . , SK, CUP, 275. 
2o SK, JSK, 583. 
3. SK, CUP, 111. 
4 . SK, CUP, 16. 
His thinking has therefore a different type of re~ 
flection, namely the reflection of inwardness, at 
possession by virtue of which it belongs to the 
thinking subject and to no one else.l 
Existential reality can come only through the effor~~ 
4-0 
of existential th1nking2 and "the only thing-in-itself which 
cannot be thought is exlstence, and this does not come within 
the province of thought to think."3 
iii. Truth. 
Consequently, the·truth and its attainment, . .as far as 
, 
an individual is concerned, will be a course of action and 
n,ot the eternal treasure of an ideal kingdom. ~~~he objective 
accent falls on What is said, the subjective accent on How 
it is said."4 Truth may be the correspondence of a proposit~on 
or a percept to objective reality from a divine, eternal, 
theocentric standpoint; and the paradox may find no place to 
lay its head in such a world. Yet an existing individual has 
no talent by which he may consider such a state of affairs. 
To have apprehended eternal truth is to have abrogated one's 
self, and fate smiles at such folly , for the very ~esisting 
of the existential situation is but another moment of exis~ 
tence. SK defines truth: "an objective uncertainty held fast 
l. SK, CUP, 67. 
2. ''Existential thinking is any process o:: thinking which 
manages to have enough presence of mind to think always 
of the self as subject in vital relation to whatever 
··· ,happens to be the object of thought." Ramsey , Art., 160. 
34 SK, CUP, 292. 
4: SK, CUP, 181-
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in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness 
is the truth9 the hi ghest truth attainable for an existing 
individual'' .l This objective tmcertainty is the paradoxical 
~ -
reality of the eternal existing in time . Vfuat a man needs is 
an explanation just how to view this situation in its time 
dete~mination when he himself is a temporal existent. This , 
"even the worshipful Herr.Professor concedes 1 if not always , 
at least once a -quarter ·· when he draws his salary. n2 
·' 
SK ev~n goes so far as to state positively that ~ternal 
essential truth is not in itself a paradox , but only so in 
temporal. relations o3 The truth , then , for an e.x:..lstent indi ... 
vidual will not have the pugnacious problem that beset 
' Soct·a tes - "For what a man knows he cannot seek since he knows 
it , and what he does not know he cannot seek , since he does 
not even know for what to seektt4 but rather will truth be 
precisely the mode of apprehension of the truth ad prehenrlere 
with its attendant states of dread, distrust , sus picion , and 
anxiety . nThere is no truth for th€'! indi~ridual except in so 
far as he creates it himself in his actions.••5 Many will be 
discontented with such a half- way house in wh ich to refresh 
Q 
o~self on the neve r -endin g jou ~ney of life, but SK could only 
retort t ha t his li ght , succulent lunch can satjsfy beyond 
the con tents of Hegel's empty cupboard and that to go unerring-
ly ih t he lj ght of the moon i s far superior to standing blind 
1 . SK, CUP, 182. 
2. SK, CUP , 172. 
3. SK, CUP, 184. 
4. SK, PF, 5., 
5. Martin , fu~, 97. 
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At this oint the problem of certainty in knowledge ma 
be raised . SKis no t con cemed with a positive body of cer-
,a 1.n kn.o·Nledge , for he f elt tha t tt.is would b e a bl1:1sphenous 
atten~ t to ~ ose as God and to usurp His power . T ega ti ve cer· -
tain ty o:' his -· r1abi 1· t y and i .:;n. ora:-l ce ~ la 2o cra te u ~ . s a ll 
thA.t a man can ho~e fo r and o.ll that he neecis . There are those 
who mny scorn such a se emi ng lc:..ck but the ca se is j us t 
as i f a polythei st were to speak with scorn of t he 
nega ti vi ty of monotheism; for the poly theist has 
many gods, t he monothe s t only o_ e. . So our ph los o-
nhers have m~my thoughts , al l VA lid to a certain 
~xtent ; Socrates had only one , whic~ was abs olute . l 
The r~egative s -wmrd at the 'rhe r·mo~'ylae of n on - contrac ction. 
perlle.ps will .r1eke 1110re pro ,c;;r ess than the zealous onslau ght 
of experlence and idealism with tbe r battle eries of potiti. -
vity . ''l\egative tl1inkeJ'S have one adv£,ntage , i n that they 
have something pos :ttive , bein g aware of the negative element. 
in existence ; the positive have nothing at all, s j_ n ce they 
are de ce :i. ved . " 2 
'l'he aspect of becoming i s wha t rne.ke s the eter·na l "'o 
e l usive and a l so makes its recept ion pa radoxical i n existence . 
I t is a hard s ayir~g , but the only one t ha t can p os s i..bly give 
one true knowl edge . The inherent redup l ication of though t 
,.. 
in exlsten ce, whe reby the subj e ct is always v~tually aware of 
hi s r elation to the object, is the essen ce of exi sten t _al 
1 . S:ff,-?F , 6 , n . 
2 . SK, CUP , 75 . 
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thinkine .. That knowler1Ge must be doubly reflected lr>. cornmun,... 
icati on is thus not surprising and this necessary i n 'irectness 
is easi l y seen in reference to God but often overlooked between 
men . Dir e ct cormmmica tl on obliterates both communican ts in 
its attempt at obj e ctivity and r evoke s their ve ry existence .. 
This presupposes certainty which is impocsible for one who 
is i n the process of becoming . It Is as though a :!nan wanted 
to relate the con victlon that the God ... relationshin of an 
indivi dual is a secret .. l The thou~hts of an existing in0i-
vidual are the constant repro c3 uct ions of existent sltuatlons 
and are trar: s l ated in to action and h en ce cormmmica ted~·- ' by 
their works ye shall kn ow them '. 
Since true thinkin g must conform to the struc t ure of 
existence, it follovvs that thought and being are lden tica l 
l n the existential sense - - that is, both are in a process of 
becomil""!.g . The trs.di tional pbilos ophical identif ::.. cation has 
r e feren ce to 1 pure thought' anc'l static being , and has "noth i ng , 
nothing to d o with exi sten ce."2 It is nonsense to posit being 
higher than thought when thought is the t ool fo r Ruch a 
position , but one must remember the existex. t i a l situation l es t 
he be mere ly comical . 
The problem of reality and the knowle dge of :. t , is grea t 
for the exit- t.ential thinker . It hRs none of the surerflcia l ·_ ty 
of the abs tra ct th:i.D {er , but also none of the p i t.falls . Ab ... 
stractlon d~mand s an i n difference in the subj e ct which preven ts 
1 . SK, CUP, 72 . 
2 . sx: , cnr, 284 . 
the accession of knowlec1.ge f or th s p oor human who cannot bnt 
ex i s t , while the s·b j a ct.i v8 thinker musters t~e ~reatest pos -
s.i.ble passlon in h i s t~hought that g.:.ves him a f -t shting cha .ce 
Et)r _mo·;Jlerlge. "True knowledge con s :l. s t-:1 i -c -;_;r '3. '1Sla ting the 
re$'l l into the p ossi'o le" , l r.nd sure 11 r"3ality is an interesse 
tetwee the moments of tha t hypothetical un i ty of thought 
Bnc1 bFJing which abstra c t thoue;ht presuppose..: , tt2 The objec t i ve 
thi nkers are in a state much l i ke the hungr tramp who , if 
he hFd some ham , would have s ome ham a11.d eggs, if he had some 
eggs . 
SK ·as n o t unav:nre tlla. t t hese foregoing c onside rations 
on ly f'II)I,ea rec1. to solve the problem o. t hand . Though the fur-
niah a str·aw for the 1•ovrn ng man ttthe persi s t en t d _f:i. c u lt 
refuses t o 1•eso lv e inasmuch !:3.S all t h ou.zht is eternal . "':! Th ~s , 
the on l y rnode of tho· ght vii t h ref renee to rea l ty , 1:1n ·he 
only l1op~ f'ot' .n l)wleclge and tr 1.!"th , becomes trH=.: narndox, for , 
as prev :ou31· ~ quoted , rr ex l~l teP c0 it se lf comb qes t':-llnk • nt; 7¥i t"h 
exisL.ng , ln so fc.li' t~~. the thiclker exists . n4 Subjec ti\re 
thinkl-cg wi ll vindica te itself , howeverj &s it "'Jro cec s to-
ward the ln vctrd ·ca l wh ch hct~ in f i n itA n eres t i the self 
an( enters E.:x i s tenz . The :tnten -· 1 t of t h :l. s inw&ro f6c ling 
wi ll dete r ml ne the 1-'!e gree of one 1 s e:xis tence . Thought and 
existence g o hand in hand , even as Spinoza's two stated f i nite 
moCles, and tQ turn one up on the other l n abstr·act th n k ing is 
1 . uK , CUP , 280 . 
~ . SK , CU , 279 . 
3 . SK, CUP , 274 . 
4 . SK, CUP , 2?4 . 
to r6dt1.c e t l1e ind i vi d us 1 t o ext nc tio"l . Only t he ~ers i s t en t 
e xe r c i se of this inward feeling c Hn save t h e day. Only sub -
j ectlvi t y is r ea l and on l y thi ._ pa s s ion is r ea l s1..fb j ect i v i ty 
iv ,. Inwarcne s s .. 
Along w:t t h the fot•eg oing t h es i s t hat trut h 1s i n SlJb j e c-
t i vity , we mus t a dd t b e fact " t ha t tr · e ex istence s a c h i eve d 
by intens i t y of fe e lin e; . " 1 The i nward 'how' of the s ub j ect i ve 
i s the inf i ni t e r- s s ion t o exist a!1ci this pa s s i on is the 
tnJth. . r.rhi s pas s i on i s pre c se l y the subjective an thu.<> :: · b -
j ect i v i ty i s cle rly seen t o be the truth. Thi s is no t any 
rand om emotion al sta te. It is a si en ificant end i ntens e act 
o f f r ee ch oice proceeding f r om a part :!.c~:tlar mode of thought. 
In abstract thin kin g a s we ll as in pure thought, which 
is the f r uit of exhaus tive abstraction, there is a disint~r ... 
e st·ednes s a t t endant that detracts from the subjectivity of 
the situation and robs lt of its existence. On the oth er 
hand , e xis tential thinking has a supreme interest i n the 
con t emplating self and saves itself from absurdity . One has 
n ever exis ted qua human being untll he has willed s ensu 
emin en ti, which is not from the s tandpoint of exploitation 
b ut rather of inwardness, having "ventured to take the deci -
sive step in t he utmost intensity of s ub j e ctive passicn and 
with full consciousness of one's eternal responsibility . "2 
Th is p ass ion in t hought anf. consequent ac t lon was basic fo!' 
1 . Wahl , SHE , 3 - 4 . 
2 . SK, CUP , 270. 
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SK in hi s epistemoloe::;tcal approach to reality . "It is impos.-
sible to exist without passion, tmless we understan0 the word 
'exist' in the loose sense of a so-called existence."L 
Personal idenl:" ty is obliterated in the flight of abstract , 
or impersonal thcught. SK believed such 9.n obliteration 
would abrogate the valicU ty of any attempt to comprehend 
reality, for when the person is disregarded the personal ex-
perience of thinking which serves es the datum must also be 
disre garded . The . necessary continuity of the pers on wi th a 
thought process is found in passion.2 ~ rr Ul\. believed this con~ 
tinuity necessary if the conclusion of thought was to be 
pert nent to man . This passion is an :t!ltense self ... conscious-
ness of one ' s thinking . It is an abillty of the spirit and 
a lso spirit's responsib:!.llty .. Passion is the spirit's trans-
cending the psychosomat c in order to obs erve and to validate 
the activity of thought« This passion serves as the stable 
referent of the movement of existing morles , and it gives the 
flux of life a credible support .. Without this , the Protagor-
ean judgment will make all action and continu ty nonsens e . 
This very interest that the individual has is constituted by 
the difficulty found in existenc~ , for he is infinitely in~ 
te r ested .in existing . 3 The passion must then be cultiva t c ·:t 
and dire cted into the d:lalectic which continually satisfies 
the needs of the in~ividua l . This rialectic will refer al-
l~ SK , CUP , 276 . 
2. SK, CUP , 276 . 
3. SK, CUP , 268 ,. 
ways to one 's existence but only as an individual infinitely 
in terested in himself and his object of thought . 
The finger of loei c may be polnted in accusation at SK 
at thi s point. He has rinituled the abstract and 'pure 
thought ' thinkers for attempting to objectify existence in 
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the process of thought , and now he has presented the implica-
tion that this is a necessity. This is the whole point in SK's 
criticism, however .. He believed that Hegel had broken the law 
of contradiction by a synthes is which merely showed that the 
theses were not antithetical at all. Abstrsct thinking solves 
the contradictions of man 's temporal state and his eternal 
demand by forgetting the latter . Properly , one should neither 
forget the one nor identify the two, but he should accentuate 
the opposition with inward passion so that the ste.ge may be 
set f or faith -- the belJef in the absurd, the embracing of 
the unintellj_gible .. 
A particular existential experience is the dialectical 
moment,and this is the point of the synthesis of infinity and 
finitude . 'tin passion the existing subject is rendered .in-
fir~ ~ 'ce in the eternl ty of the imaginative representation, and 
yet he is at the same time most definitely himself."l This 
passion is not a gift from God nor some thi.ng found, but is 
rather a point of intense striving of the individual in in-
wardness. It is a constant s urging which is balancea by the 
comic and the pathetic and is the realtzation of existence. 
1. SK, GUP , 176. 
It is comical because it is an infinite style whi ch cannot 
be seen by the observer, like an 'inward' convulsion which 
bewilders diagnosticians by the seeming calm; it is pathetic 
because it is infinite strife undertaken by a fini te indivi .... 
dual . The strife n'ever reaches its goal, but is is unrelent-
ingly persistent. For this reason it is susta ned and never 
experiences the ridiculous starvation through satiation whlch 
the system affords.. The comical part of such strife in time 
is that 10,000 years are but a trifle, and the pathetic re" 
turns to remind that a second is of infinite value. Only 
momentous existence can avoid delusion and disillusionment. 
It is a privation for the individual not to be fully aware of 
his existing condition (like the objective thinker, for in-
stance), and i't is also a struggle. to keep the moment which 
is an 'atom of eternity . 
This pasRion gives the necessary continuity to the move-
ment of existence and the requis:i.te connectedness to make 
motion possible . However , to say that this moment is all of 
reality , or everythin8, is to say that i t ls nothin g and tbis 
woulc leave one in the morass of the so-phistic error. There 
may , perhaps even must, be an objective reality but the direc-
tion to thls goal, 1.f gu1dance can possibly be given, is in-
ward and not outward where immediate d:i.sintegration occurs 
and all is fantasy. 
Inwardness in an existing subject culminates in 
passion; corresponding to passion in the subject 
the truth be comes a paradox; e.nd the fact tha t : 
the truth becomes a paradox is rooted precisely 
in its having e. relation to an existing subject, 
passion eoes by the board and truth is no lon ger· 
a paradox; the knowing subject becomes a fantastic 
entity ra.ther than a human being, and the truth 
becomes a fantastic object for the knowledge of 
this fantastic entity.l . · 
This is not an easy task and one who would ask Pilate's 
question2 with sincerity must be prepared for an arduous life . 
Many are called but few are chosen (for they must choos e 
themselves ) and consequently ' few there be that enter the 
straight gate. ' Sk gives insight into the difficulty of the 
cour·se not only in his writings but also in the course of his 
melancholy life (for he tried_to practice what he preach~d ~ 
and "only ·by enduring and suffering, by submitting to every 
argument directed a gainst my lacerated soul, do I retain any 
meaning in my existence . "3 
It must not be understood that the moment is merely the 
interaction between an immed:tate consciousness and a bundle 
of propositions which form some smug and satisfyine; system 
even if you call it faith, for this is a confounding use for 
what is really the most decisive expression of existence . 
Once the individual substltutes this passion for what seems 
to b~ a more comfortable and. 'logical' position , he finds that 
the .objectivity has defrauded him, And this beautiful, sweet, 
1~ SK, cUP, 177 . 
2 • .J:Qhn 18:38 
3 . SK, SLW, 202 .. 
sparkling liquid has bu.t one drawback- - it is deadly poisont 
Fur thermore, the wise man is one who need not taste death in 
order to see that it does not get him where he wants to go. 
Thus it can be seen tbat t o :reflect upon problems 
without taking passion into account is not to re ... 
fleet upon them at t:.ll , it is to forge t the main 
point, namely , that one is oneself an exis t ent be ... 
in g. At the same time , it :l.s to deny oneself 
choi ce , which cannot be made without pa.f'lsi on and 
is the 'ba ll-mark of existence., To exist is to 
choose . ! 
The problem for the existing subject is how to instill 
passion, how to stlr men to be themselves? SK suggests that 
it perhaps could be done by setting a man upon a horse and 
then causing it to bolt or , better to set him on a horse 
which stood still when he desperately wanted to go somewhere . 
The analogy might be better, however , in view of the encounter 
of the finite and the infinite , if one were set to drive a 
team of horses, one of which was Pegasus and the other a worn-
out jade . "Eternity is the winged .horse, infinitely fast , 
and time is the worn-out jade; the existing individual is the 
driver . "2 The driver may be one who fights to control the 
mismatched team or else a drunken lout who merely sleeps in 
the cart as it goes along ... -all are dri vera, but too many run 
like the aged plater in a claiming race • .:.. they also run t 
One must be careful in seeking to communicate even in" 
directly with his fellow ' existents', however, for fear that 
1. Jolivet , ITK, 101 . 
2 . SK, CUP, 276; cf Plato.•s myth of the charioteer in the 
? ha.edrus. 
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he be directly misinterpreted. This would be like the leader 
who had the unfortunate experience of obtaining disciples to 
aid him in disseminating his doctrine that one ought not to 
have disciples . Objectivity would be its own defeat as men 
looked outwards for their inward expressions. The existing 
individual would by these strange circumstances place himself 
in Hegel ' s situation--dying "with the words upon his lips 
that there was only one man who had understood him, and he 
misunderstood him.ttl 
Inwardness, pass ion, intense subjectivity-- these are the 
proper conditions for existi~g individuals. These experiences 
are technical terms for SK and do not refer to any passion or 
inwardness. They refer only to the spiritual self-regard, or 
douole reflection in the individual~ experience that makes him 
aware of the possibilities of existence. Only by this procedure 
of inwardness can truth be found and only by an existing entity. 
But hume.ni ty is comprised of just such entities with such an 
apparent diversity of passions and even a coldness and object• 
tvity belying passion. SK, of course, had to give an account 
for such, even the systematizers, and he presented these 
evident ' degrees of suffering' among the existing humans as 
spheres of existence, as stages along life's way, and as 
1. SK, CUP, 65 , n . 
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pe r s p e ctive s in a hierarchy of ex~s ten ce . 
v . The S ta ge s of Exis t enc e . 
The exi sten c e - spb e r e s b y whi ch the exis ting i ndividua l 
may be cl a s sified , or may c l assi f y h i mse l f , ar e pe r s p e cti-
va l p os i tions in r e f eren ce to the inward condi ti oning of t he 
exis t en t subje ct . They a r e not a t a ll to be cons trued a s a 
sort of ev o l u tionary sca l e for men . SK 1 s i nte r p r e t a tion is 
no t a rational is tic p rocedure nor a f l i t ting pe rs pe ct i v e su ch 
as a wea t he r vane whi ch 'the wind b l owe th where it l is t e th' 
but, ra t he r, t he l e ve l s a r e dis tin ct stage s of existen c e . 
" They are t he l e v e l s f r om which l ife ma y be vi ewed or a t 
which it is pr edomi nantly l ived . " l SK cal ls t he s e 'inte r-
p r e t a tions ' and t hei r dis t inctivene ss depend s up on t he ir re-
l a tion to truth . "All i n t e r p r e t a tions of exls t en c e re.nk in 
acc ordan ce wi t h t he de :3;re e of th~ i ndiv:Ldua l 1 s d i a l e ctica l 
ap pr ehensi on of inwa 1~ dr1.e s s . 11 2 
As to t he pr ope r n umbe r of s phe r e s, t he r e is a gene 1~a1 
a c cep t aD c e of t h r ee which follows a s t a t emen t by SK i n S t age s 
on Lif e ' s Way . 3 Th is is a l s o indi cated in othe r p l a c e s a s 
we l l. 4 1ne r e would a l s o be a r easonabl e bas is to de v e lop t he 
sta ge s in a t wo-fold p oint o f v i e w; the admis sion i n Con-
eluding Un sci entifi c Pos t script wou l d g i ve wei gh t t o t his 
i n t e r p r e t a ti.on . 5 Aga in one mi ght dedu c e a fiv e - f o l d g roup i ng 
1 . Croxall , KS , 23 . 
2 . SK, CUP , 506 . 
3 . SK , SLW , 473 . 
4 . SIC , CUP , 261, 262 . 26 5 . 
5 . SK, CUP , 241 . 
of spheres from t he discusE~ion of Johannes the Seducer in 
Either/Or .l This woul d ndicate a metaphysical sta ge between 
aesthetics and eth:tcs. This latter view must be cancelled, 
however , for SK clearly states the contrary in another pas s a ge. 
The metaphysic a l is abstraction, there is no man 
who exists metephysically . Metaphysics, ontology, 
is but does not exist; for when it exists it is in 
the aesthetic, in the ethical, in the religious, 
and when it is it is the abstraction of, or the 
nrius for, the aesthetic, the ethical , the reli-
gious.2 
The stages have been developed here in a four- fold group 
according to SK's own interpretation of the snheres in Con-
.. -
cludJ.,ng__ Unscientific 1'ostcript.3 This interpretation d:tvides 
the religious sphere into simple, or immanent, religiousness 
an d the paradoxical religiousness, or Christianity. This 
divi.sion appears to be the proper pres entation in view of the 
fact t hat there is a distinc tly different relation to trnth 
in these four views apo each may only be attained from the 
other by means of pathos and a leap. 
11All men are of necessity ln one ste.ge or another, and 
the problem each must solve, in order to lmow himself so-
cra tically, is to determine which stage he is in."4 Probably 
the best descriptive relation of t h e stages is as a group of 
concentric spheres with each step of the ·journey inwardly 
necessitating a dialectical leap over boundaries that are 
1. Cf, SK-, CUP, 265. 
2. SK, SLW , 430. 
~ . SK, CUP, 494; cf. 506, 473 . 
4 . Jolivet, ITK, 113 . 
yawning chasms rather than walls. One does not necessarily 
go from the outer (aesthetic) to the inner (Christianity) 
in successive steps, for some religious people have a reli~ 
giou~ affinity from the beginning . One, of course, may pos -
sibly nev r advance beyond the stage in which he ftnds him-
self . Similar to the relations of class inclusions in formal 
logic, the individual existing in a sphere may understand 
ann utilize the sphere behind him, that is, if he does not 
pet•mi t his inwardness to lapse in intensity, for cessation of 
strife may sweep one back to the contradiction of living for 
immediacy in the aestbetic sphere . This point of vi~w seem~ 
ingly fits the data of SK t'. s writings to a hi gher degree (SK 
would probably 'tunt in his grave ' if one attempted to review 
his thought with any s ys tematic certainty) than some other 
pr·esentations of the relation of the spheres. Jolivct makes 
communication of the spheres impossible by his conclus ion 
that they are isolated, exclusive, enclosed, and independent 
stages of life . l Croxall views them as overlapping in a row 
l~_ke the links of a chain which seemingly denies the religious 
individual any utillzation of the aesthetic stage . 2 
SK himself gives a concise ·description of the relation" 
ship of the spheres as well as of the essence of the leap 
necessary to ascend from the lower to the hi gher . This is 
the transition from the objective to the more subj~c:tive. 
1. Jolivet, ITK, 113. 
2. Croxal l , KS 1 68. 
. l 
The spherea are thus related: immediacy, finite 
common sense; irony, ethics with irony as in-
cognito; humor, religiousness with humor as ina 
cognito; and then finally the Christian religious-
ness, recognizable by the paradoxlcal accentua-
tion of existence, by the paradox, by the breach 
with immanence, and by the absurd.l 
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A warning that one should regard in considering the dif-
ferent spheres is issued by SK.-2 It will not do to consider 
the relations of the stages with any of the aspects of the 
rationale of the human animal . In existence intellect has no 
superior! ty and the culmination of infinite inwardness should 
not be related at all with the culmination in thought , for 
volition , imagination, and feeling are all co-ordinates in 
the existence indi vidu.al and not a hierarchy. 
To sum up the whole matter in advance, it may be 
said that aestbAtic existence is essentially 
pleasure , ethical existence combat and victory, 
and religious existence suffering not of a momen~ 
tary kind, but as an enduring stat.,.3 
With these points in mind concerning the degrees of in-
wardness, the consideration of each sphere will be undertaken . 
(1) . The Aesthetic Sphere. 
The category of the aesthetic stage is immediacy. Here 
is the niche of him who believes he can 'live by bread alone' , 
who says, ''Let us eat , drink, and be merry for tomorrow we 
die ." 
~K, C'O'P, 473, n. 
2 . SK, CUP, 310 . 
3 . Jolivet , ITK, 119. 
This is in its generality the essential aesthetic 
principle, namely, that the moment is everything, 
and in so far again essentially nothing; just as 
the sophistic propos ition that everything is 
true means that nothing is true.l 
The lower immediacies of sensual satisfaction and wealth 
seem to en thrall the majority of existing individuals and 
makes them really bare existents,. Here are those, who , like 
Johannes the Seducer , 2 believe they have found the secret of 
existence i n the immediate pleasure of satisfied lust and/ot· 
accumulated wealth . There :!.s no hesitancy in this stage but 
instead a perpetual flitting about for , 
What could be more monotonous , the aes tbeticia~ ob -
jectE, fearing to see life l ose the bewitching mul~ 
tiplicity it possesses as l ong as i t rema ins subject 
to t.c variety of the aestheti c categories . 3 
The e.es t he tlct an 's sphere is f ul f illed in thlngs and he 
muDt keep going to keep from despa i r and fruntration. As 
long as health, ability, and new f ields of poss i bility are 
avai l~ble he rushes from moment t o moment . SK gives a vivid 
picture of him in Purify Your Hearts : 
See h im in his season of pleas ure : did he not crave 
for one pl easure after another, V9.:r:!cty his watch ... 
word? Is variety, then , the willing of one thing 
that abides the same? Nay , r ather it is the willing 
of someth i ng t hat must never be the same J, But that 
is just to will the manifold, and a man with such a 
will is not only double minded but all at ,rariance 
with himself, for he wills one thi ng and immedia t e -
ly after tbe opposite , be cause oneness of pleasure 
is a disappointmen t and illusion, and it is the 
variety of pleasures that he wills. Change was 
what he was crytng out for when pleasure pondered 
to him, change , change~4 
~~~-=~ 1 . SK, CUP, 255 . 
2 .. SK, SLW , 86. 
3 . Jolivet , ITK, 126w 
4. SK, PYH, 43-44 . 
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This individual is undialectical and the dialectic which 
gives him any si~1ificance is outside of him. Such external 
objects make subjectivity ridi culous in its objectivlty. A 
passionate attempt to mix spir:lt and things can never succeed . 
The passion may continue but 'there'll come a day' and the 
reckoning will show the folly of trying to live and die for 
things. Love must be a two ... v:ay street in order to abi~e , and 
mat€'riel objects can never return love .. 
There a.re more respecte.ble s·ocial strata in the immedi -
ac~I": EJ which may be called the aesthettc life in the hi ghe r 
immediacy , or the intellectual stage. This is the sppere of 
philosophical paganism--the systematizer's arena"~and SK bit-
terly combats this whole view. with more contempt a~d irony 
than he does the lower immediacies . These are the persons 
who revoke existence in their systems by virtue of existence. 
They have attained finallty·and now may rest upon their laurels. 
Their principle ttis that no r·eali ty is thought or understood 
until its esse has been resolved into its uosse ••• an aesthetic 
and intellectual scrutiny protects every~ which is not a 
posse. ttl 
nections 
The goal of life is the knotting of rational con-
and 'closing' the system. This is subtle for it is 
a dis,guis~ed forin of immediacy and it may continue lone;er 
without despair, for the mind may often function ke-::nly when 
the sensual desire fails and the physical response is slow .. 
1. SK, CUP, 22 8., 
This aspect of aestheticism miserably fails also , however , 
for 1 pure thought 1 is just an othel~ thing and it serves to 
keep the existential dialectic outslde of the individual 
which can only lead to frustration and despair.. »r t ls , 
therefore , in despair that the f&ilure of the aesthetjc stage 
declares itself: whoever lives on this plane is in despair, 
whether he knows it or not . "l 
One of the sao features of this sphere is that the in-
~iviouals imagine that they are b usy searching for God and 
get t ing in contact with him . They are willing to find God by 
external means , ancl are highly conceited in the thought "that 
one is rather smart if he can get a hol d on Goc1 as something 
external . 1t2 
There may be some Question as to why the aesthetic in-
divj_r,ual is classified in existence at all.. The reason , of 
cou.rse, is not because of any striving that he might ha·..re 
done but just because he is a knowing spirit , an existing 
spirit who ;n11.: t exist in splte of himself . The only element 
of inwa r dness for h i m is memory which includes sadness and 
mele.Dcholy nfor it cons ists of a past which is abol:i.shed , one 
incapable of repetition."3 
If this existing individual s hould pause in the race for 
immediacy (though many never do until it is too le.te--for 
immediacy is often danger) he mey sense the utter inability 
of things to satisfy his dialectical impulse a~d turn to con-
1 .. Jolivet, ITK, 127. 
2. SK, CUP , 498, n . 
3. Jolivet , I'rY, 12?. 
sider• a leap to o.nother sphere ., It is d1f'ficul t to let 
another man know the state he is in f o r " a di rect relation 
between one s:0 iri tual being and aYlother with respect to the 
essential truth is tmthinkable . "l Bv.t , if h e does jump, t 
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may be into the ethi cal s phere , thongh an i ntsnse , i n finitely 
pass !on ate jumn co uld take him f u r ther . 
(2) ~e rthical Sphere . 
The ethical stage is the degre e of inwardness where the 
ex4.:=:tting individ1Jal , desDa i r ing of t h e a e sthetic existence 
and its attendant imperfe ~tions , and re cogni zing the contra-
cUction of externa l dialectic in outwardr>.ess, desires to "en-
ter into a glorious a lli ance , and that is ~ith the reltgious ~ "2 
When t he spi r it wi l l s C.es ~a i r· , then is fully chosert •Nhr, t ' d es~ 
~o s i r h as for its ch oice ... - ones elf in one 1 s eternal val til t:, • 
If the indi vidual is ~i s lect1cal in hi~self i nwardl 
l n self-as s ertion , hen ce in such a way that t~e ult-
i tf!a tG basis is not dj a lectic i n itself , lna.s,mch as 
the self wh5 ..ch is a,t the be.sis :l.s used to overcome 
and assert itself , then we have the ethical in t er -
pretation . 3 
The ethicist first extets when h i s whole pe rs onality is 
involv-=cl i n pass ionate inviardnors end t hen recog:.1.:!.zes 811. 
absolute d"tJ. ty to perform. Befor e him i s ~laced the task of 
choosing hLn.sclf--for ex::s t cnce or obliteration . The ae sthe -
t ic is no lon ger the absolute , but now is just a relative 
implication to the great choice that he :aust make .. The ne ces -
1. SK, CUP , 221 . 
2 .. SK, SLW , 400 . 
3 . SK, CUP , 136 . 
sity of choice make s the hi f'hest task f or the individual and 
cannot be formed upon a 1worlo - hlstorical ' consideration or 
abstract deduction any more than it coul be based upon the 
heclonlsm of the. aesthet:!.c stage . It ls the 11 very breath. of 
, 
the eternal . 11 J.. 
To supp ose that wor l d hiotory of any abstract s _. ecula-
t _on could produce the ethical is l~~icrous From the ceac , 
on.g csn never learn how to l ive . ly b ~r I!)_aking eterna l 
~ e c~.sions in tine himself can the individual ~e eth ica and 
onl eternal c1ecis ons can ho::.·, e to ri.s e ebove t~e frus t r ::::tion. 
of immecl:!.acy and rslj_eve the r'J.espair of aesthet ic exhallStion .. 
Only in tl e ethical is t h ere immort~::J.lit and an 
eternal life ; otherw se unders too() , the vorld-
hist orica l is perhaps a spectacle , a spectacle 
which perhaps endures --but t h e spectator ies , 
and h i s conte.mpla tion of tb.e 8pE.ctacle was per-
haps a hi~1ly significant way of •• , killing time ~ 2 
The et~1ical stage is a level o.f darinc; v~mturine; when 
one makes sure of nothing and r :!.s:!..cs all . It shoulcl no t be 
consi .ered merely a task i n "vhi ch to add up all of one 1 s 
various dut _e s l ike a mainter~an. ce man , but rather sucn_ an in-
t enslt of dut~r that cons ci ousness of t is for him the 
b a lance point of' eterc.al val:Ldi ty .. Not a die cast for thr·ee-
nenc e , but a choice upon which thE> soul depends . 
The aest~etic is blin~ to the contradiction of ex i sting . 
It is merely one of the facts of reality .. The et:Cical , 
hovvever , is aware of the contradiction but seek!:! to 11.eet it 
I. SK, CTJ , l3G .. 
2 ., SK , C:U ~ 137 . 
60 
vd t h self- as s ertion--a d ecis i on of the se l f to me e t t he 1a-
l e cti c a l op tions * 
The ethical :Jri n clple i~ tha t n o po .;"l t bi l ity is 
underst c oC n .. tti l each posse has r· e ully be l!ome 
an es :1 e ••• t h e e thi ca l s c r uti n y resul ts in t he 
concemn &tlon of every poss e whi c h i s n o t an e ss e , 
b u t t h i s r e f e rs or1ly to a p o r.s e in t h e indivirl ua l 
h i rn..s elf , sinc e tbe et.bical luL3 nothi1'1g to c'l o wi th 
t' e p os sll i l i t ies of o t her ind~ v ch . ls . 1 
The execut ion of the e ·i-2:89.1 ls much moi e di f f icu l t thaL 
the fore go_;_ng n a r rat:!.ve me.:; seem to i n d i cate . Abstre c t nar-
ra on takes 'b u a mi n ut e an ' is eas i l y cl o.c1e wlll l E ~ ; ::: vu.a l de -
c i s i ons a r e v e ry d iff icu l t .. 'r h e Gi tle r /or 'nay s eem to take 
inf· n i t y to r e solve for the Jtakes are very __ igh ,. In thi 
sense the eth i c al mHy sA~m inf ni te l y abst r ac t b u.t , be c aus e 
i t h as au ch a n e s s enti a l r ela t ion to the struc ture of exi s t-
nnce i tself , i ~ i s really seen t o be inf.nl t e l y con c rete . In 
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existence t i.me i s a con cre te consi dend~ i on als o ano this l e ads 
to the d ownfa ll o.f the ethi. cal as a s t able ::;r.here o f e7 i fJten c e , 
for the ir'.cl ... vtdua l ::.s ethlcal y I'A8pon s i 't l e f or the use of 
t i me \1'hile h e de l i b erates . This c ons t dera t lon 1n a dj ·- on. tu 
·c;t infinit e f.ut :,r of s. f i n ite J ti c ' s t lea s to the t A e olog-
has ne ither Li me n or opr;ortuni ty to n t ua ln. vh e :··oa f un -
v e r sa l ob1i ::;at l on .. :;:th.i ee l l lvi ne; i ~ c. 1'8. r;rlc 1 v:!.ng C'~:!J OS ed 
t o t~he stat c sel f hood of the aesthe t e , but i t on l re c ogni7,es 
t•~e f! I ' oblem of o :i.n te0.ce lnstcscl of s C>lvlng 
1 .. ~; r~ , 
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'i't1e s us::_:;en s i on in quest_ on consists l n U .. e i nc:j_ l c ua J.' s 
f!neing himself in a state prec sely the oppos:te of 
tha t V'Jhic 1 the ethi ci:!l requires , so th9.t far from 
bein g able to b egin , each moment he remain tn this 
s t ate he i s more and more p reventPn from ber;lnni ng , 
He is not re l a ted to the task as poss_bili ty to 
actua l · ty , but as i mpcssi ' li t.7 . 1 
Here the dialectic of repen tance en ters the sphere of t h e 
e t leal , an r1 it can be seen to be a tran s itional s phe e , a l-
thoue;h one coulr1 remair in perpetual del :.t bera i on and n ever 
give the r~::_:;ent&nce a chance to e~erge 'l'he ethical is a 
stage of rE:qulreii1e1:l t ll and this requiremer1t 'L s s o i nfinite th&t 
the i ndiv . . ua l always g oe s bsnkrup t . ''2 This st&nda rd , ·w_ ch 
is too fo:L·1nidabl~ for the e t h ·i cist to measure , p to , comes to 
the fore and he must despair before i t , dreadfully aware of 
guilt .. Contrary to the well-lmown poem, 1'11Jhen duty whispers 
low, ' Thou must '; the youth outc Pies, 'I can 't'.''3 
Although the ethical is of great si gnifi can ce in the 
certa~. nty of its knowledge which vali dates the ind vidual's 
exi sten ce 7 i t must make the most decisive step tbat it can--
choose to 3..l'1ni hllate i tself-- s.nd conse quen tly pa~ s by this 
diale ctical leap into the religious sphere . "Choose thyself 1 
is the maxim that e.:;:l.ves subjectivity a certain t ruth t o the 
ethicist an d now it is annulled. All i s not l ost, however , 
for thm.l.gh the ideal standard deals a mortal bloVT , yet i ts 
something beyond the individual and upon thls he has n sor t 
of obj e ctive ce r tainty which subj ectivity has val i.dity obtai n ed. 
1. SK , CUP , 238 . 
2 . SK , SLW, 430 . 
~. . Cited from Emerson ' s poem , Du t y. 
The only effective ethics , then , i s that which is 
found eo upon dogmati cs " '11he ethi cal can fulfill it-
self only by denying itself , that is , by su1nmoning 
the intervention of s. n , whlch nemands the ci.ialect -
tc2l 1eap and appeals to the trans cendence of the 
r e l igious ,.1 
(3). Religiousness £ . 
The religious sphere,called reli giousness A by SK, is 
that state of inwardness whereby the inC.l~iidual is inwardly 
defined in the same condition of immanence as ln t he ethica l 
6? 
stage and in self.-.annihi l ation before Goo. There is no hist-. 
orical startin~ poi11t for th~s mode of ex:i.stence - communl ca tion 
for the paradox of existence which re l ates , or at l east holds 
in tension , time and eternity lies whol ly in immanence .. "The 
momen t in time is, the refore , ~ ipso swa llowed up b eternity. 
In time the ind vldual recoll e cts that he :ls eternal,. 11 2 Tern-
poral activities and decisions are accidents which inf ni te 
i nwardness subsumes under the ne ce_ssi ty of eternity to wh ch 
it ~nnihilates self . 
In this s phere the awareness of guilt ~ consciousness drives 
the exist i ng indivi dua l to a transformation of extstence as 
time is subsumed in the eternal and the absolute requ:Lrem<?nt 
of the ethica l dialectic be~ins fulf illment . The religious 
s phere brings the thought of God a11d particulars together. 
Th~ reli c,l o,.ls i ndi vldual thus l ives on a week day in the s ame 
cat E c~ries as on t~e Sabba~ . Suffering is a reality for the 
1. Jollvet , ITK, 140 . 
2 . SK) CDP, 508 . 
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~eligious life and essentially relat ed to it. I n the aesthe -
t ic Ltage it May come and go , but if it ceases i n the religious 
s t ege it i s a sure sign that there has also been a cessation 
of religiousness. 
The religious stage is complt?ltely confined to a quali -
tative dial P- ~tic end has no essential relation to quan tity 
upon vlb.lch the aesthetic life depends. The reli tsious comple -
tely disda i ns the outward , adVfuiCine beyond the ethical which 
has changed the absoluteness of the outward to relati vity , 
anC. is 
like the bird which flits carefree here and there , 
when it is imp r isoned; like the fish which fea r -
l essly cleaves the waters and makes i ts wa~ among 
the enchan ted re ~ions of the deep , when i t lies 
out of i t 8 element on the dry ground--so the re-
ligious individual is confined; for absoluteness 
iR not di~ectly the element of a fin it e creature .l 
Like the other spheres, religiousness is not an easy 
mode of existen ce, and intellectual existence for the reli~ 
gious man is especially difficult. T:b~_ s is the sphere of 
fulfillment to be sure , and gui lt gives the inward impulse 
of this nlalectic;, but not to fulf ill as when one "fills 
a bag wi th gold, for repentan ce has made lnfini te room _, and· 
hence the religi ous contradiction; at ttc, J9.me time to lie 
upon seventy thousanc3. fathoms of water and yet to be joyful .u2 
The gravest of errors in thiR stage would be to try to 
prove God 's existence . The ontological argument ts i)Ure 
1. SK, CUP 1 432 . 
2 . SK , SLW , 430. 
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t autology , 1 and the whole procedure scarcely suggests itself 
to reason anway nfor if God does not exist 1 t would of course 
be impossible to prove it; and if he does exist it would be 
folly to attempt it . "2 K believes an attempt to prove God's 
existence would be to mock Him , for if it is a shameless affror..t 
t o prove the existence of some one who :ts present in any society, 
then a fortiori God . 
Rel igiousness A is the sphere of all individuals who exist 
inwardly with such intense passion that the contradlction of 
existence ( the existing of a temporal moment in eternity) is 
i :mr:1anent, and not countered with the feeble force of self 
assertion , but rather held fast in a complete denial of the 
existing spirit . This is the sphere of most world religions, 
especially thos e which are of a passion9.te , mystical , panthe-
latic nature~ These tend e i ther to sublate the essential cate-
gory of the indivichlal which revokes existence immed:tately, 
or else the guilt-consc~. ousness despairs hopelessly in its 
attempt to supp ly the inflni te demand made by repentance wi th 
the finite resources of an annihilated self . Just as in the 
othe r spheres , in the re li g i ous s phere · the i ndi vl dua l ma be 
so occupied wi th t he i mme diacy of self a ctivit that the ul -
timate GOa l of the h i ghest subjectivity and existence may be 
overlooked . De s pair at this point brings in the dialectical 
medium of the hi ghest stage which could not possibly come 
from the existen t t{ldividual , as did guilt-cons ciousness , 
and this is sin-consciousness . "The terrible emancl pation 
1 . SK, CUP, 298. 
2. SK, PF , 31 . 
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fr om t he r equireme n t s of r ea l izing t "he e t h ical , t he he t e r o-
genei t y of t he i nc1l vi du a l with t h e e t hi c a l , i s S i n . ul Th is 
is a sha rpen~ed pa t h os i n r e l a tion to t he me C.ium of Re l i g ious-
nes s A and i t make s ne c e ssary t he existen tia l l eap i n to t he 
h i ghe s t sphe r e of e xis t en c e --int o Christian ity . The · Jan t hei s m 
of Re l i g iousne ss A so l v e s t he p rob l em of time an d e t e r n ity by 
ab sorbing t he t empora l i n di v i .'lna l i n to the e t e r n a l God . God 
mus t a l s o absorb man 1 s s in an d t hi s wa s re p ugnan t to SK. 
( 4 ). Re lig iousne ss B. 
Cbristian ity is t he hi _~he s t s phe r e of exis t en c e for SK . 
It is c a lled t he para doxi ca l r e l igiousne ss . It "br e a k s wi t h 
i mmanen c e and make s t h e f a ct of ex i sting the absolut e con tra-
di ction, not wi t hin l rrunanen c e , b ut a 6a i ns t i mmanen c e . "2 The 
r e lati on of time an.d e t e rnity in the i mma ne n c e of Re l i gious-
ne ss A n o lon ge r h ol ds, for in Chri s t ianity t he e t e r na l ente rs 
time . Forme rly t h e t e r na l wa s ubique e t nus guam but n ow i~ 
s. parti cu l a r p l a c e . irh.e pa r adox i cal prop os i t i on to which 
t h ou gh t can nev er ga i n a ccess is n t ha t on e can be come e t er-n al 
a ltho ugh one wa s n ot such. "3 Th is is p o~ s ib l e t hrou gh fai t h 
which 11 l s t h e obje cti v e u..n c e r t a i n t y c ue to the repul si on of 
t h e absu.r·d. h e l d fas t by t he pass ion of i nwardne ss , whi ch in 
t h iE:i i ns t an ce is i n t ensi f ied to t he u t mos t de g r ee . "4 Re as on 
and t he ·raradox h~ve e. ' h a ppy ' en c otm t e r in t h is medium of 
f ai th , and r ea son bows out whi l e th~ :9 aradox take s its p l a c e . 
Fa i t h is t he 11 i d a l i t y which r es olve s an ~_into a n onp os se --
and t hen wi ll b el iev e i t. 11 5 
1. SK , CUP , 239 . 3 . SK, CUP , 508 5 . SK, SVN, 398 . 
2 . SK , CUP, 507 . 4 . SK, CUP , 5 40. 
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This existence sphere is pure sub jectivityfor objective-
ly Christianity has no exis t ence ,. The objective Christian 
is ~ ipso a pagan and has no share in the diffi culty which 
"consists in willing subjectively to aspire to knowledge about 
t1:::. '3 historical in the interest of one's own blessedness . 11 1 
The paradox is the acme of truth and the only ~ossible 
resting place for the spirit of the existin g indi vidual who 
has come to despair in all of the other stages . The indivi-
dual's quest was for truth and this is the only possibility, 
and it appears as impossibility . Subjectivity is truth and 
thls is the most infinite de pth of inwardness . SK says that 
much strange , deplorable , and revolting has been said about 
Christianity, "but the most stup:J.d thing ever said about it 
ts, that it is to a certain degree true . "2 It is an ~either/ 
or', take it or leave it . This is the point to which an exist.-
ing individual is driven and now he must choose life or death, 
and the basis for choosing life is infinitely absurd- The 
problem was for an existing individual to find truth , that is , 
for a moment of time to be existentially related to eternity, 
SK concludes that it is found in , and only in , Christianity . 
Existence finds its culmination in that which was a scandal 
to the Jews and folly to the Greeks, but the power of God 
unto salvation to every one who believes. 
1 . SK, CUP , 512 . 
2 . SK, CUP , 205 . 
For existence, and especially Christian ex1stence , 
unites contradictories, It blossoms in eternity, 
but is accomplished in the instant; it is choice 
and expectation , dispersion and concentration, 
extension and tension, ecstasy and reflection, 
risk and gain, life and death, the future return-
ing as the past, the past declaring itself present; 
it is sin breaking into the immanenc~ of the indi-
vidual and the condition of salvation; it is the 
u1 tirna te union of the lnfini te and the finite, or 
rather a permanent tension between them, contact 
and conflict . 1 
vi . Sumrnary • 
SK, in his attempt to find the meaning of existence, con-
siders three possible modes of reflection by which the think-. 
ing being might reach a conclusion. Objective reflection was 
the popular mode of the day and. the subject was cons:tdered 
highly capable of directly apprehending the object. Truth, if 
any, must lie in objectivity and, hence, never be without 
disjuncti on. from the knowing subject. ,Existence itself keeps 
the subject and object apart . Truth from this mode of abstract 
reflectlon can never be more than a pure tautology whose pro-
positions can only be of the nature--truth ls truth. Once an 
empirical check is attempted, truth is again put into the pro ... 
cess of becoming and the supposed identity- of thought and 
being is only a matter of anticipation. Truth for God may be 
the conforrni ty of thought and bein g , but not for the poor 
existing individual. Thls abstract system has satisfied the 
makers of the system, according to SK, but they are like 
1 . Jolivet, ITK, 103. 
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•'the custom clerk who wrote what he could not himself read , 
satisfied that his responsibilities ended 'dth the wrlting . 'l 
In the light of action the se phllosoT;Jhers are fantastic, for 
the actor cm1 act only as an abstract, non-existent being-~ 
which is not at all . 
A mediating mode of reflection is the attempt to iden-
ti fy the subject the objec t in t he attempt t o conform thought 
and being . Again the attempt is futile f or such conformi t ... ' 
can only come sub s pecie _!.eternitatls and the subject is al-
ways confined to the straight jacket of existence . 
How can it help to explain to a man how the eternal 
truth is to be understood eternally, wh en the 
supposed user of the explanation is prevented froi!l 
so understanding it through being an existing 
indi vidual'l2 
The only mode of reflection of thought which ls V.9.lid 
for the sub jec t is subjective reflecti on . If outwardness in 
ob jectivity can find no truth , the subject must turn inward , 
toward himself . Truth_, then , rather than the absurd abstract 
identi.ty of th ought and be ing , is a matter of appropriation , 
of inwardness, of subjectivity and any advance in t he realm 
of truth must be in this direction . 
This . is not e.n arbi tra.I'Y truth , according to c:oK , for in ... 
tense striving i nwardly will proce! n to·:be:.a quali ta t i ve c:1ia -
lectic whi ch prohibits all subjecttve e.rb i t r·e.riness by its 
ground in God • 
1. sK, ctfl' , rn . 
2 . SK, CUP , 172 . 
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Existenc~ is used in a special sense by SK to d note a 
quality of the human being, a value in h1man experience, ahd 
certain kind of striving . It is defined according to var ous 
levels of intensity in the search for truth. P..n impelling 
dialectic of contradiction sweeps the individual into despair 
snd tlen offers him a leap in the dark as a means of escape. 
The conti•adiction is the problem of time and eternity, and 
the existing individual must exist in time with a paradoxical 
relation to eternity . This · is accomplisbed in at least four 
ways: (1) by ignoring the contradiction a s an externality, 
(2) by regarding the contradiction as immanent and to be o'ler ... 
come by self- asse-rtion , ( 3 ) by regarding the contradi.cticn 
as imm~1 ent and essential to th~ self and finally resolved by 
an essential 'I.IDity of finite existence and eternality , and 
(4) lastly, by regarding the contradiction as the absolute 
paradox which cannot be resolved and must be approached by 
objective uncertatn ty which is faith . This latter sphere is 
the hi ghest of all, and it is supreme exlstence . Here the 
eternal enters time and gives eternal! ty to finite beings . 
This last stage , which is Christianity , represent·s the 
historic orthodox views revived in a dynamic dlalectic which 
repulses all objectivity from it . SK raises unhappy love 
for -God to the level of a metaphysical principle • . 
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In or der that the contl·,~dicti on hich bothers Kierke-
gaard may be clearly seen , it may be well to analyze his 
vi ews of time and eternity. Time f or SK is a phenomenal cat 
gory. It is duration, or the succession of even~s . This aucce~e­
ion is consider~d to be finit e in extent . Eternity is alec 
a aucceesion of events for Kierkegaard though differing from 
time i n two important aspects. First 1 as to quantity, ter-
ni ·ty is endless or i nfi nite time. Se condly 1 and most~ i mpo:t·t -
altly , eteruity differs from time i n terms of quality. A 
moment of time is i nert and me chanical while a moment of e ter-
nity i s an inst ant of existential, self-conscious decisio~ • 
Time . ay be considered a.s a. series of digits--all zero ' s , 
v;hi ch add up to zero in terms of value. Eternity, o 1 the 
other h .nd, is a series of positive i ntegers wh ich in value 
add up to i nfi nity. Man 's problem is that he, by the demands 
of his ... a.ture, mus·t have a personal total of infinite quanti-
ty. Th ae sthete i gnores this demand by losinb hi mself in the 
temporal succession of events. The ethicist vainly ·tabulates 
an endless cha i n of naughts. The A typ e religionist confuses 
t i me with eterni ty. According to Kierkegaard, only the Christ-
i a.n r~sol vee the contradic·aon--he makes his experi eno'!s 
eternal moments through the leap of f aith. These exist ent-
ial momen·ts are the element s of existence and are present d 
by K1erk~ga3Xd as explanatio1 a of the theologi cal- philosoph i-
cal proble·11 of the relat i o ... of ti tt! e and etern ity. 
Existence is ostensibly a theological concept, but it 
meant more to SK, for this concept was the only possible 
means of explaining reality and val5.<11y approaching truth. 
The rational jsm that he repudiated ~eems at times to ensnare 
SK as he imputes a great deal of ability to the human mind if 
it is properly use('_._ . • One must not mistake SK' s method of 
in 
deterr~tng exiFitence for an irrationalism. He merely presents 
what he feels to be the only two ultimate philosophical op-
tions : finding the grotmd in an Absolute Paradox (and one 
must clearly understand why he must make the understa!l.ding 
null and void at the apex)l, or accepting a method which is 
r:J diculously irrational in attempting to ground itself in a 
rational absolute . There is no mecUa ting ground- - it is 
'either/or' . 
Exist~nz Js the watch-word for SK, and the essentia l 
category in his philosophy, or better, his axiology. It is 
the prime qualitative distinction in his theological apolo-
getic. Each person is an exlsting spirit who must suffer , 
but he may suffer for things and abstract ideas which bring 
des pair , or he may suffer for God and attain the height of 
existence in eternal happiness. One must exist and thus must 
come to grips 'll''ith the inexorable aut-aut . The wise man will 
consider Pascal 's wager when he casts his lot. 
1~ SK, CUP, 181; Cf . 499 , 504, 514, PF, 47 . 
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Th~ underst&1di ng of the existing i ndividual i nvolve s 
a deep im"1'a.rd s earch. It was necesa a.ry for SK t o be a..."l alert 
psychol ogis t if this s arch was to b e vs.lid. His philos ophi-
cal p remise , the existing 1 d ividua.l , needed ·to be supplement ed 
~.nd supported by a ·thorough introspecti ve analysis. Kierke-
ga.ard' s an£1 yeie w~=~ . s q. tte~!!pted i n order to ful fil l this ne etd 
a s well a s to but ·tr e ss his a.oceptanoe of cert a i n ·theologi OF.I.l 
do c tr i nes . The chi ef element of this analysis was the psycho-
logical st a t e of dread . Dread for Kierkega.ard was the key to 
understanding the vari ous motives that move men. An an~lyeis 
and cri t icism of t his key will compr ise t he next chapter of 
the d issertat ion. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
DREAD 
1. SK the Psychologist . 
SK wrote two books that he termed psych.ologtcal in nature . 
The first, The Concept of Dread, was a "simple psychological 
deliberation oriented in the direction of the dogmatic problem 
of original sin .. "l The other, The Sickness Unto Death , was 
i n t end ed to be 11 a Chx-·istian psychological exposition fo!' edi -
fication and awakenin g ."2 In these two volumes there comes 
to light the detailed, acute psychological insight of SK 
int o the psychological states of ' dread ' and 'despair'. How-
ever, throughout all of his writings there are a great number 
of emphases of a psychological nature . Lowrie says in his 
introduction to the tran slation of The Concept of Drearl t hat 
al thongh these two are 
the onl~books expressly described as psychological, 
fthey . ar~J by no r.1ean s th1'3 on,J.y ones in which this 
interest is p ro:mir..en t , ~ut 7 are suffic ient i.n 
t hemselves to insure to S8ren Kierkegaard a promin-
ent and pecul iar place among psychologists.3 
SK' s Un.iq_ue 11 terary ability in describing p3ychologi cal 
!'actors and relating the analysis of mental conflict makes 
him fascinating to read~ His psychological interest was pre-
supposed by his adoption of the de lphic epigz•am- ... "One must 
know oneself b e fore knowing anything else <Ytwf>, ntJ. 'rO ) tt4 __ 
1 . SK, CD , 1 . 
2 . SK, SD, 1. 
~ . Lowrie, Art. , xi . 
4 . SK, JSK , 17 . 
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end its subsequent adaptation to ' choose t hyself '. 
It ia relatively easier to understand. SK 1 s basic psycho-
logi ca 1 principles than many of his phi los ophi cal pers pe ct:i:ues • 
In Corurept of Dreed he wrote in a direct style and somewhat ob ~ 
jectively and dogmatically as opposed to his usual indirect 
and obscure dialectic.. SIC felt that this was the reason some 
of the Docents liked it {and he was consistent enough to 
claim this to be am· sunderstanding) . The reason for this 
different style is revealed ln Conclud1.ng Unscientific Post ... 
script ... - 11 ferhaps the author ffie wrote it pseudonymousll:7 has 
thought that on this point a communi ce.tion of knowledge might 
be needful , before going to to ene;ender inwardness . ttl SK Vias 
indeed a ~~rcat ps ·cholog:i.nt in potential 'tut to him must fall 
the crlt~c:tsm that fell upon Condillac , however vice versa : 
"Er fehlt die Theile in seiner Hand , hat leider nur der ge ist-
i ger :!3and . tt2 
The a1cpr· oach to his psycholog· might well be started and 
completed with a psycho- analysis of SK. It will not do to 
dispose of the writings of such men as SK and Nietzsche, 
however, wt th a wa ve . of the hand. just because they were neu--
rotic and perhaps suffer:tng occasional psychotic states. 
These arguments against their theories are empty for the 
proof of the pudding is in the eating and not in judgments 
concerrring the cook; It will 
1 . SK, CUP_.. 241 . 
2 . Cited rro~ Goethe ' s F~ust. 
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. " not do to dispose of Soren Kierkegaard's psychology 
by remarking that his ovm soul, the soul that he 
chiefly studied, was a sick soul . For all souls 
are sick (he would reply), and the n_otion that one 
has a ' healthy minded' ~ oul is the most perilous of 
all sicknesses .l · 
The phenomenological analysis that SK made is hi ghly rated 
by many contempo-rary r sychologists . He made a substantial 
break with traditlonal rational psychology and was one of the 
fir st to i n sist that the roac to reality must be t8.ken by the 
whole individual.; Fror.1 SK ' s initial investi gation existen .... 
tialism as a school may be commended for the emphasis upon this 
whole indi v:i.dual as a feeling and acting being as well as a 
thinking being . 2 The resul ting psychological pers pective and 
analysis made SK , . in Werner Brock ' s opinion , "one of the :most 
remarkable psychologists of all time, tn depth , if not in 
breadth , superior to Nietzsche , snd in penetration comparaole 
·only to I'·ostoievski."3 
2. SK and Contemporary Psych oloGY • 
Kierkegaard did not found a school of psychology, and he 
has had few, if any , psychologj cal disciples . He may be re-
lated to the contemporary trends of psychology from ttree 
general aspectE' . 
1 . Biblical Psychology . 
In his presuppos:Ltions, he assumes a blblical anthropology 
and the doctrines of the orthodox Christi~n system. This 
1. Lowrie, Art., xii . 
2 . Cf. Hay , MA. , 30 .. 
3 . Brock , CGP, 75 . 
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perspective is a religious psychology whi ch is nresen tly 
championed by such men as Wyngaarden and Bovin cl{ of the Free 
Un iversity of Amsterdam and such Americans a s Van Til of 
\~ estminster Sem-tn8.ry and J aarsma of Calvi n College .. This 
school does not i w~. ore clinical resear ch nor in tr· ospecti ve 
ana lysis, but it insists that the norms for evaluating the 
data resnlting from such procedures must be derived dirActly 
frorn the Bible.. 'l'his school of ps ycbology i.s very closely 
related to Ki er~egaard in his starting poi nt . 
ii. sychoanalysts . 
The ~ethonol 08Y and some of tbe conceptual izat ions in 
~K 1 s psycb.ology is s imilar to that of the pnychoanalysts . 
His development is closely aligned at many oints to t he very 
popular Freuo.i'::l.n &nalys is of human mot~vation ., Some f eel that 
I<:iei'kegaard ' s analysis was even more adequate to account for 
th:i s moti vat on . 
I n his time , Rnd still more in ours, even when j_ t 
does not decline to admit that th~re is such a 
thing as a psyche , psychology ha s been contBnt 
to r emain so - much on the surface t hat there is 
not much to distinguish it from histology, and 
even the so - calle~ 'deep 9sychol0~y 1 of Freud , 
Jt.t.rtc;, and Adler does not delve deep enough to 
discover the soul . l 
In Friedmann 1 s opinion "one should say , 1 Kier·kegas.rd and 
r-ietzs che y;·ere the first ps ycho.-analysts 1 ; Kierkegaaro under ... 
stood ver;;r well the dynamic role of the 1.IDconscious . "2 In 
1 . Lowrie , Art., xi; cf . Mowrer , LPD , 534 ff . 
2 . Friedmann, KI E , 51 . 
view of the infl uence ~ ~ r eychoanalyttc methods, it wil l 
be well to i n dicate severa l :points of simi larity between 
SK an d this school . 
(1 . ) The Unconscious. 
SK d oes not r1 evote much time to the discussion ar.cl analy ... 
sis of the ,mconscions ~ ~' bu.t l t is l.ID.doubte d l -;," an im-
portant s.spe ct of l-:is thought . He V8ry clearly h eld it to 
be a significan t asDect of 'J sychoJo gy . That t he phases of 
unconscious mental process are not me r el:r the hys i ological 
ba::;es for conscious experien ce is s tatec i.n the Jourr..als,. In 
an a ttacl-< on the genera l concept of emei' t::;en t evolt;ti on , he 
posits the irnpo s sibi.H t~- of exr l a inlng the transi t lona l steps 
from 'body ' to 'c-aind 1 1 and r~_dicules the 1 miraculo s ' nov;er 
of novelty involve d . 
We l earn from the s ophi sti ca l physi olo gy that 'the 
key to b~cwledge f the c nsc i o1s l~fe of the caul 
l ies i n the l1fl.COE2C i ous' (C: arus) . B t what pr'3 c isely 
does t he key .rnean if t 1.8 transit on f rorn unc:onf: c_ 01.18 -
n ess to consc.ious r>ess is not ex-c l nined'? The tran -
sit i on ls a leR-p (which ans1~;ers . to mar-veling) which 
no key can ope~ . l 
For S~':: the unconscious was p1J rely a me!"lta l enttt~~ . It 
seemed to have a cl0se I' 8 lation to th-e hcc'ly , hut forth~ m, st 
nart dae~ed to be in a ~ara lJ e lls ~ which has e close ar~ c-
79 
Freud held ~ Osten 2ibly SK ~ao interested i n the u . con sci~us 
seems to so ~ve ss a factor OL epistemological a_ alys i s is 
t r ue , but t~e mai~ i n fluence an~ imretus aooears more c~oAel~ 
r~elated to the ' dynsm:!cs' of psycho l orr,y . One of his 'T-~sycho-
lo[izing' biographers states tt.at nruerl{egaaro j_llu•nh•. ateo 
the c~s•.)t:'1s of the unconsc =:.ou.'i . 11 l Das:tc to this illum:! £l3.ti on 
was 3'':: 1 s coctrlne of the S1J.b stantia1 .:oul vihich, ha telieve¢1. , 
was bs.s 5_c to orthodox Christianity . He struggled to bring to 
light the 1..m seen facto r s which greatly influen ce d con sc1.ous 
sx:?erie.nce and bro·:;.sh t. t her1 out us rel i gious ronceptualizations~: 
V.'hen j uo t a JOtlr>.t: student he made e.n obser ~;a tion which indi -
cates an early i nterest in expe rience below t he level of 
consci ous awareness~ 
IJ:'be extraordi nary way in which s ometh :::tf- long for-
go tten suddenly bursts into consciousness is really 
quite rema rkable, for exa.mp l e , the recollection of 
something wrong of wrdch one was hardly cons cious 
a t the mome:1t of acting- -li~htning annou..11.clng a 
violent storm, They do n ot come forward, they lit -
era l ly burst fo~th with trerneno ous power , demandi ng 
to be he arr-1 . • 2 
Six y6ars l a ter after a period of d~ssolute l iving, the 
death o.f his father , end the affai r wJ th Ree;iD 8, !"1e again 
r e cogrii zed thi s fact of the unconscious '"' :._ th a deeoe r insi,;b. t 
into its implications . 11 '1'1 ..... "'r i 1 1 t;..,-· • 1e tJv r ) e uln(j lS when a man 's 
consciousness- is sub j ect to such pressure f rom childhood up 
the ela f i city of' the soul, nor all the energy 
" 
1 • Friedmann , Kl E , 51 " 
2 . SK , JSK, 30 . 
of fre e dom can rid him fro n it . "l 
Tt 1e l.J.Ylcons cicms fo r ;::v: was a ba s ic fact r in h u.ms.n ife 
l:trd_versa 1ly- a l (~ cr'-e whi:.;h contJ'olled many of the ga te s t o 
the ['1 tur e . Tlli s f a ctor was n ot t':' c main de terr.<:!.n o.n t of the 
self , however , for Hgenerally speaking , consciousness , i .. e . , 
cons ciousnes s of s elf_, i fl t h e c-:;c-Lsive crite rion of the s e lf . 
The more cone ci ommes s , the more s el f . '!2 I-Io·wever' , the pot"3n _, 
tlal ·which is ac t ive i n i tself ) of the self must n ot be ove r -
looked f')r there is "a gradation of thB con s ciousnes s of the 
sel f ; fi_rst comes v.nconsciousness of b e i ng an ete r na l self , 
then a lmowl edge o f having a self in which there ls a f ter all 
· ' i t 1 n~ some tn ng e erna ~ 0 The individu? l ~ay become aware of the 
unconscious Alement of h :t s make up but t1:1is awareness does 
vt=:ry l ltt1e to-Nard the governance of i t .. In th:ts ele''1'3:J.t 
the r e i3 nan i nnocf!n ce , an uncon sciousness , which e ven 
t!le holies t a ct. 
SK h e lc. t hat sf'x was o£' .6reat contri bution to the ana lys~ s 
of human psycho l ogy .. SK did not go so far as F1•eud , who 
analyzed mos t of human behavi or L'l terms of seJ<nal motiva-
tio-.-1 . ...ex has a broad c':efinl. t: 0n f or Freur: but i s strtctly 
natura l istic. SK was n ot natur~ listi c in hi s psychol ogy or 
phi los or hy nd sex for h i m, thoue,h the immediate c n,Js e of 
, ":' TT -rev 112. ... . '-1 l } ' J t...i .L \.. 1 
2 ..: rr C" " 11'1' L ~L , '-' '-" II _,_ '-' . 
,--ur 
h)l ~ J ;.) II 1~36 . 
4 • r T~ Ee p . 65 . ..::. 
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o~ muc1 behavior , was exp l aine d in terms of ~-B un~erl~no 
e r e£'- • The v i Em of se.;~ n the psychol ogy of Jun g is much 
more modi f ed and pe rhape :J o:uiewha t clo::Jely relR tee to the 
view of E:K . J..r, 3K there i s mnch l t=>ss emuha :::; ::._ ur.on t~'1e se~ 1 
"' ,/iP-bo ls . He uses :!. t, for tl..,.e m s- 1 art , in his 'l'r~ t~r ... gs to 
i llustrate the conrlict of frea~ nd espnir ln t~e· SEE~~et_ c 
n ~' t ur·c of r.1an • 
c' c: 11 be ra t.:. on ~ He C:ic1 not 
l:l-1. :::: i~.he :r'rt:;t~~-=-d.n J cClr' J oi the nat r-e 0f tho ib (l o ,. Fo 
. 
~' Ltl 1 ' ~ith qinfu l nasu ~a s posited SAxuality ~"l ~ st as 
J lV1.!l ), but thl dr6at1 i s l1.it: e11.err;;y . It l s not a subjectivel-
re.:' l ectec: Clreac'! ••• :t.t 2_~ the who l e p ower of sensuality ~ •2 At 
v,. .. L s ,:vne t moe the cH s t i 1 c t .t on of so o0 a:n.<l ev il c rr..e to Adsm , 
s o d d the s ex1 a l dist i ncti on nr1se in him as e ~ro _ ens lt ~ 
I t 'nas no t sir1ful i n t.self , only ra!O',de ~YJ. ful b sin . At 
1~ 5.:-nes (;Y: seews to th.:Lnk :::: 7_n &.nd se:x were the tiw - f lr1 consA -
quences of t.h.e Fall ; and in 8. way tile -prcof t b:::.t ~.lau ',<;as a 
synthes i :.:; of tori·, and soul . 
T . ':'-':. ,- CD ' 47 . 
2 . SK , E/ 0 , I , 105 . 
• 
~ n c ~ t e~r.er:.. t t o furth 8r s i n while sex, meat" 1: 'b lle , was ~ w e fl' e ct 
of t he Fall upon t he bod y- .. 11 If he were not a s:y-rct're 8is of s 0ul 
&.nd body ·which is s ustai ned by spirit , the sexual coul d never 
come into the worln w:l.th sinfllness . •'l This exrla Ln s the 
pr·onfme ss o.f the sexua l to be expressed through ac t s of sin . 
SK was not too clear 9s to the ezact differenti a tion and 
r e lationship of sex an d sin , but he was clear ln t h at sex was 
neithe r :Jinf ul per· ~ nor the basic psychologi cal energy 
dri ve . 
The who l e qu e stion about the significance of the 
sexual , and its s :t ~1'1ificance .!.n the particular 
~rh~res , has undeniably been poorly ar.s wered un-
tl l now , nnd e.bove al l it is very s el om answere d 
with the r :i.3ht feeling . To utter wit t ic isms 8rO'.l.t 
it is a l0wl ./ art, to admonish it is not d ff i cult. , 
to preach about it in such a way as to l e ave out 
the diffi culties is not hard to do , but to talk 
about it in a fash on truly humane is an art ,.. 2 
( 3 . ) Dre ams " 
Dreams were important for SK in psycholoeicel ana l ysis , 
though n ot t o t he degree in which the psychoana l ysts cmoloy 
t h em . For Sk they were not sexual SY?Ylbols but rather !nan -
fes ta tt ons of the a c t i vi ty of creH d and mess a€;es from God 
through the dreaming spirit . SK makes an interesting en tr~r 
in his regard ng dreams and the importance of un~ 
cons c:t ous a c ti vi ty . 
1 . SK, CD, 44 . 
2 . SK , Ct:, SO .. 
Pe op l e mus t h.:lve l:t ved e ver so much more simp l y in 
t he days when4 lfe l ieved t ha t God ma d e h is wi ll kn own 
in d r eams .•• Mor eov er t he poor op inion i n whi ch 
dreams a r e he l d n owadays is a lso con ne cted wi t h in .... 
t e lle ctua li sm, which r ea lly on l y v a l u e s t he con -
scious, while i n s i mp l e r a ge s pe op l e p ious l y be -
lie ved t hat t he t.m cons ciou s l i f e i n man wa s t he more 
i mp ortan t a s we ll a s t he profounder . l 
( 4 . ) Fur the r Si mila r i t ie s to F'r eud . 
Mowr e r a ttempt s to sh ow t ha t 8K is close to Fr eud i n h is 
an t h rop ology . 
Cl e arly t he bodi ly comp onent corre sp ond s to wha t Fr eud 
cha r a cte r i z ed as t he 1 id 1 • The 1 soulish 1 , or psychic , 
f a ctor corresp onds equ a lly we ll to Fre ud ' s ' ego'. 
And from t he way i n whi ch Ki e r kegaa r d use t he t e r m 
' spirit 1 i n a numbe r of differen t con t en ts , it is not 
too much to supp ose t h a t f or him it wa s rou3hl y equi -
va l en t t o t he ' supe r ego ' or c on sci enc e . 2 
Obvious l y , h owe v er , t he body for SK is exa ctly equiva l en t to 
t he body in Fr eud ' s p s y ch ology . The sp irit i s r adi ca lly d i f -
f eren t f r om t he ' s upe r ego' bo t h in be ing and f un cti on . For 
Fr e ud 11 t he ' s upe r ego' is utter l y na t u r alisti c and epi phen omena l 
• •• (whi l e for E1K ) ••• t he spirit is t he man ife sta t ion i n man of 
t he s upe r na tur a l, an d is n<t"me.nal. u3 
It is i mportan t to r emembe r t ha t SK h as en t i r e l y di ff e r en t 
p r es u pposi t i ons from t he major i t y of ~s ychoana lysts . T~ e 
r adi ca l di f f e r ence of hi s Bi b l i ca l pre supp osi tions and his 
r e l igious p urp os e make s SK 1 s p s y ch ol ogy appe ar to be only 
l. SK , J SI'C , 376 . 
2 . Mowr e r, LPD , 5 43 . 
3 . Copp , SKF , 119 . 
in c· den ta ly nnd a e el den t a lly rel a t ed to ps ycLl. oan a l ys i s.. The 
similsrity of s ome of the anal ysi s i s , h owever , et r lki ng . 
ii i~ Ps ycholor.;y of Re li gion . 
SK 's psych ology i s r elated to a third psychological 
perspe c ti ve ~ Hi s theory is very mnch li ke tile psy~.,;ho l o ~i e s 
of f.:ch l eierma cher and Otto in both method and purpose. His 
ps ycholog:i ca l eng_l ys i s i s inte r pr e t ed in terms of bas i c r e-
l :i_gi ous exper en ce s . Thes e'moments' of SK resemble Otto's 
'numinous' and a r e the points of con t act with God . 
The broad perspective of Kierlcegaard ' s psychology ha s 
s ign i ficant affinity to these preceding three psychological 
perspectives . As Kierkegaaro develops in pop_ula:t>i ty , and 
if his works become more widely read , he may yet at t ain the 
r ecognition and acclaim , as a psycholo ~ist , that Brocl: has 
conferred upon him in the above quotation . 
3 . The Basis for RK ' s Consideration of Dread . 
The emoti onal state of dread is , Kierkegaard believes , 
very important" Dread for SK was the key to the unders t and-
ing of anthropology. "Everything turns upon dread coming 
into view . "l This concept is the basis for the C:.avelopment 
of his theory of psychological states and it alone will 
properly relate man to God . Just a s SK 1 s philosophy had 
on l y one basic category- -the i ndivi dual , so the individual 
has only one basic psychologi csl category. Man ' s religious 
longing an~ his moral laxity are both explained by its myster-
1 .. S K, CD , 39 .. 
ious and all pe r·vadine; powel'• Only through the investi gati on 
of dread--"a psychological study of the pre - dispositi ons in the 
human consciousness out f which the anti-ethical emerges by 
a leap"l--can one hope to view man properly and hope to ex-
tri cate him from h is pr edicament . This concept also must 
be considered in order t o understand the solidarity of the 
human race . Man 's pred:Lcament is the sin in his l fe and its 
presen ce must be accounted for. SK did not presume to use 
::_Jsychology as a final proof for his theological apolo getic 
f or sjn , a~d in his psy~hological wor ks he admitted the need 
for dogmatic , or presupposed doctrinal statements, in order 
to supply adequately the basis for sin. The psycholo ,ical 
observations furnlshed the ' real possibility' for the ge:ner-
llti On Of Sin While d0~11atiCS prOVided the I . '19Bl p0SS1.bili ty t w 
Again it may be noted that SK 1 s life and personality 
may· have had much to do with the particular psychological per-
spective that he presented. A few years after the analysis 
of man 's psyche, he indicated how closely dread had pressed 
I 
upon his thoughts through his life . 
Deep within every man there lies the dread of being 
alone in the world , for gotten. by God, overlooked 
among the tremendous household of mi Udons unon 
millions . That fear is kept away by looking upon 
all those about one who are bound to one as friends 
or family; but the dread is -nevertheless there and 
one hardly dares think of what would happen to one 
if all the rest were taken away. 2 
1 . Swenson, Art., xxii . 
2 • SK, JSK, 220 . 
SK would retort , however, that his personal , close con~ 
tact with dread only made its significance more obvious to 
him than to others. DrP.sd for h i m was the only ' middle 
term' which could adequately serve to deduce the present 
sta_te of man in reference to his creation by an Al:>solute and 
Holy God . This concept was no incidental means of enter-
tainment for the intellect , but rather was in a real sense 
the key to the universe. He felt tha t dread would sustain 
all the import that he placed upon it and he challenged all 
who would deny his thesis . "If science has any other psy-
cbologtcal micdle term which do~atically , ethically , and 
psychologically possesses the advantage that dread has , then 
one is free to prefer it . "l He deplored the neglect of dread 
in psychology.. Fven when ,-sed , it was gener!:'.lly considered 
one of ma:ny diverse emotional sts.tes of unpleasantness , and 
hence in SKs opinion, really by- passed . - - "One almost never sees 
the concept dread dealt with in psycholo~:ry .tt2 
Kierkegaard sought to avoid thls neglect by making dread 
the central feature of his psycbolo~J · This was done for 
two significant reasons: 
(1) He considered dread the prime feature of any phenomen-
ological analysis~ His o.vn melancholy and moody life may 
have increased the importance of this fe e ling- t one of experi-
ence . SK believed dread to be an introspective ly observed 
T. SK , CD, 69. 
2 . SK, CD, 38. 
psychological :mood which -s ertTed as the condi tion for all other 
psychological states . 
(2) SK developed drP.sd as a theological concept to defend 
certain doctrines of Lutheran Christianity to which he aQhered . 
Dread served SK ns an. apologetic factor by which to elucidate 
man's predicament as a sinner as well as the means of salva-
tion from this predicament . 
SK ' s exposition of dread will be reviewed from the per-
spective of these two reasons . The firs t part will define 
and differentiate dread as a psychological datum. The second 
will show how dread as a relig1.ouR concept tmdergirded his 
theological doctrines . 
4. Dread in Phenomen ological Analysis,. 
Dread is an experience of 'dizziness of the spirit' ·whi ch 
presses in upon a man when he is presented with a crit:ical 
decision .. This emotional state is generally an unpleasant 
feeling.-tone ·which at its height is physiologtcally registered 
as a 'sinking' in the visceral muscles . This varies in 
:Lntens l ty toward a vague apprehension of a.n ominous situation .. 
Dread is an a\tra.ction to what one fears , a sympathetic 
anti::>athy . Dread is an allen power which lays hold 
of an individual, and yet he cannot tear himself 
loose from it 1 and also does not will to; for one 
is afraid, but v.rhat one fears e.lso attracts one .. l 
This a tt:t·action- repulsion dialectlc of dread is like the 
experience of a man who has qutt the use of dope , with a great 
1. SK, JSK, 105 . 
me a sure of inwar•dnes8, and now encounters a narcotics peddlP-r " 
He is drawn by the anticipated pleasure and emoti onal confort 
of the drug and r epe lled by the possibility of once more being 
a slave to it . KierkegB.ard considered th s much cU ffe rAnt 
than the state of f ear , however. 
i . Dre ad and Fear . 
SK did no t v;an t bis l'eader to mistake the dialectical 
dread for common f~ar . "I must therefore call attention to 
the fact that it is different from fear and similar concepts 
which refer to s-Jraething definite . nl Kierkegasrd believed 
that the ex1;1erien ce of fear was always stimulated by a definite 
object . Fear comes when a man walks in the woods and mee ts 
a b ear . Dread ocr:urs when he meets nothing ln the fore~t and 
~ret becomes suddenly panic - sti·icken for no reason at all . 
This dread seems to beie_q_niva l ent to the numinous awe , or 
Y •.rea tur~efiful , of Hudolf' Otto .. "It is the emotion of a 
cre11ture , abas ed and overwhelmed by its own nothingnesE' . tt2 
This emotional sta te does not start a s a. vague mood and in-
creaoe in i ntensi ty to fear . 
Anyone who i s capable of more precise introspectlon 
must recognize that the diBtinc tion betw~en such 
a ' dread ' and natural fear is not simply one of 
degree and intensity . The awe or· ' dree.d 1 seems to 
penetrate to the very marrow, making the man's 
hair bristle a.nl'l b . f1 J imbs quake ,. But it may also 
stea l upon him almost unobserved as the gentlest 
of agitations , a more fleeting shadow pass i ng 
across his mood . I t has therefore no t hin g t o do 
with intenRi ty , and no nat~ral !'ear passes over· i nto 
i t merely by being intensified . 3 
-=----::~-=-1 . SK, CD, 38 . 
2 . Otto , IH , 10 
3 . Otto , IH, 16 . 
The difference between fear and 'ead i s much more basic than 
i ntensi t~r ., It is the dif.ference between an a gitation causea 
by some observed object , and a religious ex9erience which for 
Ki erkegaard makes one guilty before Goo . 
ii. Dread and Anxiety . 
These two words are cons i dered synon~ous by many psy 
ch ologl sts . Tbe G€r1•1Rn word Angst is transle.t ed variously 
as 'dread ' or ' anxiety ' and it is obvious that the same psye 
cholog:t cal state is intended . I t is true , however , tha t 
'anx i ous ' often includes a ' set ' for action or a general 
readiness that dread does not contain . 
It will be well to regard K erkegaard ' s thought at this 
point in reference to two psychologistH who have terme d this 
experiencf'? 'anxiety ' and have considered it a very si gr1_ificant 
aspe0t of psychology . This will give a point of reference 
for SK' R concept to contemnorary psychology a~ well as 
pe rhaps c lari f ying wh a t S ' meant by t t o a degree . 
( 1) ~reud 1·s --View of Anxiety<~ · -
l<'reud is very much interested ir.. ctread (he translates 
Angst as anxiety) and hss written a book or::. this topic ... ...,The 
Problem of A!lxi ety. He believed t h i s to be a very important 
aspect of psychology . The concept was analyzed into two 
aspects: neurotic anxlety and objective anxiety . The for::ner 
is a harmful psychological state , and if carried to the 
extreme may precipitate a very serious neurosis . This type 
of anxiety has no real object or ground . Objective dread 
90 
is that which signals a really dangerous subject and is dis" 
Qh.&rtjec1 as a self .... prt9s~rving ~nergy . Anxiety arises when the 
libido is repressed and is a mani festation of ego defense . 
Freud even sounds like SK in discussing the problem. "What 
we are seeking , it is apparent , is an insight which shall 
reveal the nature of anxiety , an either-or which shall dis ... 
tinguish truth from error in regard to _ it·. ttl 
It is easily seen, however , that Angst is rt9garded _in a 
different manner from that of SK. SK would insist that the 
proper object of anxiety is nothing as in Frau.d 1 s neurotic 
anxiety . He would be quick to affirm that this was real anxie -
ty as cpposed to the __ real e.n.xie ty of Fre ud which has a dis .... 
cernible object of danger . Dread for Freud is e.lso explained 
t..~~~ sex rather than being the ultimate explanation of sex& 
Dread is for SK the basic psycholog1cal category. It is the 
basis for all of man ' s difficulty but also the ~~ide to his 
salvation. Dread is man's advantage over the beast and that 
which makes him unique . On the other hand, even objective 
anxiety is unfortunate in Freud's thought and avo dable with 
the proper traini~e . 
The condition of anxiety is after all un\rariably de-
triMental ; its disadvantae~ becomes conspicuous when 
it reaches an intense degree . It then interferes 
wi th the action that alone would. be expedient s.nd 
would serve the purpose of self-preservation, whether 
it be flight or se1f-def ense . 2 
1 . Freud, POA, 69. 
2 . Freud , GIP , 372 . 
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For SK dread was not just an acci den tal emotional state 
by wb~ch the ego was defended . Inste ad , it often caused ego 
loss. His dread was that antipathetic s~nathy that repelled 
s. man for fear he become guilty before his constituting Power , 
and yet v1hicl.t made him acknowledge his guilt already for, in 
hating that whlcl1 he (h•eaded, he loved it ,. 
Freud considered anxiety to be overcome 'Nhen it was 
converted into an obje c t i ve fear while SK believed ttrt is 
only at the instant when salvation is actually posited that 
this drcs.n is overcome .'tl F'reud's naturalism and Kierkegaard ' s 
superna turalism would tend to make their theories differ 
widely . "The most striking difference is that for Kierkegaard 
anxiety is a constructive , ' saving', 'educative ' experience , 
whereas for Freud it is deGtructive , pathogenic , and ali en 
to the best interes~ and aimE of the affected individual . "2 
(2) Rollo May's View of Anx i ety . 
Dr . May bas written an excellent volume of psychology 
on the topic of 'anx~ety' . He ,sives a review of Kierkee;aard's 
theory and commends SK as one of the first to seriously treat 
the phenon~enon of dread . For Iv'is.y' ttAnxiety is the apprehension 
' 
cued off by a threat to some value which the individual holc.s 
essenti al to his existence as a personality . ••3 Dread , in 
May's opinion , is a threat t o the total security of the se l f . 
l . SK, CD , 48 . 
2. Mowrer, LPD, 545- 546 . 
3 . May, MA , 191. 
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He , too, disti aguishes betwe~n dread and fear, for the l a tter 
is a threat merely to some phase, or level , of pe1•sonality 
1 ins tead of the whole . Fear and dread are not quali tatively 
cl.ifferent as in SK and Otto , however.. hay constners anxiety 
a generic term, while fear is "the expression of the sa~e 
r-apacity in its specific , ob j ectified form e'2 Dr. May, like 
SK, considers anxiety , or dread _, one of the most important 
aspe cts of psychological study. He does not regard anxiety 
a.s a religious mood , however, and it does not attain an 
i mp ortance equal to that tn Kierke gae.rd. 
May, like Freud, develops a two-fold aspect of anxiety, 
normal and neurotic . The normal variety may be 'ecucative ' 
as SK holds~ but the neurotic is an attempt to escape and 
produces a defense Mechanism which is unhealthy. In May's 
theory snxiety is a capaci tJ·· of an organism to react to 
threats . SK would insi.st that this is only one side of the 
story , for dreat4. is not only a threa t but , mo.st important of 
all , also is a promise ., May, not holding to K1erkegaarrl 's 
view of canthropology , does not re gard this promise , which is 
made pos~ible because man is a spiritual organism. 
11 :t , Gui 1 t • 
K1erkegaard consi_ders the psychological experie11ce of 
cu1lt as being distinctly different from clread ._ 0 One feels 
guilty when he ls making deci.sions in the ethical sphere. 
1 .. May , MA , . 204 ..... 205 . 
2 . May , M.A , 205 • 
3 . SK, CUP, 468-483. 
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Either the ma king of a de cision to a c t cont rary to what one 
f eel s i s hi s o"Ql i ~ation, or f a.ll i1.1-g short of a fulfil lment 
of t his obl i gat i on, brL gs on guilt . Dread co ditio s the 
d ecision to live ethically hile gui lt results from th im-
poss i b i l i ·ty of a fiui teJ individual's a·~taining a..a. ideal of 
perfect i on. The etnical sp her e of existence is a decision 
to make every posse anc e sse • 
.. -, ... .. i ~ .;.. ~ ....., 
.... r _, __ ·. u _ o 
·c . ·· t 1~ ·, l:.t..C. l':.f: c::c. ~- e:. t <l a ctual ize far outrun his ability. to 
real ize ·chem. Man has set his ste,nda.rd and now he feels 
guilty in that he canno·t p1·aJctice~ what he has preached . K 
s ms to refer to gui lt s.s a. self - d iagustedness an.d a frust-
rat i on dua "liv procra.ati a.t i on which is f CII·ced upo him be-
cat,.ee of lack of powc:r to perfor m his thical obli ·at i o iS. 
He is guilty f or he h .. s chosen. ·th . s ~ obli ·at i ons hims l f. 
Dr e e.d arises f rom this situat i on when o e wond rs what th 
cons quent of gui lt will be . Gui lt is a. phenomenon in the 
ethical realm of existen ce ~-nd is to b distiu5uished f rom 
t 
the awar eness of f alling shor ·t of 't he mark iu the 1·e11 i ous 
realm. The la: .; ".;ei is the .x:perience of sin. 
iv. ~in-Oonsciousn~s e. 
Cons ci ousness of sin i s dist i n ct from guilt. Gu i lt 
is the phenomenorl resulting when one f alls short of hie own 
standards . Sin-consciousne ss is the emotion experienced 'rhen 
1 • SK , CUP , 51 • 
death', and it is "the possibility of this siclmess i:Iha.D 
is man's main advantage over the beast.'•l 
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Although despair is universal, it is not universally re-
cognized. A wasted life is one which was never conscious of 
despair. The unfortunate thing in the world is the unconscious 
level of despair, that is, not being conscious that one is 
despairing. This is the reason that the world in general has 
not been cured of the illness precipitated by the presence 
of dread. The Qnconsciousness is in the sphere of what primi-
tive Christians called the 'world' re~erDing to the mass of 
unregenerate people and the 'natural' man in Christendom. SK 
indicates somewhat paradoxi cally that one basic r eason for the 
awarene ss of des pair is because " the dearest and most attract-
i ve dwelling of despair is in the very heartof immediate 
happiness."2 The worldling is so busy eating , drinking , and 
making merry that he is ignorant of despair. ·The individual 
can never really understand himself and thus never cure his 
ills unless he is aware of despair and that he is 111. Des-
pair brings to man the knowledge that he has a spiritual 
dimension and enables him to have insight into the dread that 
dri ves him. But sad to say "the majority of men live without 
being thoroug...h.ly conscious that they are spiritual beings. u3 
Those without despair are the sickest and those who admit 
having it are the nearest to being cured. 
1. SK, SD, 20<» 
2. SK, SD, 37 • 
3. SK, SD, 39. 
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The great task of one who understands despair is to get 
others to recognize it. The man of the world, however, is 
hopeless for he does not understand his own nature and "with-
out understanding spirit it is impossible to understand des-
pair."! This man talks of despair but believes it to be mere-
ly a frustration of aesthetic pursuits. This is an occasion 
fol" both laughter and tears according to SK. "The comical 
thi ng is that he will talk about having been in despair; the 
dreadful thing is that after having, as he thinks, overcome 
despair, he is then precisely in despair."2 
Despair as a psychological concept must be observed in 
the conscious state, however, to maintain the scientific 
character of psychology and also to understand better the con-
cept of dread. 
Principally, however, despair must be viewed under the 
category of consciousness: the question whether des-
pair is conscious or n ot , determines the gualitative 
difference between despair and despair; Jn its con-
cept a ll despair is doubtless conscious; but from 
this it does not follow that he in whom it exJ s t s , 
he to whqm it can rightly be attributed in co~formi ty 
with the concept, is himself conscious of it.~ 
The despair increases with intensity as conscious aware-
ness increases, and it is most inten se when the spirit is re-
fle eting upon itself. The sickness of the s pirit may be view-
ed from a three-fold perspective in terms of the synthesis of 
1. SK, SD; 34. 
2. SK, SD, 90. 
3 • SK, SD , 90 • 
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the finite and the infinite in man. It .may be "in despair 
a t not being conscious of having a self (despair improperly 
so-called); in des pair at not willing to be oneself; in 
despair at .willing to be oneself."l The first form of despair 
is self-deception, amo1mting to the ignorance of des pair 
which is typical of the immediacies of the aesthetic stage 
of exi stence. The se cond and third states a re really de ~ -
:;&iring. They are opposite tensions in the synthesis of time 
and eternity, body and soul, and possibility and necessity, 
a s well as infinity and the finite. Man wavers, in despa ir, 
from wanting to be Goo. to the opp osite extreme of wanting 
compl e te indep enden ce of God. He des pairs 'tbe cause he cannot 
con ceive himself, cann ot get r i d . of himse lf, cann ot be c ome 
nothing . "2 The solution to the problem of des pair is already 
pr e scribed when one is aware of rli s condition. Real s ubje cti-
v ity is t h en on t he h orizon. An indivt dua l is trul y an existing 
ind i v i dual only as :<.e is mak ing his decisions in the height of 
des pa i r. Just as every cloud has a silver lining, however, 
there may we l l b e hope f or the c on d:-; tj_on of d es pa i r b :y ',-m --· of 
~ J _ 
J . [, .. 
Despair is inherent in man himself; but if he were 
not a synthesis, he could not despair, nor, if the 
synthesis were not from God's hands, constituted 
in the right relationship, could man despair.3 
1. SK, SD, 65. 
2. SK, SD, 26. 
3. SK, SD, 21. 
The spiri t is God 1 s i ma g e i n man and just as by it a l one. man 1 s 
p r ec1i c a . en t is a ctuali zed and r ea l ized , s o by i ts very na t u r e 
as Go d 1 s ,gi ft t he cure f or man may come . 
Dr e ad and despa ir are t hus s een to be c lose l y r e l a t ed . 
I t may be pe rmissib l e in many in s t an c e s to equ a t e t hem . F'or 
t he most pa rt, howev e r, de s pai r 8e e ms to be t he p sycholo gi c a l 
manife sta tion of dread , whi l e cread is t he u.nd e rly i n g fa ctor 
of psychology p rore: r l y conceived . Dr ead i ndi c a t es t b e need for 
the ex i s t ing i ndi vi dua l to t r~rn i nwa r d for t he truth of hi s 
concH tion i n this wor l d , 111Jhi l e c.e s )ai r is t h e i n t en s e e ff e ct 
of t_e dreadful a ctionwhich rive s man to a qua l itatjve l ea p 
by whi ch a l one he can r ea l i ze and sav e h i mse lf. Dr ead is t he 
e x pe ri en ce of one who kn ows n ot wha t to d o, but mus t d o some -
thin , whi l e d e s pai r r esults from h avin g made t he wr ong 
deci sion . 
vi . Re c api t u l a tion. 
SK beli e v ed the expe ri ence of d r e ad to be a unique e x -
perien c e of man. I t had no dis crete obje ct which stimul a t e " 
man and it was di stinguishab l e from f ea r f or t h is r e ason . 'rhi s 
expe r i en c e mov es men to a ction but n ot s ole l y as a t_reat, f or 
it is a l s o a p osi t i v e stimulus . Dr e ad is a curious sympathe tic 
anti pa t hy to wha t col ors mu ch of one 's ex 9e r ienc e . Ki e r kegaard 
disti nguishe d d r ead from s uch emotions as fear , de s p a ir, and 
g u i l t not by dif f erentia tion in t he emotiona l f ee l ing-tone , 
bu t by noting t he obje ct s of the s e moods --a phen omena l dan ge r, 
t he f a ct of di s p l e as i ng God , and the fa ct of fai l ing t he s e lf. 
Dread, on the other hand, has no object. This psychological 
datum has been regarded contemporaneously by psychologists 
t hough none consider it of such moment as Kierkegaard. 
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Dread was indeed a factor that SK derive d from intro-
spective analys is, but it was more important to him as a con-
cep t by which to articulate his theological position. This 
brings the disserta tion to the second purpose of dread in the 
t h ought of Kierkegaard. 
5. Dread as a Theolo gical Concept. 
Kierkegaard did not begin his psychological investigation 
wi t h empty hands. The presuppositions with which he a pproached 
ps ychology were the validity of the statements of the Bi ble and 
the truth of the doctrines of the Lutheran Church. His chief 
i nte rest in developing a psychology was to erect an apologe t ic 
for these presuppositions. Dread was not only a result of 
phenomenological analysis, but also a useful theological theory. 
i. ~Tead as a Qualification of Spirit. 
Dread qualifies the spiritual dimen sion of man. It is the 
experience t h rough whi ch the spirit is revealed. In the infant 
stages of the individual and in the drowsiness, or sleeping 
state, of a more mature level of development, dread qualifies 
the spiritl and is the only manifestation of t he spirit's 
synthesis. Dread never is f ully clear to consciousness and 
1. SK, CD, 38. 
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in its most clear condition it is little more than a peripheral 
psychological pressure which is expressed in the intense emo-
tional states of despair, fear, and even elation. Dread is 
al s o the factor which qualifies spirit in its most self-con-
sc i ous states as it synthesizes ln the growth of personality. 
"Personality is a synthesis of possibilit y and necessity,"l 
and spirit makes its determination in the face of dread wl1ich 
arises in possibility which is the freedom of s pirit. This 
is as close as one can get to m1derstanding the sinning of 
the spirit. 
Dread is the dizziness of freedom which occurs when 
the spirit would posit the synthesis, a~c freedom 
then gazes down into its own possibility, grasp ing 
at finiteness to sustain itself. In this dizziness 
freedom succumbs. Further than this psychology can-
not go and will not. That very instant everything 
is changed, and when freedom rises again it sees t ha t 
it is guilty. Between these two instants lies the 
leap , which no science has explained nor can exp lain.2 
In all degrees of awareness, dread is the synthesi s which 
spi rit p osi ts in all its relat ionsht p s. Spirit is the uni que 
as pect of man , and it is qFalif ied in all of its phases by the 
ps y ch ological state of dread. The influenc e of dread is in no 
wis e in proportion to the con s cious act:!. v:t ty of spirit, however, 
for t:t.e dread ma :r be greater in one who does not even realize 
t ha t he is a s piritual creature . The un consctous d i men s ion of 
dre ad ma y mod i f y one ' s l ~_ fe whi le he i s c omp l ete l y unaware. 
1 . SK, S_ . , 6 2. 
2. SK , CD , 5 5 . 
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SK sup p oses t h is l a t t e r to be t he case in t he indivi dua ls 
wh o ha v e a ' spiri t -less 1 exis t en c e and exis t wi th a nparen t 
con t en t in t he a e sthe tic sta ge of l ife . 
Spi rit is e s senti ally fr e d om to a ct. Dr ead , a c cor dingl y , 
is always ori en t ed toward fr ee d om . 1 This c a _a city for fr ee dom 
t ha t t he sp iri t of man ha s brings anxie t y fo r awhene v e r 
anxie t y is p ot en ti ally p r e s en t in t he same expe r i ,n ee . " 2 Thus 
pri or to t he s p irit 1 s exp r e ssion in a ' momen t 1 of existen c e 
t her e is t he J\..-pe ri enc e of ore ad whi ch brings t he p ossibi l i t y 
of ch oi c e t o the s pi ri t. 
ii . Obj e ctive Dr ead . 
SK , wh o be l iev e d t he Bi b l e to b e inerran t, made an a ttempt 
to account for a ll of t he da t a of t he Eible . His t heory of 
ob j e ctive dre ad was to a cco unt for h ow sin came i n to the 
wor l d . The physi ca l universe was imp l i cated in t he Fall of 
Adam and t h rough d r ead t he na tural e vil s ar ~ pro u c ed . " The 
whole creation gro ane th and travaile t h in pa i n to gether. rt3 
Th is r e ad is no t 'the p os sibi l i t y anteri or to u os s i bi l ity 1 
as in the ca se of human subjec ti ve d r ead , but rather , the 
c.i r e ct r e sul t of s i n 'runn i n g ove r' into t he wor l d . The ' wor l d ' 
is us ed by SK in t he dis para ging s ense to i n cl u de bo t h the 
ma t ~ ria l world and the anti - Chr is ti an e l emen t which make s t his 
wor l d a s eemi ng mass t hat s ee t he s and surge s under t he influ-
en ce of e v i l. 11 This e ff e ct of sin is th e non-human s _he r e of 
1 • S K , CD , 138 • 
2 • May , MA , 3 3 • 
3 . Romans 8 : 28 
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being I have called objective dread."l This world-dread is 
produced every time an indi v idua l posits sin, and it is in-
creased q{lanti tati vely with every moral defection. SIC doe s 
no t clarify what mi ght a ppear to b e an inci p ient hylozoism in 
r e gard to obje ctive dread. Presumably he would declare objec-
tive dread.to be a valid observation in terms of natural evil 
and appea l to d ogmatics for its ' i deal p oss i bility'. This 
dread must be referred to t n e Spirit of God which not only is 
manifest in the synthesis of every man but also 11moves up on 
the face of the wa t er . 't 2 
The resolu tion of t his objective dread is en tailed in 
~he resolution of the subje ctive dread in man, and fi n al re-
demption will include both. Therap y which will r es olve the 
con flict caused by d r e ad in the p3rson will also ultimately 
re s olve the confli ct in t h e world , for the crea tion will be 
're deemed' alon g wi th t he creature. Thus the dread of the 
indi vi dual is the important concept for psychology but it is 
well to remember that 
.dread si gnifies two things; the dread in which the 
indi vi dual posits sin by the qualitati ve leap ; and 
the dread which entered in along with sin, and whi ch 
for this reason comes a lso into t h e world quantita-
tively every time an indi v i dual p osi t s sin.3 
iii. Subjective Dr e ad. 
Subj ective dread is the d r ead whi ch is ' personal' to each 
exis ting i ndivi dual. In t hi s qua l i f i cat ion of the spirit was 
he conceived and i n it he mus t live and move until, or unless, 
I. SK , CD , 52. 
2 • ~n e s i s 1 : 2 • 
3 . { , CD , 49. 
he is 'fully saved'. If he does not have the effects of dread 
healed before death, drea d will be h is p ortion forever. Sub-
jective dread is different in intensity in every indi vidual 
and, seemingly gets more inten s e in each individua l who is 
b orn, according to his chronol og i cal dis tan ce from Adam. 
Subjective dread desi gnates what exists in the 
innocen ce of t he individual, an i Qn ocence whi ch 
corresp on s to that of Adam and ye t is quantitative l y 
different by reason of t h e quantitative increment 
due to gen eration.l 
This is the dread atten dant in concep tion which energizes 
man in his career. The t wo s tates of dread have their origin 
in the sub jective state of dread in Adam and they a l so flow 
by means of generation from him. 
Consequen tly that dread of his- has now acquired two 
analog ous expressions: objective dread in nature,2 
and subjective dread in the individual--of whi ch two 
the latter contains a more and the former a l ess 
than the dread of Adam. 3 
Th e objective dread in nature accounts for na tural evil wh ile 
t he subjective dread in contemp orary man a c co1mts for moral 
evil. The dr ead in n a ture is s till less than the dread in 
Adam even though it has increased wi t h every evil act of man, 
for na ture has infinite l y l ess capacity for d read. The matter 
constitutin g the phys ical universe as well as the n ewb orn bab e 
were n ot considered essentially evil by SK in his hy othese s 
of objective and sub jective dread . Th ey were practical l y so, 
however, for t he p r essure of dre ad left no alteTI~ative. 
l. SK, CD, 51. 
2. ef. Roman s S:22 . 
3 . ·sK, CD, 54 . 
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i v • 'I'b. e Ob j e c t of Dr e ad • 
The dia lecti cal mode of SK 's thought is very a pparent in 
his dis cuss ion of t he object o f dr ead and in few p l a ces, if 
any , of his wr i t in gs is i t more dif f i cult to penetrate and 
analyze. He i degger will be seen to have a close a ffinit y to 
SK at this point. Plainly s p eaking the object of dr e ad is 
n oth ing . It is a mere l a ck. Initi ally it is seen as the ne g -
ati ve unity in t he relation of the body and s oul as the s p i r i t 
first attempts the synthesis. This nothing, however, is pos~ 
ited quick ly as a positive nothingness, a metap hysical void, 
as the spirit becomes the actual third term in the n a t ure 
of man . This nothing is es pecially pertinent to t he p rog en ty 
of Adam ; SK calls this p osterity by t he universal term--the 
'later individual'. In this later individual no thin g b ecomes 
a 'some thing '. In Adam, however, the n othing was absolute 
and devoid of any con tent, but i t nevert~eless envelop ed him. 
Til e nothing of dread is a comp l ex of pre sentiments 
wh ich r e f l e c t t hemse lves in themse lves , coming near-
er and nearer to the individual, notwithstanding that 
in dread t hey signify a gain es sentially nothing , not, 
however, b~ it noted, a nothin g with whi ch the indi-
vi dua l has not h l ng to d o, but a nothing in lively 
communication with the i gn orance of i nnocen ce.l 
The object of dread is nothing in e very case wherein it 
is related to innocence, e i ther in Adam or in a later indivi-
dual. This is the state of imme diacy which seems to be the 
state of any indivi dual from drowsiness to complete unconscious-
1. SK, CD, 55. 
ness , bu t e specially in the dreami ng state . In this stage 
it is mo r e danger ous f or a p erson mor ally, for her e he 
supposes himself neutral and saf e . "All i mm diacy, i n spite 
of its i llusory peace and trar quili t y, is dread , and hence , 
quit e consistently, it is dread of othi ng. "1 
Nothing ie a.n invisible barrier . I t presses i on a 
i nd ividual and then his dread engul f s him. I t is no ·~;hing 
i n the se.se of · ~o th i ng '. The ensuing despair, f ear , 
f r us tr8.t i on , or j oy, fl ows dir ct l y from the j e ne sais 
quai. SK is especiall y i nteres t ed i n this ob j ect of dread , 
f or he bel i eves that the dogma tic doctrine of origi al sin , 
which wi ll be dis cus sed l ater, may then be r ef erred to the 
culpabil i ty of man aad not to God . To explai n or i ginal sin ' s 
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i nfluence , however, a ' someJ11hing 1 is needed and thi s some thil g 
stricte sic dict.a. is ori ,_; i nal sin . The some thi ng which t h no-
thing of dread may signify in a later individual i s the ~ c~ 
2 
s~quence of the f act of generation." It i s the cornmon 1 more' 
which every i ndividual has in contrast to Adam . "The dread of 
sp irit i n a ssuming the respons i b i l ity for his more becomes a 
greater dread. The r e is i npli ed here a s a maxi m the terr ibl fact 
that dread of s i n produces sin.n3 SK believed that the nothing-
ness, whi ch was dr.ead ' s ob j ect, extricated, by its i nherent 
n utrality , both God and man f rom blameworthine ss fo r the set-
t i ng of men 's first qual i tative leap i nto sin . This .othi ng 
l • SK , CD, 3g • 
2 . SK , CD, 56 . 
3 • SK I CD ' 65 . 
can be further elucidated in terms of possibility and the 
future. 
v. Dread ln Terms of t h e Pos s ible and the Future. 
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Dread in the indivi dua l life may be represen ted in terms 
of t he relationship to him of the po s sible. " Possibility is 
for t h e se lf wha t oxygen is for breathing ,nl but the emptiness 
and fullness of the p ossible is the state of dread. Drea d is 
t h e t en sion of p os sibility as decision is before man. Possi-
bi lity is t he op en ga te of the future and the des pair of man 
b eca use he mus t be able to ch oos e his own self .and ye t he is 
mortally fearful of ch oos ing that for which he may have to do 
eternal penan ce. Possibility is t h e recogni tion of freedom 
to make a choice by the spirit. SK believed t hat every act 
was to be accounte d for and had eternal significance for wea l 
or for woe. This fact is an instance of dread and overp owering 
for him in its awfulness. He would readily admit that all do 
not have this state of dread in consciousnes s . However, the 
dr e ad was proportionately greater for one who made such critical 
decisions and was blessful ly unaware of their import. The 
future is a corresponding f a ctor with possibility. They g o 
hand in hand. They are the essence of t h e noth ingness which 
is the object of dread. They stand in polar relations to the 
necessity and t h e past which become the s ome t hin g of nothing-
ness . Dr ead is in a dia lecti cal quandar y for 11 t he f u t ure se ems 
1. SK, SD, 62 . 
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to be anticipated by the past, or, in other words, it is the 
dread that p ossibility has been lost before it has been lost. 11 1 
11The pes sible corresponds precisely t .o the future. For freedom 
the p ossi ble is the fut ure ; and for time the future is the 
possible. Corre sp on ding to both of these ••• is dread. 11 2 The 
si gnificance of this dread heightens when one observes t ha t 
t he f u t ure h olds out t he possibility of eternity as well as 
temp oral p os sibilities and this makes dread of infinite impor-
t ance. 
vi. Innocence. 
SK claimed to abhor the Ca lvinistic doctrine which held 
that an indi vidual was condenmed by virtue of being conceived. 
He was far from a universalist in regard to salvation, but for 
him damnation was properly administered to an individual only 
in terms of pe rsonal guilt. Man was innocent until he himself 
became guilty. The theory of federal representation in Adam 
seemed a fantasy to SK. Adam was the first created human ( SK 
held the Edenic narrative to be non-mytholo gical except for the 
serp ent)3 and with him drea d came into being., The first p roblem 
is to account for the possibility of inn ocence in the presence 
of dread as is required by d owaa tics. 
In the thought of SK ninnocence is ignoPance. 11 4 The pris-
1. SK, CD , 8 2. 
2. SK , CD, 82. 
3 . Curiously, May maintains t h at SK believed the Eden ic account 
to be a myth and quotes SK from a conte~t in which SK dis-
parages the 1myth 1 of calling Adam a Myth! t!f. May, MA , 34. 
4. SK, CD, 34. 
tine state of Adam was due to his ignorance of the distinctions 
of good an d evil. Dread, however, was present immediately at 
the time of the creation, for man was from the be ginning a 
spiritual being . Be fore the Fall, Adam was 1 soulishly 1 de-
termined in his innocence. He was, 11 in so far as he was s pirit, 
a dreaming sp irit. nl Th.e spirit is always related as dread, 
however, and even in the dreaming state of s p iritual inn ocence 
Adam, t h ough unaware of it, was becoming influenced by this 
b asic motivation. The prohibition of eating of certain fruit 
d i d not abrogate Adam's innocence, or to say the same thing , 
his i gn orance of moral polarity . His dread was hei ghtened 
tremendously in his consciousness, however, for he be gan to 
re a lize his a bility. Dread was enh an ced by 'bein g able'. The 
thre a t of p unishment so permeated the being of Adam in the form 
of the enveloping nothin gness for which he had dread that he 
felt almost guilty. This condi tion 11 is not guilt and yet it 
is dread, as though it (innocence) were lost."2 SK wanted 
this condition of Adam to be understood as neither an incipi-
ent Fall nor an oppressive burden. It was both sweet and 
sour. 
Dread which is p osited in inn ocence is, in the first 
p lace not guilt; in the second p lace it is not a 
h eavy burden, not a s u fferin g wh ich can..Yl ot be brought 
into harmony with the felicity of i nnocence.3 
1. SK , CD, 44. 
2. SK, CD , 41. 
3. SK , CD, 38. 
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This dread is not an arti culate element of consciousness. 
It is, rather, more unconscious as it presses in on the indivi-
du~ l. He knows not the basis for his emotional state. He is 
only aware of a sta g gering disturbance. 
This innocence is los t when guilt is experienced by the 
spirit. 11If it was not by guilt he lost it, neither was it 
i nnocen ce he lost; and if he was not innocen t before he be-
came guilty, he never became gui lty."l This innocence-g uilt 
phase is not unique with Adam . It is t he lot of all men . No 
men can be gui lty unless t hey were inn ocent. SK did no t be-
l ieve this because of moral indigna tion, but on t he contrary 
as a result of rational argument. 
To wi sh to deny that every subsequent individual has 
or may be assumed to have had a state of innocence 
analogous to Adam , would not only offend every man 
b ut would abrogate all rational thought , because 
then there would be an individua l who was not an 
individual but was related as sample to t h e s p ecies, 
in -' spite of the fact that at the same time he would 
be viewed under the cate gory of the individual, that 
is, as a gui lty man.2 
Thus, the later individual goes through the same basis 
metamorphosis as Adam--from in~ocence to guilt. SK believed 
the activity of dread to be a very obvious pro gression quan-
titative ly in dread tension up to the p oint of the Fa ll. This 
was well wi thin the s phere of the science of psychology . The 
instant of t h e Fa ll was not just an added increment of dread 
1. SK, CD, 32. 
2. SK, CD, 54. 
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so ~s to be l ike t he straw that broke t he camel's back. 
"Invari ably inn ocen ce is lo s t only by the qualitative leap 
of the individual."l First is the dreaming state of ignorance 
whi ch builds up in t he ' dizziness of fre e dom', which is the 
lm.owl edge of 'being able' to do s ome t h ing wrong . Then comes 
t he awak en ing to the f a ct that t h e ch oice has been made--
which was prohib i ted. Good and evil become clearly known in 
guilt and t he choice is unerrin gly known to be evil. 
\'i_~i. . Sin. 
Just how sin comes into a person's life is imp os sible 
to exp lain. SK holds that dread is not sin but only closely 
rela ted to it. Sin enters by means of dread, but sin in turn 
has brought dread wi th it. In p oint of fact the reality of 
sin is a r eality which h as no con tinui ty. This is p ointed up 
by SK when he reveals t ha t sin is not strictly_ a subject for 
p s y chology . Psychology can only be related to t h e situation 
preceding and subse quen t to sin--dread and despa ir; inn ocence 
and guilt. 
Sin, however, is not a t heme for p s y cholo gical inter-
est, and it would on l y be to ab andon onese lf to the 
service of a misunderstood cle ve rne ss if one were to 
treat it thus. Sin ha s its definite p l a ce, or rather 
it h as no p l a ce, and t ha t is wha t characteri zes it.2 
SK believed tha t human nature only had to be expla ined 
in such a way t ha t it was p o ss ible for a human to sin. This 
1. SK , CD, 34. 
2. SK , CD, 13. 
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i s c a r e f ully deve lope~ s o t ha t one co u l d n ot mi s t ake t h is 
p os si b i l ity of sinn ing for t he r ea l i t y of s:tn . IIe c on s i d e r e d 
t h is mistake sh ockin g to e t h :t cs and b le.s phemous to o grnat i c s .l 
Sin is n ot to b e e xp l a ined ••• ps y cholo gi cal l y it is 
pre cede d by a v a gue a pp r ehensi on ( Angs t) of s ome t h ing 
th a t both a ttra cts and r ep , ls , bu t thi8 0oe s no t 
bring us to sin i t se l f , whi ch , as an a ct of the 
h uman pe r son a l i t y , come s b y a 1 s pri ng 1 . 2 
Sin is e ss en t ially a committa l &8a i ns t God ( d ogma tica lly 
speak i ng ) which a l iena t e s man from God . This i s t he root of 
all of man ' s diffi cultie s --disobedien c e to God . This d isobe d -
i en c e be come s , af t e r t he init i al l eap , a part of man ' s n atur e 
and h is i nno cence is los t fore v e r . It do e s nn e no r o od to 
s orrow a ft e r h is inn oc en c e .. trim10 cen c e is not a perfe ction 
on~ o u gh t to ~Q s h to r e cove r; fo r a s soon as one wishe s for 
it , i t i s lo s t, and it is a new gu i lt to was t e t ime on 
v.rish, s . 11 3 Sin 3o e s d eep b e l ow t h e cons ciousne ss of man and 
the r e perva d e s an colors his e v e r y a ct. 
It s h oul d be n ot e d t ha t t h e r e a r e t wo di f fe r en t t ype s o f 
qualita t i v e l eap t ha t an i ndiv:i.dua l may make . On e i s t ha t 
l e a p vrhe r eby he mov es to a new sphe re of existen c e b y an i n -
war d c om.mi tta l. This is movin g t owa r d tru t h an God . The l eap 
of sin , h owe v e r, "a s dr .a d i n t he exis ting i ndi vid u a l is t he 
g r e a t e s t p os s i b l e and mos t pa i n f u l p os sib l e di stan c e from t he 
tJ!·uth , when tru th is sub j c ctivity . n4 Jus t h ow sin c ame in, 
e v e r y man unde rstands b-y h i ms e lf; i f he 'NOul o l e a r n i t from 
l . SK, cu , 20 . 
2 . Gr ie v e , rt ., 698 . 
3 . SK, CD, 34 . 
4 . SK , CUP , 18 6 . 
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another, he ~ i~ mis unders tands it.ttl It suffices to 
note the signi fic an ce of dread in the transition from 
innocen ce to guilt. Fur t he r t han this psychology can -
not g o, b ut s o far it can reach, and moreover it can 
verify t h is p oint a gain and a gain in the observation 
of human life,.2 
With the establishment of the es s en t ia l nothingness which 
is the object of dread , SK hop e d to e s t ab lish the thesis t ha t 
each man loses hiS own innocence. The re is s till a need for 
classification, however, in terms of t he 'something ' which 
nothing be comes in the l a ter indiv ~_ dv.a l. Every man subsequen t 
to Adam h as a ' more 1 than Adam h ad in terms of dread.. It is 
s omehow easier to fa ll than it wa s in t he be ginn i n g . This 
is the s phere of t he d octr ine of original sin whi ch was si g -
n ificant in SK 1 s view of unconscious p s y cho l ogical moti v a tion. 
vj1.j... Original Sin .. 
SK held t h e human race to be an organi c solidarity which 
was influenced by the a ctivity of any i ndi vi dua l member of it. 
Adam's initial sin made no one guiltybut himself, but t ha t is 
not to say that it affected no one lm t himself. This concept 
became a ll-important to SK for he be li e ved it was extremely 
pertinent to his own life. The gui lt of his fath er who had 
b las phemed on t h e heaths of Jutland be c ame his own personal 
guilt as the "a ll-consumi n g p ower of ori ginal sin shows it-
se lf. tt3 The dread under l y ing this proces s is for t he most 
1. SK, CD , 46 • 
2. SK, CD, 41. 
3 . SK, J SK, 39 - 40 . 
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part unconscious , and it is most active when one is unaware 
of its a cti vity and when circ~~stan c es seem mos t favorab le. 
It is like t he consump ti on which is a t j_t s most rava gine 
sta ges when one is enjoying t he best of hea lth. :.Jh en it sur-
f a ces it is too l ate to remedy and one can only be c omforted 
by u..nremi t t ing des pai r. Lowrie s ays t ha t "that there has been 
n o other man in modern times who took so seriously t h e p roblem 
of ori gina l sin; he exp erien ce d it as a con tinuity of h is 
fa t her' s guilt."l 
The first sin of every man i mp licates him in gui lt jus t 
as did Adam 's. There is n o jus t i f i cation in making Adam 's 
sin grea t er , or the f irst sin of my l a ter i ndividual l esser. 
The differen c e d oes not res t, however , in t he case of the 
l ater individual, for one wi ll "here en counter the phenomen on 
t ha t a man se ems to be come gui lty mere l y for dread of h i · w e lf, 
of whi ch t he r e coul d be n o ques tion i n the case of Adam . tt2 
Th ere is a quan titative i n creas e in t he wor l d of dread at 
e very sin and the indivi dua l fal ls he ir t o tbe universal human 
gui lt. Thi s conse quen ce of generati on be comes t he something 
of t he no t hing of dr ead an d is the ' more' wi th which the sub-
s e quent indi v i dual must contend. The dr ead of t h is guilt of 
the past b ecomes guilt for the indivi dua l as h e trembles 
b efore dread and beli e ve s himse lf already lost. In t his a ct 
1 • Lo~ri e, SLK, 101. 
2. SK , CD , 48 . 
he is lost for nwhatsoever is not of faith is sin.nl 
The na ture of origina l sin bas often been examined, 
and yet t he p rincipal cate gory has been missing--
it is dread, that is what really determines; for 
dread is a desi re for Vl'ha t one fears, a sympathetic 
antipathy; dread is an a l ien p owe r which takes hold 
of the individual and yet one cann ot extricate one-
se lf from it, does not wish to, because one is 
afraid, but what one fears attracts one. Dread 
renders the indi vidual powerless, and t he f irst sin 
always happens in a moment of we akness; it there-
fore lacks any a pparent accountableness, but that 
want is the real snare.2 
This dia lectical formulation of ori ginal sin attempts 
to show it as consequen t upon an organic and non-atomistic 
view of the human race. The rela tionship of any individual 
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of t he race makes implicit in him a sense of the sin-experi-
ence in any other member . The chief p s ycholo gical work of SIC, 
the Concept of Dread , had in mente the d ogma of origina l sin 
and dread was, in a sense, inci den tal to the intention of the 
work. Swenson asserts that SK avoids the t wo gen eral pi t-fal l s 
whi ch ari se in the a vera ge a ccount of ori gina l sin. On the 
other hand SK 1 s concep t 
a fortiori a lso excludes the pseudo-scien tific, pseudo-
evolutionary, pseudo-ethical and pseudo-optimistic 
notion of a human race on its upward pa th of a 
gradual llbe ration from the burden of a " brute' in-
heritance of sin, than whi ch no conception could be 
more confused.3 
In the same section Swenson notes that SK has also escaped 
the identification of ori ginal sin wi th any metaphysical pre-
1. ,.l1gmgns 14: 23 . 
2. SK , JSK, 105. 
3 . Swenson, Art., xxi ii. 
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moral condition in the nature of man for the exi s tence of a 
moral striving such as is postulated by Royee. 
To call the existence in human nature of cond i tions 
making po s sible a moral task, by the name of a moral 
burden from which t he individual needs to be saved, 
as does Royce, is also to indu l ge one's self in the 
luxury of a confusion of the cate gories.l 
SK felt that to explain Adam's sin was to exp lain origi-
n al sin in later indivi duals also, for though man i.s an in-
d i vi dual, "as such he is at once himse lf and the whole hu.rnan 
race, in s uch wise t h at the whole race has part in t h e indi-
vidual, an d t h e individual has part in the whole race. " 2 It 
is wi t h s ome dif f iculty t h at one s quares t h is with SK 1 s in-
s isten ce on his uni que philosophical cate gory of the indivi-
dual. He s a i d too often t ha t t h e 'crowd wa s the lie.' It 
ma y well serve to account for the intensity of the indivi dual's 
existen ce, however, if someone has the res p on s :i.bility of t h e 
whole race upon his shoulders. 
~. Faith and Dread. 
Since every con flict in man comes from the underlying 
.:.s y cholo gical state or factor of drea d , his salvation will 
consist in either d i s p osing of dread or else utilizing it for 
harmony in his life. Because man is synthesized by spirit, no 
disposal of dread is possible. Even suicide is no escape for 
t h e s pirit is eternal. Faith, or believing in God, is the 
answer for SK . He bases his reli gious t h eses up on the Bible. 
1. Swen son, Art., xxiii. 
2. uK , CD , 26 . 
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Fai t h is t he a cc e p ting of the thesis that ttchris t di ed for our 
sins accordin g to the s crip t ures. " l He a lso calls this belief, 
which is a passionate l eap of faith in this God - man , Christ, 
as the on l y so l u tion for the despai ring s tate of sin and guilt. 
T!iJ.1h e opp os i te of being i n des p ai r is beli evi ng . 11 2 The object 
of d read is no t hing , but t ": e ob ject o f fa i th is 11 God 1 s reality 
in existen ce as a particular individua l, t he f a ct t h at God 
has exis t ed as an indivi dual human being . rt3 This p s y cho-ther-
apy c1 oes not eradi c a te d r ead but ' educ ates' i t inasmuch as 
it is t h e p os sibility of freedom . "Dread is b y t he a i d of 
f ai th educa tive, l aying bare as it d oes a ll finite aims and 
dis covering a ll their de ce p t ions. "4 11When sa lvation is 
p osited, dread is put behind , j us t as p os sibility is. Wi th 
t his it is n ot ann ihila t ed but now p lays ano t her role, i f it 
is ri ghtly us ed. tt5 The pos sibility is trans ferred by this 
res ting of the mi nd in be l ie f. It is n ot abro ga t ed , but t he 
overwhe l mi n g d r ead whi ch as p ossibi lity for i ts objects is 
saved in t ha t with God all t h in gs are possible . n'lne be l iev e r 
p oss esses the eternally certain antido te to des pai r, viz. 
possibi l ity; for with God a ll t h i n gs are p os sib l e e very i n -
stant. n6 The e leva tion to Re l igiousness B, or Christ i anity, 
whi ch was reviewed in the previous chapter is the only , and 
the adequa te, c ure for the prob lems of dr ead . This resting 
1. I Cor. 15 : 3 . 4. SK, CD , 1 39 . 
2. SK , SD , 77 . 5. SK, CD , 48. 
3 . SK , CUP , 290 • 6. SK, SD , 6 1. 
of the mind is nc s ·t a tic tr anquili -ty, for fa.i~h must not 
rest content with unintelligibility; for precisely the r ela-
tion to or the repulsion from the unintelligible, the absuz·d, 
is the expression for the pasa±on of f a ith. 
6. Cr itique. 
I n the p r e ceding an~ysis of · Ki~rk ga.ard' a though ·t, there 
comes to light the ex-~ent of t he talents of this formerly 
obscure philosopher 111ho is now her alded a s ' that. marvelous 
Dane '. SK' s remarkable i nsight and i nt erest i n i n t llectual 
pursuits belat edly earn hi m due respect and praise. H& was 
that one i n modern times who r ecal l ed philosophers t o the · ask 
of examining themselves, His existential r eaction is the b a sis 
for mo st of the present phi l osophi e s of existence a d theo-
log i e s of cr isis. Kierkegaard, re alistic ally facing the ~go-
O ~ ntric predicament, made a phenomenological anaysis in an 
eff ort to sol ve the press i ng philosophic problema. He is per-
haps the first to give the phenomenon of dread, or ~xiety, 
its proper place in such an analysis. Along with the val id 
emphases t hat SK made, however, there s eem to be several in-
s ·t an ces of !lQ!l. segui·tCl! ill the a ctual outworking of these em-
pha s es. The criticism wil-l be divided i uto five ge ... eral areas 
i n a ccord with the arrangeme~1t of t he dissertation. 
i. Anthropology. 
SK is to be commended as a. ~heolog ic a.n in his attesmpt t o 
pr esen·~ a clear a.."'l.d careful analysis of man . His trichotomy 
of man into body, soul, end spi:ri t may, however, 'be brought 
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into question on at l e.ast three points. First, it is a quest-
ionable exegesis of the Bible. The obvious interchangeabil ity 
and parallel use of '!rV{upg.._ and ~ iu the New Testament !!ind 
the Sep tuagint make t hese two f e a tures of ma.n to be the same. 
They are merely two somewhat ay onymous terms by which the 
bibl ical wr iters denote the immater i al aspect of ma1 , Thi s 
cri ti cism is perti · ent for Kierkegaard accepted the Hebrew-
Chr istian Scriptures as evidence for t he elements f anthropo-
logy. 
Se co1.dly, the reaul ts ~f exhaustive psychological re-
search in the last f ew decades have shown the t hesis of f ac-
ul ty psychology to "be highly i rnprobable, Thus the 'faculties ' 
of 1 so'..ll 1 and 'spiri ·c• in S'K'a development appear tC'l i mprop -
erl y attai.ed. This criticism does not imply that the immat-
erial aspe ct of man, or mi nd , does not have distinct and dis-
tinguishable functio~.s, but rather, that these functions a:r 
not independent entities as Ki 6rkegaa:rd seems ·to say. 
Finally, 1 t may be said that the amb igui ·ty L the der-
ivation of 'spirit' clouds over the forthright attempt 110 
p r e sent man in a simple three point snalysia. The spirit of 
man seems to appear from nowhere. At first it see ens to b e 
merely s. denominat ion of a, unique co~b ination of soul md 
body, but suddenly, without sufficient explanatio.~.1 , becomes 
a pos i tive third entity which governs the other t wo . SK 
ahould have given more exact dAfinition to such an i mportant 
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concept. He seems t o oscillate between the use of t iv~ term 
sp irit to represent the unique fr eedom that ma..'Yl. ha s a.YJ.d, on 
the othe r h~1d, to r epresent a. positive part of man by which 
his fr e dom may be explained. It may be said for Kierkeg~ard, 
however, that at l east he tried to face the problem of fre don 
'·' i th more than mere assertion. 
1 :l. Inwardness. 
The co. cept of subjectivity which is ce ltral in SK' s 
thought is a concept that he believed most philosophers over-
l ooked. Kierkega.ard demanded that men face the fact tha t the 
'datum self' is the only source of information. The st8.g s of:_ 
i nwardness tta ·~ he presents in terms of the levels of exist-
ential self-consciousnass a:re earnest eff9rts t o analyze sub-
j ecti,ri ·ty. They fall short due to the lack of criteria. f or 
r ecognition end t e sting. Th e distinction of generic i ward-
n .ss fro~ Christian inwardness is not sufficiently clarified, 
however , ~d this is one of the most critical points in SK's 
philosophy. Intense hatred se ems just as good a candidate for 
an exis·t ential experience a.s does in tense love. If emotion, 
without any mooring in a coherent system, is to be the cri-
t eri on, then the shock of a cold shower would seem to a t ·tain 
a s great a degree of inwardnes-s as does the co1r~ernplation of 
a. paradox. Inwardness ~ ~ is to be sure the arena of ex-
iste ce, but one ne eds some sort of rule s nf the game in 
order t o re cognize and arrive at the objective. I ·t is yet 
true t hat 'pe rcepts without concepts are bl i nd'. 
--- -- ---
i i i , Ob j e c t i vi ·t y , 
Kierkegaard's emphatic repudia~ion of any obj e ctivity 
i n phil oso~hy is difficult to correlate \Uth his acceptance 
of the statements of the Bible as authoritative. He decried 
a.nd denied the val idity of gramma.tico-historica.l research 
1.20 
and yet based everything upon the truth of one historical 
incide t--that God beca~e a man in Jesus of Nazareth. SK 
r e j e cts all forme of 'obj ective' vidence and then seens to 
accept that one objective document which most would call 11 to 
quel9tion. If he had a.ccE:'pted 'objective' evidence aubject tc 
'subjective' verification, he might nave established his ca se. 
He lacked criteria, however, and , furthermore, had no inter-
est in such a valueless 'probable' result, 
iv. Irrationality. 
Kierkegaazd considered the ultimate goal of philosophy 
to be the acceptance of a.nd the tenacious perseverance in 
the unin·tell igible. The only solution for man' a problem is 
the resolution of time and eter ·J.i ty and t his is only poss-
i ble in te.r ms of absolute paradox. The psychological possi-
bil ity of this act is questionable. One must live with prob-
leH:s but the acceptance of a cont:r~ictiion is another matter. 
It would seem that SK Yvould b e much more ~ffective as a 
philoscpher if he had be en content with r at ional probability 
a.nd h s.d prese ted his philosophy in continuity with coherence. 
No one has ri ~d to break logic but that logic first broke 
him, 
v, Dread, 
Since Kierkegaa.rd promote s the experience of dread in 
the interest nf two perspectives, it will be well to make 
r emarks a s to the satisfactori ess of dread ~o serve these 
i nterests . 
(1 ) Phenomer.olog ic~ A alyai s. 
SK is ·to be commended for his presentation of dread as 
a unique and significant aspect of m&1 1 s experience . He has 
anticipated much modern psychology in his ~nalysis of dread, 
It is in the descriptio of psychologioal expel.~ ience t na.t 
Kierkegaard reveals his prowess as a psychologist. The exte t 
t o which dread is util ized to cha.r acter :l.ze the emotional life 
of man in . K'·s theory seems inordinate, however, A a has been 
mentioned ear l ier in the disser tation, i t is no doubt lar gely 
due to SK's own melan cholic and depressed mental state that 
led to this excess, He supposed this dread to be a common 
and cont inual experienae of all men .3-nd he considered one in 
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real danger if he were unaware of it. The b asic unco.scioua 
element of dread would a ccow1t for this var i at ion in different 
persona and would perhaps alleviate ·the cri ·ticism of the ex-
cessive use of dread as a fac cor of phenomenology. Kierkega.ard 
did not explicitly employ a th ory of unconscious psychology, 
howAver, thus the i nsertion of such a theory ir to his psycho-
logy, though helpful in making 8K co ~sis ·tent, may well be be-
yond his intention . 
(2 ) Theological Concept . 
The ma i n import8nce of dread for Kierkegaard i s to en-
s.ble him to present a cons istent philoeophy of religion, 
Dre~d s~rve s to explain both the l eap of sin and ·iihe leap 
of f a ith, t he fi r st of which is 1.ohe cause of man 's difficulty 
and. the seco!d the cure , The doctri11es of orig i nal sin, acts 
of sirn i ng , salv~t i on , and sanctifica tio are all argu d on 
the b asis of the psychology of dread . This is a unique method 
of Christ ian apologet ics and one wh i ch is ne ce ssary if these 
doctrines are to be justified and correlated to human xperi-
emce . One is l .... ft with t he suspici on , howeve r , that dread is 
used as a panacea f or t he ill s of systematic theology i n SK 's 
wr i tinge. Ins tead of explaL1i ng the tra.nsi tory p r ocess of 
sinning, f or i nstance, dread seems r ather to give t he cause 
for sin ano ther name a s though this were ·to expla.i it. 
Yl Kierkega.ard. must be reprimaded perhaps, but not too 
"" 
s eve rely f or a.t les.st two rea.sons. He would be t he firs t to 
admi t the lack of coherent interr~lat ions of his varicus 
idea.s and concepts. Se condly, he w8.s t he founder of p r ofound 
perspectives ~nd one c~~not e xpe c t them to be or i gi nat ed i n 
perfection. SK , l ike Hume, is a cr~ditor of s oci e ty f or he 
wakened many f rom their dogmatic slumbers. 
The dissertation will compare and oo~tras t ~h6 ab ove 
a sp ects of Kierkegaard' s philosophy with the ·chought of 
.Kartin Heide gger :La. an at t empt to determine the influence of 
SK upon Hei degger a s wel l a s to note whether He i degger over-
came the de~,iciencies of Kierkegaard. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HEIDEGGER 1 S DOCTRINE OF DASEIN 
l. The Man . 
Mart in Heidegger was born in 1889 in Messkirk in the 
p r ov i nce of Baden i n Germany. He was born and r aised a Roman 
Cathol ic but many of his writings indicate an athPistic point 
of view· at the p r e sent t ime. "He ha,e been accused of athe ism, 
i mmoralism, ant ihumanism, and outright uihi ism, notwith-
standing the fact that Heidegger has at var ious times con-
vincingly refuted all these cha.rge s.n1 His knowl,edge of the 
scholast ic tradition is obvious i n his works and his admira-
tion for the early Greeks i s transparent. He first studied 
under the neo-Kantia.n movement in the schools of Wi ndelband 
and Rickert and later came under the i nfluence of Husserl 
and his phenomenology . This lat ter association is marked in 
its influence upon his p sychological analysis. He taught at 
Ma.rburg 8.J.'ld la.ter (1929) succeeded Husserl at the Univers ity 
of Freiburg. During the early rule of Hitler, He idegger de-
liver~d an address which gave qual ified app r oval to the 
Nat i onalist Socialist revolution, and since ·the Frez 1ch occu-
p at i on of Baden , he h ':I. S been refused permission to resume his 
t eaching for politioa.l reasons. Reoently, however, he has 
been allowed to hold seminars and give a few lecture oourses. 
He is now l iving i n a retreat on a moun·ta.in top i n Todtnauberg 
1 . Reinhardt, TER, 131-2 (cf. Heidegger, UH, 32- 33 ). 
in th~ Black Forest where he resides i n a simple f a shion, 
pori~g over the poet r y of H~lderlin and writing occasio.al 
e ssays, 
12l.L 
He idegger is sa id to be one of the most influential men 
in the existential ~novement 1 1 Europe a t the pres•nt time. 
"This is in spite of the f a ct ·that Heidegger hi1nself ha.s 
repeatedly disavowed his association with 1 exis·ten i a.li sm 1 , 
i nsisting that his philosophy is pri mar ily concer ed ~ ch 
1 be i g' rather than 'exist nee ' • nl 
He has de clar ed tl1a ~ he is not a philosopher of 
ex iate.ce, but a philosopher of Being, ~1d that 
his eventual aim is ontological. He idegger con -
s i ders the problem of existence solely to intro-
duce us to o tology, because the Oi ly form of 
Being with which we are truly i n cont act (a ccord-
i g to Heidegger) is the be ing of man. 
The r elation of Heidegger to the philosophies of existenc e 
wi ll be investigat ed in a l ater s e ction of the diasertatio,, 
His first pub l ished work, Die Kategorien und Bedeutungs-
lehre des Dune Scotus, which was an i naugural addr ess to his 
le ctureship a t ~arburg, app ear ed in 1916. The first part of 
his propos d major work, ein und Ze it, was published i n 
192 7. •rna last two parts of -~his monumental work ha.ve not 
been forthcoming since, and there is re a.son to believe that 
they wi l l never appear. ·neti.'1er t h is i s caused--by a. cha ge 
of view philosophi cally, or perhaps some difficulties e.aeuing 
from the fir st two parts , cannot positively be determined 
though scm~ believe these reasons to b e true. Rayner 
Heppensta.ll , who edited ;£U.1.d i ntroduced Ruggi er o ' a es says on 
1 . Reinhardt, TER, 121. 
2. Wahl, SHE , ll. 
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existentialism, makes an interesting remark on this point of 
whether or not one can expect to see Heidegger's finished 
work . "After wr:tting the first part of Sein tmd Zeit , 
Heidegger _turned back to Kant in direct preparation for the 
writing of the second part of Sein und Zeit, which I now 
understanding to have been partly written and subsequently 
destroyed (but since the end of the war, Heidegger's public 
utterances have been ambiguous in the extreme). nl In 1929 
Heidegger had several essays publ1shed: Kant tmd das Problem 
der Metaphysik, Vom Wesen des Grundes, and Was ist Metaphysik? 
" Several studies on the German poet Holderlin just before, and 
during the war, and some other essays have been published in 
the postwar period: Platona Lehre von der Wahrheit, Einem 
" Brief uber den Humanismus, and a volume called Holzwege, 
which contains essays on various philosophers and philoso-
phical subjects. 
That Heidegger has been , and is being, very influential 
is undeniable and that he has many followers 1$ obvious. 
The reasons for this are not due to any conscious effort upon 
his part, however, for he has done everything that could be 
possibly done to make his writings inaccessible and obscure. 
First of all, he has created a philosophic lang-
uage and terminology all his own, frequently re-
verting to the long-forgotten root meanings of 
words and concepts, or coining new ones to satis-
1. Ruggiero, EXI, 15. 
fy his groping quest for an adequate ver bal ex~ 
pression of his ideas. He has, furthermore, 
abandoned time-honored ways of thinking to an 
extent that makes it almost impossible to fit 
his philoso~hic concepts into any established 
categories . 
This, of course, gives expl~ation for the fact that he has 
apparently been misunderstood and misinterpreted by many 
philosophers, especially those who are not German and who 
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must puzzle over some of his untran s l a ted works. Sartre adds 
fuel to this fire of obscurity by apparently abandoning 
Heidegger's general intent and perverting it by using his 
ontological analysis . 
2. The Philosopher . 
Heidegger's philosophy may be conveniently considered 
in four segments. The portion of Sein und Zeit that he fin-
!shed included consideration of Dasein , or 'being- there', 
and its relationship to temporality . Later essays: Vom 
Wesen der Wahrheit and Was ist Metaphysik? make a rather 
comprehensive view of his philosophical outlook. A brief 
discussion of each of these four aspects will be given in 
order to indicate his basic views . 
Heidegger's terminology is a point of difficulty in try-
ing to understand his philosophy and the possibility of error 
or in interpretation is ever present . Some of his essays are 
available in both English and German , but the major work, 
Sein und Zeit, is not yet translated into English. 
2. Reinhardt, TER, 131 . 
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i. Dasein. 
Heidegger believes that the concept of 'being', as the 
ancients had so clearly seen, is the most universal concept 
that can be considered. Yet it cannot be derived from any 
higher or lower concepts. It is very obscure and indefinable 
and entirely different from any particular beings such as 
stones, trees, or frogs . However , all of our knowledge, un-
derstanding, and attitudes make use of it. "We are used to 
" living in 'an understanding of Being' (Seinsverstandnis), but 
hand in hand with it goes the incomprehensibility of what is 
mean t by 'Being't"l Heidegger's aim is to revise the tradi-
tional approach to the problem of understanding Being, and 
to approach it not in the accepted way through the phenom-
ena of perceptual things, but with human Dasein as a start-
ing point. This terrn is one intended to avoid the tradition-
e.l words such as 'man', 'human', and 'human being' • It is 
a common German philosophical term to designate 
'existence', which in his use is also meant to 
preserve its literal meaning of 'Being-there'. 
Man for- Heidegger, is Mr . Being There, i.e., 
Il"~n alw.sys exists in a situation, he comes to 
consciousness of himself in a world surrounded 
by factual conditions which he himself has not 
created.2 
An ontological analysis of this concept is considered by 
Heidegger to be the proper approach to the whole question of 
Being. 
Dasein differs from all the other things in the world 
1. Brock, Art., 27. 
2. Earrett , VliE, 26. 
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in a fundamental sense. Only Dasein has self-concern in re-
gard to its own Being. It alone can make decisions that will 
affect its own Being and may even cause it to lose its Being. 
This Dasein is always 'my own' and cannot be reduced to any 
genus which can be ontologically grasped. All other beings 
are either in the world . of nature--'vorhanden', or are made 
by man and serve as his tools--'zuhanden' . 
To be sure there are other forma of Being for 
Heidegger; there is wha t he calls 'the being 
of things seen', or scenes; there is the being 
of tools and instruments; there is the being 
of mathematical forms; there is the being of 
animals; but only man truly exists . Animals 
llve, mathematical things subsist, implements 
remain at our disposal, and scenes manifest 
themselves; but none of these things exist . l 
These all have their special classifications and their own 
qualities but Dasein is unique, and alone exists in the proper 
use of the word. 
Dasein is charactei•i zed as a 'das I n -der-Wel t .. sein' 
and this is its innermost constitution. This essence of 
'being-in-the-world' considers 'world ' not in the tradition" 
al sense of the sum total of the things of nature, nor in 
the ethical sense of Chr:tstian:J.ty, but rather as did the 
early Greeks t o indicate the •how' i n which the beings are 
'in the whole' ••• before any special kind of beings is con-
sidered separately."2 
The ' In-Sein ' of Dasein, which is a consideration of 
l e Wahl , SHE , 11. 
2. Brock, Art ., 41 . 
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how Dasein is related to the general concept of Being and is 
the first step in the inquiry of Heidegger. "The analysis 
of 'in-Being' is to clarify what is meant by the'~', the 
'There ' of human Dasein, what, in Heidegger's terms, is its 
existential:J.st:1.c constitution."l A fundamental trait of 
Da s ein which permits this analysis is the 'Erschlossenhe1t', 
or disclosed, unveiled, or discovered state of Dasein which 
is an intuittve illumination of itself by wh:l.ch it is eli• 
gible as a datum for analysis. 
There are various discernible modes, or 'extstentalia', 
in the 'in-Being' of Dasein and these ar'e of great importance 
in an understanding of its structure. The first of these is 
'Befindlichk~it' , or the 'pl acedness', -of the Dasein., This 
indicates the way in which it is pla.ced in life and in the 
world, and this human being real:l.zes his Befindlichkei t 
through various psychological moods which are vague and gen-
eral and yet sufficient for his awareness. This tells him 
not hing of his past or his dest:t.ny, bn t it does furnish the 
fact of the 'there' for Mr . Being There. "Die Befindlichkeit 
1st eine existenziale Grundart, in der das Dasein sein Da 
ist.••2 
The second of the existentialia is co--original with the 
first and is 'Verstehen', or tmderstanding. This discloses 
to the Dasein 'for the sake of what' it is in Being. This is 
much different from the 'gest:t.mmte Befindl:!.chkeit' of the 
former mode, for here the significance and purpose of the 
1. Brock, Art . ! 46. 
2 . Heidegger, ~uz, 139. 
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Daaein (or the 'Da') is revealed. This will determine the 
purpose of all other Daseins, things, and the 'Being-in-the-
world' of the human being in question. This presents the 
potentialities of Being to the Dasein. 
Das Dasein ist ihm selbst ~berantwortetes 
" Mogll chsein, durch und durch geworfene 
M8glicfl..keit. Das Dasein ist die M8glichkeit 
· n " 1 des Freiseins Fur das eigenste Seinkonnen. 
This understanding not only lends significance to the world 
of nature and its utensils but also to itself. This is the 
'project' of Dasein which reveals the 'for the sake of what' 
it will be in Being. It is not an explicit scheme but r ather 
a remote, implicit plan. The Verstehen is 'authentic' when 
it is primarily concerned with itself and 'unauthentic ' when 
i t is concerned primarily with the disclosure of the world. 
A third co-original mode of In-Sein is 'Rede', or speech. 
This is the articulation of the Being-in-the-world as it is 
revealed in the understanding. 
Die Rede 1st mit Befindlichkeit und Verstehen 
existenzial gleichursprllngl1ch VerstHndlichkeit 
ist auch schon vor der zueignenden Auslegung 
immer schon geffliedert. Rede 1st die Artikula ... 
tion der Verstandlichkeit.2 
These three existentalia conclude this particular char-
acterization of 'in-Being' from the human being 's unique 
aspect, and consider him in his likeness to other Daseins, 
1. Heidegger, SUZ, 144 . 
2 . Heidegger, suz, 161. 
or from the viewpoint of the 1 ever yda.ybess 1 of Df:', Ct ··L1 . This 
is the 'in-Being 1 of the 'or .. e l ike ma.ny t, the 'someone • , 
' Da s Man '. The oha.ra ct!fristios of the 'in-Being ' of· every 
day Daee in are l ikewise dis t i ngui shed as three. The ee are 
the rrodificatione of the existeut~lia of 'in- Being'. 
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'Gerede ', or 1 t alk r, or 'chatter ', holds when one l i stens 
to wb.at is said &.d does not understs.nd what i a spcken of, 
or what is . This is the superficial unders·tanding tha t move s 
in the t:radi tional realm a.nd is un critical. Everyday Dasein 
i nterpret• and gives significance to the world , per iJ) ns, and 
things in the l i ght of this. 1 Curi osityr is a modifi cation 
of the 1rJ.a'bur al l i ght', or Erschloseenh!it, by which d~s Man 
w~nts to s ee what thi es look like but is not in terested in 
under at anding them. The t hird modifica tion, 1 a.mb i gui t y', 
shows the difficul ty i n de termin:'::ng just what is disclosed , 
or d i scovered . One may be earnestly and sincerely wrong , and 
he i s oftem .. f ound to be so, 
Da.s Ma.,g_ in Heidegger ' s theory i s pa.rallel to the ' ob j ct-
ive ' i ndividual in SK. He is the member · of the crowd--the 
atom of huma· ... i ty. He is 1 ur.~.autl1entic' and is attempting to 
b e something other tha,n a human b e i ng , He i degger has only 
contempt f or Das Man 'Nhich is an attempted escape fr om Da.se in. 
This ' E: ve ryda y' pe:t·son responds to t he existentalia of his 
be i ng but they are adul tera·ted by the modifica.t i o .:.a whtch 
them i nsi gnificant • .As in the ca s e of SK , the individual i s 
the category for Heidegger. His future is in his own hands 
and he must cr e::J.te his o?m essence by resolute act ion . Da.se in. 
a s xist in~T becomes awa.re of his a:;ircumst "'.n tial ai tuation , 
strives to underst and this 'placedne ss ', and then realizes 
hi s opportunities by communica -GirJ.g his understanding to 
f ellow Da.seins. 
Heidegger has in mind the lack of leadership in his ovm 
nation and the t end ncy to wait for others to a ct . v1hile plac-
t ng the blame upon them for the ensuing procrastination. Das 
Man s noops SJJ.d chatters l ike a monkey in a cage a.nd tries to 
l ive without existing. Heidegger regards the calling of man 
out of this lethargic state his mission in life. 
In a. concept that is similar to Kierkega.ard's doctrine! 
of sin in man, Heidegger gives a further basis for the terr-
ibl~ ' everydayness' that robs Dasein of its birthright. This 
concep t come s from a further analysis of Dasein ':i"hich pen -
trates to the innermost sphere of Dasein 's be i ng . 
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This further mode of 'in-Being ' which is chara c·teristic of 
Da.se in, and which is a.l so basicall y r elated to the three modi-
ficat ions ment i oned above, is Verf§Lllen(ruin, decay, or 
s lavery). This is the state of the human being who is loetin 
the publicity of 'I!IV6l'yda:yness' and comes i r1to a state of 
self-estrangement which :Ls as destructive as it ie deceiving. 
A e Dasein puts its trust in the ordinary a.nd common modifica-
tions of its 't h~reLeas ', an appeasing influence overcomes it 
a nd it is bl i nded to i'tie potentiality of Being . VerfalJ:-1!. 
as a mode of 1 1n- Bei.g1 does not enda ger or deprive 
exist nt i a.l i t y. It is i nate9.d a we i ghty argu~nent f or this 
exi ste tiality. 
Das Verf llen an di e l.~e l t iat a.ber nur dann e i n 
ph!.nomenaler ' Bewe ia' gegen die Existenzia.lit!.t 
des Da.se i ns, wenn dieses al a i sol i er t s Ich-sub-j ekt angese"t zt wird •.• Wenn wir j edoch das Se i l 
de s Dasei~s in der aufgezei5ten Verf assung des 
In-de r-W ... l t -seins f esthal ten , da ... m iV' ird of fenb a,r , 
das s das Verf allen ala e i nsa,rt di sea In-se i ne 
vi elmehr, den eleme tars ·ten Bei"le ia f'llr die Exis-
t~nzial it!lt des Dase i n darstellt . l --
This analysi s df the struc·t;ure of Da.se in has give1 r ise 
to a new pr oblem f or He ide~6er in the consider at i on of t he 
ground f or the structural unity b y which all of "th .s e analy-
ti cs may be w1ited. This leads beyond the 'in- Beirg ' of 
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Dase in to t!le probl em of the B i r~; of Dasein . The cone .pt of 
dread wh ich was introduced by Ki erkee:;a11rd sets t h e stage f or 
He idegger t a discussi on of 1 Car e ' .s the newer to th i s problem. 
Dr ad is a roused i n r ef erence to t he world as such, and is a 
st epp ing stone to 'G~re ', which bri. gs out of ' rothin ess ' 
t he Be i ng of Daee in as i ·ts pote1 t i al i ty is r evealed ·to i t . 
Thi s !l.spect of Heidegger 1 s thought wi ll be considered i n de-
tai l in the following chapter . 
An analysis of •care t reveals that the importan t onto-
1 g ical aspe ct ~ of Dase i n are : exi stentiality,in regard to 
potent i al ity, unde rs ·tanding, r1nd proj e ct i on ; Befil dl ichkeit 
134 
(the 'thatness' of the 'ther eness' ); and Verfallensein, the 
movement into 1 unauthenticity 1 which, in some respect, char~ 
acterizes every Dasein. 
Dase in is then s een to be a kind of being which is con-
cerned for itself and its potentiality of Being and, hence, 
is in 'advance of itself' , It is such, however, not as an 
isolated phenomenon, but as a being ' thrown' into a world 
snd left to take care of itself . In addition, the human 
being always has some regard for the other beings in the 
world and the Verfallen is actlvely manifested . 
Dasein is thus~ structurally: Already-Being-in-
the-world, in-advance-of-itself, as the Being-
concerned-with-beings-encountered-in-the-world. 
This is the formula for the ontological whole 
of the structure of Dasein, i . e . , for its Being, 
to which the title or-c-are (Sorge) is given. 
The formula may seem formidable at first, but I 
hope that, once it is seen how it arises, it can 
relatively easily be understood in its articu-
lated meaning.l 
The Dasein 11 is only the fleeting, momentary ex istence , 
the immediate presence, the given that is not explained or 
justified, swaddled as it is by nothing .. "2 , bnt it i s the 
necessary starting point into the problem of Being. Heidegge r 
be l ieved that such an analysis would open up the way and 
throw light upon this major problem of philosophy. 'Car e' 
leads to the necessi ty of a ground for existence and such a 
consideration will be forthcomine, but first must be consid-
ered the temporality of Dasein. 
1. Brock, Art . , 64-65. 
2. Ruggiero, EXI , 32. 
It will be appropriats to compz:.u·e Heideg6er ' a ~ei~ 
with the existing individual of Kierk gaard at this point. 
It is now rather obvious that ·the two terms serve i der.otical 
functions in the general phi losophi e s of the two men . Both 
r e cognize the ne t:3d of starting the philosophic quest with 
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the eelf-~xpe.rie·noe of man . The sinful state of SK' a ir..di vid-
m:j,l is ei 1i~ ''1r to the Verfall!nhei t whBlh characterizes Heid-
eege:r· 's Da.eein while ·the lat ·ter'e 'everydaynes s ' is akin to 
the futility of the aesthetician 's existence. 
The major contrast ar ises from Kierkegaard's presuppo-
sitions a a to the nature of man. The i J.d i vidual is ohai·acter -
i z&d by the spark of divinity in his spirit. God's image is 
reflect~d here and man, as essen·t i ally aeEtking to realize 
his eternal dimens i on, is a ' be i ng- towards-eternal-life ' (to 
use Heid gger 's mode of hyph.enation) . Heio.egger does not har-
bor this presup-p osition and, hence, Dase,l~ has a different 
status. In the flux revealed by the phenomenological analysis 
one finds 01ly change . Th is is not just an inconseque tial 
tra..nsi t ion of parts but rather a deteriora,tion towards death. 
Man is not here to prepare for a fu·ture life but to prepa:r~ 
for an inescapable extinction. This is ~ot ~ occasion ' to 
eat, drink, ~1d be merry for tomorrow we die', but rather, 
to take stock of the possibilities and limitations of a short-
phase existe. ce. Thus the basic diff~rence betw en SK 's exist-
ing i ndividu.e.l and Heidegger ' s Dasein is primarily a result a 
presupposition and 10t analysis. 
ii. Dasein and Temporality . 
The consideration of temporality as a means to finish 
the ground work preparatory to the investigation of Being 
comes next in the philosophy of Heidegger . 
Die b i s hep ge existenz.lal Analyse der Da s eins 
J;tann den Anspruch onf .. Urspriln gli chkei t 
nicht erheben . In der Vorhabe stand immer, 
nur das uneigentlichf Se i n des Dase i ns und 
dieses als tmgQnzes. 
The raising of the question of origins and the unification 
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of Dasein is found in the consideration of this Zeitljchheit . 
This will perhaps lay b are t he 'horizon' so that something 
such as 'Deing' can become understandRble . Before the pro-
blem of temporality as such may be regarded , there are two 
fundamental ques t ions that need to be answered . How can 
Dasein be investigated and analyzed as a whole'? Secondly , 
in what way can Dasein be authentic in terms of the authen .. 
ticity of the preceding analysis? Dasein can only be regard -
ed as a whole if in fact it is a 'Being- towards - one's-o~~­
death ' (Sein zum Tode) . Death is the completing and ter-
minating factor in the being of a human being and it must be 
a central consideration in getting a full perspective of 
Dasein. The difficulty mounts, however, when one realizes 
that to cross t his bour1dary is to become non-Da s e in and yet, 
short of t he en d , we cannot know Dasein as a whole . This is 
r·esolved by noting that death s not simply characterized 
1 . Heide gger, SUZ, 233 . 
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by being at the end, but more ap propriately by 1Being-towards-
the -enc 1. Dea th is a mode of the Be ing of Dasein and it must 
be recogpized as a part rlght from the beginning. The problem 
then becomes how death is essenti al l y related to 'Care' , 
which is the Being of .:..;asein . Death is closely r e la ted to 
the tr~ee chief elements that were dis cove red in the analysis 
of ' Care ' . The existentiality whi ch re ga rded the potential 
and the projection of f ,asein is similarly expressed in t he 
death relationship. Death is a potential toward Being in 
every human being, and it ha~ the novel pro je0tion in that 
it severs all relationships with all other Daseins . It i s 
expressed in the mode of Befindlichkeit, for wherAver a numan 
is 1 thro~~' death is also !placed' . ' Being-towards-one 1 s-
ov•;n-dea th 1 tries to escape its inevitable end and to forget 
about the imminent call of the 'man with the scythe'. 
An analysis of ' Being-towards-death' r0veals that death 
is the innermost and most certain potential of the human 
being as he attempts to realize himself in his Being. A man 
is free, however, when he r ealizes this, for t hen he will not 
be entangled in chan ce possibilities and mis1nterpretations 
of his opportunities . 
The runnin g forward in thought reveals t o Dase in 
that it i s l ost in the 'one self' and brings it 
face to face with the potenti ality of being 
itself, prirr~rily unald e d by the care of others, 
but itself in the passionate, actual Freedom-
towards -death (Freiheit zum Tode), being certain 
of it and dreading it, yet being indenendent of 
the illusions of the 'one like many 1 . 1 
The second problem of the new inquiry is that of the 
aut~ent icity of the ~asein. The authentic potentiality of 
the Being of Dasein has been presupposed in our previous 
analyses and the fact of self- Being has been asswned. Three 
phenomena which testif of this self ar•e analyzed ontolog-
ically by Heidegeer : Conscience, guilt, and resolve. 
The essence of conscience is the 'call' of 1 Care 1 • 
Dasein, in the mode of Verfallen, is moving in . the unauthen-
tic direction as it listens t o the speech of others as a 
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'one in many'. The call of conscience breaks through (speech 
is not necessarily voice or words) and calls the Dasein to 
realize the potentiality of its Being. This call of the self 
out of its lost condition in the world as Das Man is clear 
and tmambiguous but the content of the call and the caller 
has been isolated either e.s C'.od, or as the satisfaction of 
some biological needs, but Heideg8er wants to keep the source 
within the Dasein. It becomes a sort of Kan t :!.B.n moral auto-
nomy. Con.s cience reveals i tseli' e~.a the call of 1 Care 1 as it 
appeals to 1-::a. s e ln 1 s selfhood and. summons 1 t back from the 
anonymity of Das M~n . 
Guilt comes as the result of conscience when the human 
being notes the privation of himself. He is deficient and 
se·es himself permeated with nullity . That he is guilty does 
1 . Brock, Art., 78. 
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not r sul t from a special a ct i on of error or s i n , but con-
versely, he coul d not do one of these faulty deeds if Dase_!n 
were not al ready guilty. This is closely r elated to SK's 
doctrine of original s in and is a condi t·i on of Befindl_!chke i!_ 
as it indicate s Verfallenheit. 
Resolve is the projecting of oneself into this guilt 
situat i on and this ma.kes ·t h a Dasein free to r ealize 1 tself. 
Onl y through resolve is there r eally any choice , for in it 
alone is the Ba ing of a human being au·thentic. "Re solve , 
intimately related to conscie ce and guilt, is ·the 1 au t hen-
t ici t y' of Care ."l 
Guilt f or Heidegger is the cognizance in Dasein of fail-
i ng to fulfill his r e spo!sibil ities. Dase in should be doing 
verythi ng within his power to lead himself and others to 
authent icity and, i nstead, he is doing nothing. This ethical 
consciousness is no t lli~l ike guil t for SK. Heidegger could 
not a.d:ia.nce beyond this experi ence to sin-consciousnes s a s 
Ki rkega.a:rd did for the standard of conduct that Dasein pre-
sented w~ .. s e,ll tha t t tere is. No ccmmandme .. t giving God stood 
over him in judgmtm -~ and, thus, o transgression of holy law 
could be a consideration 
There is no time-eternity co1r~radiction in Da.sein and 
hence the ethical stage of existence is not necessar i l y in-
ad quate, as i n the theory of SK. Conscience is t he exper ience 
1 , Brock, Art ., g7. 
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in whi ch Dasein become s aw~re of the l ack of unity in its 
struc·t;ure ar .. d the basi c concern, or Care , in which thi a unity 
may be real ized. 
Only by a fre e resolve can Daaein be authent ic. He id~ 
egger calls to men to disregard the inevi table fate of each 
one and to coope:x-ate in an existttntial society. This is not 
an appeal to altruistic endeavor but rather to be one.self 
and to lead society in a creative effort, This wi ll p rhaps 
ground -t;he: eleme 1ts of Da.sein in the unity ·that they need. 
The problem of the fm1damental unity of Care is ~t this 
point i!' Ore compli cated than 1 t was when this last analysis 
was sta:c-te.d. No·~ only have the characte.:r i sti cs of Care not 
b een given structur aJ.. unity, but instead there have been 
more aspects presented than what must be entailed in the 
m1ity. We have now exietent i al ity, Befindlich~eit, Verfallen-
ee inJ the aspect of Daaein as a 'Being-towards- the - end ', 
conscie:ace, guilt , and resolutio(i as characteristics of Car • 
Tr~ditionally this problem of unity has been solved in terms 
of the ego , of th self, ~a a basia ground. Heidegger criti-
cizes this a.pp roach, however, for· the self was not an ever-
present part of the Vorhandene but was only arr ived at m1d 
given a basis in the authenti city of Care through resolve. 
The question of Heidegger 'a philosophy has been one 
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"das die Einheit tm.d Ganzheit der Strukturmannigfaltigkeit 
der Sorge ontologisch trHgt?"l The answer comes through the 
analysis of time and history. "Die urspr-3ngliche Einheit der 
Sorgestruktur liegt in der Zeitlichkeit.u2 
Time has traditionally been regarded as a series of 'nows' 
. that follow in succession through the calendar, according to 
Heidegger . This has developed from the Greek approach to the 
Vorhandene and the subsequent pluralistic division of it.. The 
future was considered a 'now' which would be realized, while 
the past was a departed 'now'. Heidegger criticizes these 
views as inadequate and presents these 'ecstasies' of ti.me 
in terms of his own analysis of Dasein. 
The future is an essential aspect of the Dasein because 
a human being is always moving towe.rd himself • Its · charac.-
teristic that enabled it to be analyzed as a whole-'the running 
forward in thought' which could comprehend the end and see the 
Dasein as a 'Being-towards-death'- is grounded in the future. 
This enables this being to be concerned with itself and its end• 
The primary 'meaning', i.e., the inner possibility of Existen~ 
tiality as such is the 'future'• "Das in der Zukunft grllndende 
Sichentwerfen auf das 'Umwillen seiner selbst' ist ein Wesens -
" " charakter der Exis tentialitat. Ihr primarer Sinn 1st die 
Zukunft."3 
1. Heidegger, SUZ, 196. 
2. Heidegger , SUZ 6 327 . 
3. Heidegger, SUZ, 327 . 
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The past is the ground of the 'thrownness' of Befindlich-
kelt. The Dasein which 'runs forward in thought' into the 
future finds itself in a state of 'Being-guilty' and this 
implies a state of 'wes'. Thus, the two concepts are closely 
intertwined, for the Dasein could not advance in resolution 
toward its own Being if the nullity of the guilt of the past , 
wh:tch is a present state of acknowledgment of 'thrownness', 
were not a present factor . Thus, the second primary character-
istic of Care, Befindlichkeit, finds its primary meaning in 
the past . 
The present is the ground for the concern of Dgsein of 
the 'world-of-its-own-care'. This concern is related not only 
to the fact of losing of oneself in Verfallen, but also to the 
resolute Dase in which is becoming more authentic as it moves 
toward its own Eeing. The present is different from the past 
and the future in that it is embedded in both of them. 
To formulate the relationship of the three modes 
more precisely: Being essentially directed toward 
the 'future' (in the sense indicated above), 
resolve understands fr om it thA 'past' so as to 
'present' the concrete situati on for its circum-
spect action. The 'past' originates from
1
the 
'future' so as to engender the 'present'. 
The formula which was given above2 for the ontological 
whole of the structure of Dasein is now seen to receive its 
structural unity in temporality. The 'Being-in-the world ' is 
grounded in the past, the 'Being ... in ... advance-of-itself' is 
1. Heidegger, EAB, 94. 
2 . er. page 134. 
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grounded in the future, and the 'Being-concerned-with-beings~ 
encoun ter·ed-in ... the ... v:orld r is grounded in the 'rendering present' 
of the present. All then are united, as the present is embed-
ded in both the past and the futu!·e . 
Resolute, authentic Dasein lives in the fulfilled 
moment and has become capa'ble of relating itself' 
to future, past, and present, the three dimensions 
of 'tempol'a.l i ty' . They unveil tempor•ali ty as a 
'b~ing-outside-itself' (an ex-statikon} and are 
therefore called by Heidegger the three 'ex-stases' . 1 
At this point> Heidegger has brought us to the very hori-
zon of Being in Time. The structural unity of Dasein , which 
has its Beine in Care, is grounded in temporal1ty. Since thi~ 
is the concluding poin t of Sein und Zeit, one must look in 
Heidegger's essays for information regarding this mysterious 
Being which he has approached in this phenomenological analysis. 
iii . Truth. 
In the development of the essence of truth, Heidegger 
points out that 'true' end 'real' are often confused with each 
other . All objects of our perception are real but some of them 
are considered to be untrue or not genuine because they do not 
agree with our :tdea which. has g:tven them meaning in advance. 
Truth, just as trsdi tion has insisted, seems inextrl cably in-
volved with correspondence, or agreement . 
1 . Reinhardt, TER, 139 . 
Das Wahre, sei es elne wahre Sache oder ein 
wahrer Satz, 1st das, was stimmt, das Stimmende. 
Wahrsein tmd Wahrhei t bedeuten hier Stimmen, u..-r1d 
zwar in der gedoppel ten v,/ei se : einmal die Ein-
. " stinnnigkeit einer Sache mit dem uber sie Vor 
gemeinten und zum andern ·die Ubereinstimmung des 
in der Aussage Gemeinten mit der Sache~l 
The traditional scholastic statement of truth~veritas 
est adequatio rei et intellectua--ls t aen s een to be a proper 
definition so long as this two~fold aspect (Doppelcharakter) 
i s heeded . It is not only an approximation of perception to 
a thing, but it is also the approximation of a thing to per• 
ception. 
Any perspective of truth implies the correlative of 
falsity, or untruth, and this will be found to be the leek 
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of conformity , or agreemei}.t• "Die Unwahrhei t des Satzes 
(Unrichtigkeit) ist daR Nichtnbereinstimmen der Aussage mit 
der Sache. Dle Unwahrheit de r Sache (Unechtheit) bedeutea das 
Nichteinstimmen des Seinden mit seinem We sen. ••2 
The problem of truth then seems not to be so difficult 
as history has indicated. If one can determine the agreement 
of a statement with a given thing, he already has the truth . 
The great question is still wi th us, however. "Was 'bleibt 
It 
einer Aussage hier noch Fragwurdiges, gesetzt, das wir wissen, 
was tfuereinstimmtmg einer Aussage mit aer Sache bedeutet'? 
Wissen wir das1"3 
1. Heidegger, VWW, 7. 
2. Heidegger, V\Wv, 9. 
3. Heidegger, mvw, 9. 
It is easy to see the meaning of agreement when it is 
used in reference to the physical appearance of two things, 
but what can be the agreement of a statement and a thing? 
The thing is spat:i.al and the statement is non- spatial; the 
e thing is of material composition and the statment is 1m ... 
" 
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material . .Agreement, in regard to the truth, must . not be mat ... · 
erial likeness, then, but rather some sort of representation. 
Heidegger uses this concept in a restr~cted sense, however, 
a.nd tt 'represents tion' means here, 1 f we disregard a.ll 'psychol-
ogical 1 and ' theory of consciousness' preconc.eptions, letting 
~thin_g take up a position opposite to us, as an object. ''1 
The thing of our eognition, to be true, must stand fast in 
itself and at the same tinie come across, or 'open' itself to 
the Dasein . Thts condition will manifest itself in simple 
II behavior for "das Verhalten 1st offenstandig zum Seienden. 
Jeder offenstandige Bezug is Verhalten."2 However, behavior 
c'.in not be the criterion of truth, or rightness, of a state .. 
ment, so there must be a more original basis which can be 
tta possibility which alone invests propositional rightness 
with sufficient status to achieve, in any measure , the essence 
of tt•uth."3 
Because the overt character of behavior is grounded in 
freedom , Heidegger concluded, it can be a standard of right-
·-
ness. "Das Weaen der Wahrheit ist die Freiheit . n4 Freedom 
1. Heidegger, EAB, 327-8 . 
2. Heidegger, VWW , 11. 
3 . Heidegger , EAB, 330. 
4 . Heidegger , mwv, 12. 
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must then be defined in such a way as to bring stability to 
t r uth . Freedom cannot be any kind of pure fortuitous chance 
e.nd it cannot be a Spinozistic acquiescence to strict determin-
ations . Freedom, according to Heidegger, is a mean of these 
two extremes ~ucl :is the "participation in the revealment of 
what-is -as-such 11 • 1 "Freedom, so understood as the letting-be 
of what-is , fulfills and perfects the nature of truth in the 
s ense thet truth is the unconcealment and revealment of what-
is.tt2 
~fuat makes man err? If an essential aspect qf the nature 
of Dasein is this freedom of projection which may uncover 
'what-is', this question seems very pertinent. The Ver·fallen 
sein of Dasein furnishes the answer, however, for 
Die Irre, durch die der Mensch geht, ish nichts, 
was nur gleichsam neben dem Menschen herzieht wie 
ein Grube, in die er zuweilen fallt, sondern die 
Irre gehort zur innern Verfassung des Da-seins in 
das der geschichtliche Mensch eingelassen ist.3 
Al l modes of behavior have their ways of erring and the whole 
life of man is one of turning away from error, if he is dedi-
cated to the uncovering of what•is in the attempt to discover 
the nature of Being. 
Heidegger makes a cleft analysis of the essence of t ruth 
in accord with his consideration of Dasein but the problem 
still comes to the fore in the finding of the ground for freedom 
and the nature which it reveals in a situatl~L of truth . Free~ 
1. Heide gger, EAB, 334 . 
2a Heide gger, EA B, 336. 
3 . He ide gger , VWW , 22 . 
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dom may be the essenc~ of t ruth, but any significance t ha"G 
it wi~l have wi ll depen4 upon the truth of essence. Like the 
r es t of his analyse s, truth must be illumined by, and grounded 
in, Being. A good sumrnary of his discussion of truth is gi ven 
by Reinhardt : 
Tr uth thus consists in the 'uncove.r i ng ', in the 
br i nging back i J.to • ·~he open ' that which i s , Man , 
i n the pre sence of this 'uncove r ing ' of the be i ig 
of ·things, enters i n to Dasein. The early Greek 
t hi nkers r evealed for the first time what it means 
to be or to exist i n ' truth '. And while t his i n-
sight i 1to the Truth of Be i ng l iberates man f or 
authentic existence, th~ p r evious concealm nt of 
the Truth of Bein 0 h;td held man i mpriso .ed i rl' un-
truth and error. True philosophy, Heidegger con-
cludes is always obedie .. t to and a servant of 
Bei ng .l 
He i deg er ha s begun his philo sophic quest of Being by a 
phe omenol ogical analysis of Dasein, or t he sel f-consci ous 
experie .ce of man . Thi s i s the only possible ave ue of ph i lo-
sophy ·to Be i ng , in He idegge r' s opinion , a.nd Be i ng i s obscured 
or veiled by the everydayne s s of Das Man who is not rea~izing 
himsel f a s Da sein. This is ·~he: lack of i nwardness that haunt-
ed Kierke gaard and it is to be overcome only by decisive acts 
of subjectivity. They arl!:'t true i n proportion to t h ir degree 
of i nwardne s s f or t ruth is defined by SK as subj ectivi t y. 
Truth for He i degger is the uncover i ng of Be i~g in man through 
the state of Da.sei.n which is implici ~li in every ma.n. Truth 
is the degree of the r evelation of Being t hr ough the exposure 
of man ' s ve ry e ssence . 
1. Reinhardt~ TER ~ 141 . 
Kierkegaard found God at the heighth of subjectivity as 
the basis of truth but He idegger fi ;1ds only a promise of such 
a b~sis in th ' horizon ' of Baing. This ' horizon' of Being 
is found in Care, through which Being gl immer s· l ike a l i ght 
through a crack i n a wall . The articulation of Being must 
come by means of a car~ful consideration of this gliwner, 
Thi s consideration leads 04 to Heidegger's metaphysics. 
i v. M19taphysics. 
lit 1 o other poin·t in the philosophies of Kierkegaard 
and Heidegger is th contrast greater than in their att itude 
to t.va.rd meta.physics. SK claims loudly that he ha s no meta-
physical system, for in me taphysics he sees the roots of 
objectivity. Not so f or Heidegger--all philosophy, to his way 
of thi nking , should bs oriented to the study of Be i ng . 
From the ti ·ne of He idegger' s important e ssay on this 
subj e ct, &.s ist Metaphysik?, o e would suppose that t he 
conte t would lead him to the point of direct d iscussio of 
the met3.physics of Being. I nstead. tlowever 1 h a ims the 
discussio J. at a me ·t ~physical question and lets metaphysics 
'speak for itsel f '. The wisdom of this proceaure is d f ended 
on ~he basis of ~h~ fact that 
Firstly. ever y metaphysical que s t ion always 
cover s the whole range of metaphysical pr oblems . 
I J. very cas it is i.tself the whole . Secondly. 
every rnetap~ysical question can only be put in 
such a way that ·the questioner as such is by his 
v .ry quest i oning involved i n the question .l 
1 . He i de ger, EAB , 355. 
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All such questioning must not only proceed as a whole , 
but it also must ari::: e from an essential s itua ti on of exist-
ence . All scientific methodolo ; ies 1 though often far a part , 
are valid ins ofar as they re ~ard the world-s i tuation, and 
they all attempt to consider the r elevant part of the world 
in total ty--to discover and explain wha t-is. "That vJi th 
which scientific expos ition effects it s 'irrup tion ' i s what -
is - and beyond that, no thing . rtl This irruption is the emergen ce 
of the pa rticular entity-' Man ' -in his purAul t of science . The 
importan t thlng i s to note that beyond every b0undary of the 
•orld we say that the re ls nothing . Th is iR remin i s cent of 
tb.e Atomists who not only considered t he atoms but a l so had to 
re~ar~ t he 'void' as an explana tory , an d ess ential, ~art of 
reality . Modern scien ce, however, will have nothing to do rith 
'nothing' and yet evokes i ts us e in all of its explane.tions . 
Heinegger bel ieve s this calls for fur·the r consideration ancl 
·oases the question : "Wie s t eht es um das ::.1 i chts? tt2 
Nothing can not be investi gated because we can not say 
t.ha t nothing 'i s 1 and, hence, can not ?;et Hny proper ot j e ct 
of irquiry . Logi~ v:ould i rnuediately rule out the possibility 
of progress , for one must think about something. One can not 
deny the validity of logic , for it is needed to discuss nothing 
in any way . "Nothing is the ne ga t ion of the totality of what-
is: that which is absolutely not .n ~ Negation is a rational 
1 . Heidegger, EAB 1 358 . 
2. He idegger , WI M, 25 . 
3 . Heidegger, EAB , 361 . 
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e.ct, however , and can not be the basis of nothiP-g . Negation 
itself must rest upon this nothingness . 
If we are able to discuss nothing in any manner , it must 
be given to us . Certain moods or fe e l ings :revea l to us what-
is-in-totality and when we are in such affe ctive states such 
as ennui , hap:riness , etc. , j ust when v;o might be able t o 
experience nothing) it is obscured from us. There is one mood, 
though , which is peculiarly revelatory and through it we are 
brought face to face with Nothing itself . This i s the mood 
of dread . This mood is different from anxiety , or fear , in 
that it causes what-i s ·· to slip away from us and leave us sus -
pended without support-suspended by Nothing . "Dread reveals 
}1 othing .. " l 
In this frightening experience al l things seem 
to slip Envay from the grip of man: the 'nothing ' 
seems to an nihi l ate them ( das l'acht$ nichtet ). 
But thi s sinking away of things may and should 
be followed by a se c ond and r everse movement : 
man ' s redi sc overy of t~e true nature of things 
and his subsequent turning back to them w th his 
newly gained love and l.mderstand.ing . Once he has 
been threa t ened and stirred to h i s depths by the 
engulfing terror of nothin gness, he i s now pre -
pa r ed for a new and radically different approach 
to reality . Things , after having been t ested in 
the contrast to nothin e;c.ess , are r evealed in the 
to tal 'otherness' of their true being . 2 
Met~.phJaics is a questi onin£ beyond what - is , a trans-
cc~1dence , whi ch 8trives tow~n~ds originallty . It goes beyond 
reality in order that it mig.."l1.t win back reality in a state 
1 . Heidegger , EAB , 366 . 
2. Reinhardt, TER , 143 . 
of understanding. Negat ion is baaed up o Nothingness and 
even the logic \Vhich made us pursue ·chis course mua·t "dis-
int ~ .;rate i n the vortex of a. m•:>re original ques t ioni lg. nl 
Th Be ing that Heidegger has been searching f or in his 
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philosophical inquiry is ~o eare r t o being def ined than fr om 
the be5inning , but the analyses of the ontological character-
i sti es of the only avai lable starting point--human Da s L --
have opened a new 3.pproa.ch to r eality f or Haide 0 ger. 
Metaphysical inquiry, He idegger says, began wi th 
th~ au~ ~t ton, ' hat i R the Being of al l tha t 1 ?' 
This query brou5h·t ma i n to ' ·th-3 open': his hori-
zon ·.videned immeasurably, and both history and 
civil izat io~ reo ived a solid foundation. Azd t his 
momentous process ha s to b repeated ~Y every gen-
uine thinker in every historic epoch. 
Trc-... nscendencG is of the nature of Das in and ·this ' go ing 
beyond ' is metaphysics. This !l'lakes obvi ous t he impor t a ce 
of m ta.physics to man . "Metaphysics is the ground-phenomenon 
of Da se i n . It is Daae in 1tself.n3 
I t is a surprising question that Heidegger l ave s us 
with af ter we have followed him SC' f a r in the analysis t hat 
is so e ceseary i n order th~t he might give me aning to B i n~ 
"W::l.ru."ll 1st flberhaupt Se indes- und n icht vielmehr Nichta?" 4 
3. He idegger and Exist~ntialism. 
The purpose of this chapter is not alone to expound scm 
of the aspects of the philosophy of Mart i n Heidegger , but also 
1 . He i d gger , 
2 . Beinhard t , 
3. Heid gger , 
l.j.. Heidegger , 
B:AB , 3 72. 
TER, 143. 
EAB, 379. 
I M, 3~ . 
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to regard him n respect to the phi losophi es of existence of 
which he is said to have contr buted a substan tial part. 
It is very obvious that the concept of existence is an 
i mportant part of Heide gger ' s thought and the chief question 
in regard t o the sign i fi cance a!1d va lidity of his philosophy 
is whether an ontological struc ture can be established on 
such a ground as existence . He undoubtedly received much 
of his thought fr om Kierkegaard and his t~e ology of crisi s 
which is permeated with dread. 11 But the emr·h:l sis shi fts 
from the cris is as such, as a passage or transitory event, 
to the ontologi cal insi ght won through this passage.ttl 
Why then Heinegger's protestation that he has 
no affiliation with 1 exis tentialism1 1 Because 
f or him ' existence' and 'man in existence' or 
' existence in man' is mere ly a starting point 
and a me ans of i l l umina t i on of Bei ng as such, 
that is , for t he elaboration of a uni versal 
and fundamental ontology . 2 
Lest any decision that is made as to whether He i degger 
is an existentialist or not appear too arbi t~ary, he shall 
be viewed 1!1 the light of what was discovered to be the 
characteristi c core of t he phi losophies of existence earlier 
i n the dissertati on . 
a . The pri ority of existence over essence. 
That this point is important in the writings of Heidegger 
i s very ap parent a1:.c es"t)eciG.lly i n hia starting point-human 
1. Kunn7 Art., 412. 
2. Reinhardt, TER , 132. 
Dasein. It may have been only a factor of methodology to 
his system, as a sort of stepping stone to the essential 
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ground of all reality , but existence has nevertheless. an un-
deniable primacy . "Das ' wesen' des Daseins lie' t in se~.ner 
Ex is tenz . ttl Heidegger gives h_is own interpreta t!on of th5 3 
s en tence ; it is the "vorrang der 1 existe_ntia ' vor der ·essen-
t1a . »2 It is interesting to note that Heidegger never did 
really go beyond an attempt to ;;d1re an ontological analysis 
of Dasein and its relationship to i ts own potentiality and 
that of others . The beginning seems to be the eP.d also . 
b. Existence as the prerogative of man , whereby he continually 
chooses his essence . 
This is as clea!'ly found in Heidegger as anywhere in the 
existentialistic writings . Continually man must make the 
choices that will permit him to transcend t he unauthentic 
realm of ' everydayness •. His exi stenti ali t y depends upon 
his realizing the potentiality of his own Being and thus to 
save himself from being lost in the crowd of Das Man who 
contradicts himself in a meaningless attempt to disregard 
Dasein . He must exercise a continual resolve toward his 
Being . 
c . There is no knowledge independent of a knowing subject . 
Knowledge has no meaning apart from Dasein which can be 
concerned with itself and the beings a~ound it . All the 
1 . Heidegger, SuZ, 42 . 
2 . Heidegger, SuZ , 43 . 
truth and untruth is in reference to a human subject who 
represents things either in terms of projecting one's poten~ 
tiality to uncover Being (truth) or to conceal it (falsity). 
d. Existence is purely a human category . 
Although Heidegger sometimes uses Dasein other than in 
re ference to a · human being (even e.s Kierkegaard talks of the 
existence of roses) 1 when he is careful in his analysis , 
Dasein can rflfer .t o nothing else than an individual human 
being. 'l'he burden of his analysis depends upon thi~ very 
point. 
e . Hmnan finitude , temporality , and the problem of death. 
Daseln , in Beidegger 1 s development , is almost unapproach,... 
able unless these conditions are faced . Man can only glimpse 
himself as an analyzable whole becauae .he is a Being-towards-
his-own-death. In addition, finitude in respect to the Verfall· 
ensein of Dasein is man' s very essence; while temporality is 
found to be the necessary structural unity and ground of the 
whole ontological quest . 
f. Existence involves a bas i c psychological experience of 
anguish. 
This is one of the most important considerations in 
Heidegger ' s work. The dread of Dasein which leads to the 
transcendence to authenticity paves the way for the under~ 
standing of Care , which gives structural unity to the aspects 
of -the 'in- Being' of Daseln . Only through dread can t he 
question of metaphysics be raised . Other psychological moods 
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such as ennui , guilt , happiness , and fear , must also be con-
sidered in the preparatory stages of the consideration of 
the persistent problem of Being. 
Apparently the considerations which ar~ bas i c to the 
philosophies of existence are also basic to the phi l oso~hy 
of Martin Heidegger . He claims that existence is only the 
starting point of his philosophy but thi s may be well chal ... 
lenged by the fact that he apparently did not go beyond his 
starting point . A searching and critical analysis of human 
existence may be gran ted as a si gnlfi cant accomplishment , 
but that he has developed an ontology through tbJ.s can not 
be granted . That he tried is clear . That he succeeded is 
not clear . The difficulties that he 's tirred up ' i n his 
introduction to the problem, may well be the reason that 
Sei.n und Zeit remains a fragment . Kierkegaard would no doubt 
retort, "The system will not complete itself in man for man 
is e. fragrnent l " 
Admittedly , Heidegger's aim is to transcend existence 
but his attempt only illustrate::~ the fact that to ' raise 
one's sights' will not ' increase the charGe '. ~~uch of .the 
contemporary existential writi ng is directly influenced by 
Heidegger and it seems only proper that one should ' father 
his ovm. child 1 • 
4. Heidegger and Kierkegaa.rd. 
Befor proceeding to an analysis of Heidegger's the ory 
of dread, it wi ll be well to con~are and cout rast SK a d 
Heidegger at several basic points. 
i. Truth, 
In r efer e ce to the concept of truth, there is a close 
connection between our -~wo philosophers, Truth for them ia 
defined existentially in terms of decisive, sel f-conscious 
activity. Truth is arode of action, For SKit is subjectivity, 
while for Heidegger truth is the proportion to which a ctivity 
reveals Being, The difficulty in their theories is due to th 
lack of verification f or any specific proposition or a ct 
which i s a candidate for truth. There is an ideal criterion 
which may serve a.s a no:t'm in the t hought of b oth Kierkega.ard 
and Heidegger, but in e ither case it is i nconsistent with 
their repudiations of absolutes. For SK , the God who r evealed 
hims elf 1 cripture is the norm ~ d for Heidegger Be i ng a~ts 
the standard for truth. The seeming relativity of truth in 
the subjectivity of existential action makes the two philo-
sophies under discussi on difficult both ·to art iculate El.nd to 
de fend, 
ii. Me·thodology. 
Kierkegaard eJ ld Heidegg-er wer of one mind in the gen-
e r a.l methods of philosophical inquiry. A phenomenological 
analysis of exper i ence as considered basic to the attainment 
of significant data for ~GhEl phi losophic quest. Both men are 
able psych logists as well as philosophers in this a.alysis . 
Heidegge r was more consistent with his purpose, however, and 
attempted to construct his philosophy ,It thout the illclus i on 
cf speculative hypotheses a s a fr amework. SK, ou the other 
ha.nd , quite free l y interpre·ted and classified his da·ta in 
terms of certa in presupposed religious doc~Jrines. 'I'his may 
be defensible per se, but Kierkegaard adamantly denounced 
any such ' ob j e ctive ' standards ·throughout his writ ings . 
iii. The Individual. 
The attempt to e stabl ish an individualistic philosophy 
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of man is a.t the fore frout of existential philosophy. Thi s 
a ttempt was central in SK and Heidegger. Each presents a free, 
act ive , i ntell i gent ent ity as t he basic •category' of philo-
sophy. Their respec·lii ve presupposi tiona kept t hem from de-
veloping similar vi ews of t he individual. Kierkegaard accepted 
a tradi t i ona.l religious anthropology and co .. eluded tha·t man 
as an exist i ng ~ndividual was a Sein zum Ewigkeit. Heidegge r 
rejected all traditional anthropologies and could find i n th 
f l ux of experience only a Dasein who ·was a. Sein-zum Toa.e . 
iv, The Individual ' B Sickness . 
SK believed tha-t man 's pxoblems we1·e due ·to the f act the.t 
he was a sinner, in rebel l i on against God. Man was re svone ible 
to live by God's standards and man's ve r y nature forbade suce-
e ss i n the fulfillment of this requirement , This corcept of 
sin was rece ived by Kierkegaard fr om the Danish Lu·theran 
Church which ha.d a great influence on SK both positively and 
negatively. 
Heidegger repudiates such a reliBious curse upon man and 
pr sents instead Verfal l enheit, or the deterioration in man, 
a s basic ·to man's structure, This is man 's great problem for 
this sickness oonoea~rnanrs essent ial goal. Being is covered 
by Verfallenhe it. The existent ia.l leap is the c1nly cure for 
the problems in the i ndividual, For SK it is the leap of 
f a ith and for Heidegger it is t he leap of resolu·te action. 
v. Time . 
Heidegger'a view of time is much more adequate to his 
method than. is that of SK. Heidegger's time is 'psyoholoogioal ' 
a _d de:ri ved from his phenomenological analysis, For him the 
pa.et and future are entailed in the present moment which is 
e ssentially concern, or Care, This concern involves both the 
Befindliohkei·t, or oi~oumste.ntiaJ. situation which is the 
ground of 'pastness', and the 'Being-in-advanoe-of-i tseJf ', 
or· t hE' f e.ct r·f i rr:p e.:.J.ding death, grounds the future. Kierk -
ga.a.rd, however, views ·t ime s.s a statio 'clock timer which is 
an almost qualityless succession, The quality of the exiaten~ial 
moment, as it covers past sins and promise s future r.demption~ 
is not due to any temporality, but rather, to t he eternality 
which is thus mediated. The concep t of eternity a s qualitat-
ively different from 13ndless time is forei gn to the thir ... kin.g 
of Heid>!tgger . 
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vi. 1Ae ta.physios. 
Kierkeg? .. ;z.:-d a ctually repudia·t ad any metaphysics. Thia 
J.acision ma.y have been clue to hi s association of metaphyeice 
with Begelian phi losophy . If one means by me ta.pbysice, ho i7e vsr , 
merel y the ground for all exp rienoe, SK w.s.a nrYt vvi thout a 
d efin ite concept . The tr3.d1 tioaal Christ1L1.n God was f or SK 
the prim~l source of all t hat i s. God is related to ·the uni-
ver s e a s a cres.tor . This c:r: eat iv a c t neither reduced God in 
any W1'l.y, nor d i d i t util iz e a:r.y pre- existent mater ial. God 
i s a ctively concerned with the aff a irs of ·this world , e sp eci-
ally the affairs of men , who a.r~ created i ma.g_o d,i. God ' s 
c oncern was such that He poe i te;,d Himself as man and came i nto 
the \l'iOrld of h i story i n order ·to strai ghten out men' e aff a i rs . 
Ki rkegaard bel i eved this incarnat i on of God ~s J esus Christ 
to be an ab sol u te brea k with ocher ne e but a. I e cessary belief 
for man if he is to r ealiz e his potenti~l . 
Heidegger embra ce s metaphysics r ather t han repudiates it . 
H~ ~ven s ~ys that :neta.physiss is hi s only interest for he is 
concerned pr i ma..r i l y wi th the problem of Be ing. Since Aristot e 
had defined metaphysic s in re f erence to th is problem , H idegger 
is a metaphysician . Be i ng i s never fully attai ned ~ld exami ned 
by He i d.egger , but his entire phi losophy is permea ted with 
' gl impses ' of Being , Da.sein is the basic clue to Be ing , which 
1~1 turn l s th~! ground f or Daaein , 
He idegger meant this conclusi on to be only an introduct i on 
to he analysis of Being . However , at this time h~ has not 
yet pres nted his further steps. 
Tho poL1ts of cor~tac -~ bet'.veen SK a ... d Heideggei· a::.; num-
Jrous as rell as very i _tereating . Heidegger s eems to be i n-
f l uenced by Ki srkegaard and to b e stii·red to a n a. "'jj i:iemp'li o 
modify arid r enovat e the philosophy of this nine t eenth centur y 
ocra es f rom Copenhagen . The ~ xt ent to which dread , which 
h~s been so i mportant for SK, ia util ized i n the philosophy 
of Heidegger will aow be consider ed. 
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CHAPTER SI X 
ANGST 
1 . Psychology . 
He i deg6er has li ·ttle or no i nterest in psychology 2.!£ 
se and there is s o,ne quest i on as t o the propriety of rev i ew-
i ng his Dase i nanalyti k fr om a p sychologic~ pe r spec t i ve . He 
received his phenomenol ogical L te re s t f rom Husserl who care-
fully dist i n5Uish~d p henomenology fr om p sychology . Th i s app ar-
ently was not origi nal with him f or Ca irns tel ls us that 
"Vror1 tz Lazarus, i .1. hi s Leben de r Se al~ (lg56- 7), dist i gui shed 
Ph~nomenologie f rom Psychol ogi e : t he f or me r des cr i bes he 
phenomena of ment al l ife ; the lat t e r s eeks th ir causal ex-
plan~tions."1 Psychology was s ti l l t oo much affil i ated with 
phi losophy and was bel i eved a t t he t i me t o be too non- emp ir-
i cal. Phenomenology was an endeavor merely t o describe the 
conscious states and to attempt to f L d t he s t r uc t ural rela-
tions of t he i r eleme nts . It was much l ike th psychological 
i nterests ~nd e deavor s of Titc oener. " The problem of psycho-
logy closely resembles th ... problem of phys i c a . T e ps~rc ~ ..... 1 ~ -
1st se eks , f j 1·& t of all , to a alyz m n+t a experience into 
its s i mples t components . "2 Husserl was not i 1te s ted i n a 
sc i ntific psychology , howev r, He was onl y interested i n 
lay i ng a. s ci ent ific base f or a. philosophic perspec t ive. 
1. Cairns , Art ., 231 . 
2 . Ti tch ner , Ton , 37. 
His method proposed to p u t the real world •.vi thin 
brackets and disconnect the co sciousness of i ·t, 
switching attent ion inwar ds instead to t he absolute 
world of experience i tself, exploring and describing 
~he structure of consciousness i n its i ntui t ing of 
e ssencesi dispens i ng of me1ani ng , a.nd const i tuti of 
objects . 
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Husserl was £ ot a psychologis t and did not consider his 
phenomenolog ical amilysis a.s psychological . "Wie Husserl so 
wi l l He idegger niohts davon wi sse .~., da.ss seine Bemfthungen 
etwas ala paychologische angesehen werd n." 2 Heidegger had a 
specific p ilgr ima,ge toward Be i r.J.g a.nd he presumed people would 
misundersta,nd him if his wor k was consider·ed a .1. analysis of 
mind as such . I t seems t hat Heidegger has just as l ittle succe ~ 
in demurrin?; from any psyc hological consideration as from 
b e ing classi f ied as an existentialis t . 
Demna.ch kann man di e Frage s ·tellen, o·b nich t doch -ill 
~ eg von der Ph!!. .. omenologie , die Husserl be kar.~. .1tlich 
im alle rsten Ansat z ala •aeskr i pt ive Psychologie' ve~ 
starden wi ssen wollten zu der Heideggerschen Dasein-
analy t ik ffthr t .3 
He idegger ' s terminolo~y is p sychological a.nd , since his 
endea.vor is in the sphere of Da,sein according to the exposi-
tion of the preced i ng chapter, h i s whole analys i s may be seen 
to have a basic psychological i r terest . "Alle d i ese Dinge 
(bzw, die Sorge , die An~st, und den Tod) s i nd meuschl i che 
Dinge . Ala aolche si1d s i e · ~cholo~is che Selbstverstandlich-
4 ke 1 ten' • " He idegger had a. metaphysical purpose a ... d i t seemed 
l . Blackham, SET , 87. 
2. Heiss, Art., 22 . 
3 .• Heiss, Ar t ., 25. 4 Heiss, Ar t ., 28. 
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to him much different from the current i rterests in psychology. 
" Jas hat das Se i nsgeschick dieser Angst mit Psychologie und 
Psychoanalyse zu tun?" 1 He is reflecting upon the ground of 
mete.physics, and the Stimmungen of analysis are in his eyes 
more significant r;han the psycholo ~S ical data fr om the co tent 
of co~sciousn ss . 
Our 'feeliugs 1 as we call them , are ot just t he 
fleeting co 1comi tants of our •11 .1.~"a or voli t · ~· _s.l 
behaviour , nor are they simply the cause and occasion 
of such behaviour, nor ye ·c the state that i m r y 
1 ·~here 1 and in which VIe co me to some kind of under-
standing with ours .lves82 
Psychology seemed to operate only in the for e goi ng areas 
and, hen6e , inval idated itself for Heidegger's purpose . He 
had no ant ipathy toward 1 t as a, scientific discipline, but 
rather 1 f elt that it was totally unfitted for netaphysical 
pursui ·te . Sci ntific procedure is pragmatic ally justifi d, 
but al;t the natural sci noes forget to questi on t hemselv s 
periodically in order tha they maintai n their prope.c· niches. 
T'sychology i s no exception and i ti is well to keep philos ophy 
free from any adulteration by it. 
Heidegger wend~t sich von der Psychologie ab und i& 
nor iert sie, weil sie nach seiner Me inung sich all-
zuaehr auf die vage Selbstst~ndlichk it verlasst . 
Sie hat gemeinsam mit anderen Wiasenschaften vergeseen , 
nach dem Sinn dieser Selbstverstltndliohkei t zu fra.;en 
und in dem Masse als sie das tat ihr Fu1dam nt ver-
loren .3 
However, Heidegger did not completely tra~scend psycho-
1 . He i ceggerJ I V- , 12 . 
2 . Heidegger. E.AB, 364-365. 
3. Heiss , Art ., 27. 
logy in hi s deliberations. His starti~g point i n D se i n mak~ e 
this impossible. His was a new t yp e of psychological an 
however , and probably properly differ nt i ated from t 
schools of psychology. Thus He i degger a · ms to hav rep 
psychology in general and then admit ted a part icular ps 
logy i~ through the b ack door . He r eturn d to psyoholog but 
"wohl is diese Paychologie nicht d i o akademische , n ioht die 
traditionell g lehrte Schulpsychologi e .nl 
He idegger repudia ed a d tr~1scended the descripti 
predictiv, and ~xper ime.tal emphases of contemporary p 
lo~i es . 3 coul d s ee no merit i n reams of b havioral 
~ specially ·that from the observat ion of animals. The 
awa.y from int rospe ction as a method of psycholo 'Y di d 
well with H idegg r . ~sychology should be a careful 1 
s~ecti ve analysis of exp rience with &""1 a im 
set 
t he e"' arnents of analysis in order to find the ground and con..."l-
a ction of thes~ elements . 
He i degger was i nt. rea·ted i ~ ne i the r pure psycholoc as 
' psychology for psychology' s s ake ' or in psychology as 
pragmat ic dis cipl ine by hich to c oordinate tly 
some motor a ctivity. Psychology, rat he r, is cal 
discipl ine by which the riddle of the universe mi ght be -is-
covered through the inv~ stigation of Da eei n . This invest ga-
tion coul d o 1ly be a ccompl ished by psycholo5ica.l a.n 
He i deg6er repudiated psychology as an nd in ita l f m-
1 . Hiss , Art., 30. 
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braced i t i n the re cognition ·~hat it vr~- s n•o~sal'3.ry to th 
qu st of Be i ng , The only approa ch to Be i ng is through e eri-
ence, md aJ. l experience is a p sychological pro ces s . H 
re ceive d h is part icular me thod fro m the phenomenological 
studi e s of Husserl. His psychological method is 
grasping of the stre am of consciousness wi ·thout 
or interpre t a tion . Such an analys is wi l l reveal 
i ts gr ound Yii thout a priori distortion. 
2 , Anthropology. 
He idegger considered Da sein to be the essence of m 
This, i n vi ew of ·the anal y s is of Da.s e i n in t h e pre oedi n chap-
t e r , ia but t o say ·cha t mF,m is e sa ~ntially a. sphere of 
en c • This po i t f ollows from. H .i degger 1 a philo s ophy a is 
systema t ically integrated iuto 1 t. Da.s ein !nay become 
clear , · howeve r , i n contr ast to th · I'aditiona.l vi ews 1 an . 
Heidegge r wa s I ct una.·wars of t he histor·ical definitions of 
man , but inste ~~.d, ,,vas well vera d i n them and convinced of 
the ir i1a dequa oy. He f el t that both Greek and Christian an-
-~hropologi e s :nay have eerved their purpos e s but w re r e 
quit irrelevant to the qu e stion of the bein€; of man . 
Sofern abe r auch d i cogit at i ones ontologisch 
stimmt bl~ iben , bzw. wiederum unausdr~oklioh ' s 
verst!.ndliche ' <>,ls e t was 'Ge e bene s' genommen w 
d seen ' Se i n ' ke i He r Fr3..ge unterst eht, bleibt d 
anthropolo~isohe Problema.-tik in i hr n ent sohe id 
ontologischen Funda.menten uub es timmt.l 
1 . He i degge r , SUZ , 49 . 
be-
lbst-
rden , 
e 
nd n 
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Aristotle held that man was ..... " ).oyot' t)Or' and 
egger is not opposed to this as a partial definition as ong 
a.s it is properly understood. be understood in erma 
of Vorhandense ins a.nd Vo:rkommens. '!'he 
"ein h~here Auastattung, deren Seinsart ebenso dunkel bl ibt 
·wie des so zusammengesetzen Seienden. "l The traditional iew 
of man which attempted to delineate exhaustively 
acteristics of man, however, was ·the tri-pa.rti te 
was carried over from Plato into the Christian tra.di tio 1 . 
This was the vi~w of Kierkegaard and one which Heidegger care-
fully considered. This had some merit but only 
goes • which was not far enough for· Heidegger. 
Die Frage steht nach dem Sein des ganzen Mensche1, 
den man ale l e iblich-seel isoh-geietige Einheit z 
fassen gewohnt ist. Leib, Seele, Geist m~gen ie 
Ph!r .. omenbezirke nennen, die in Absioht auf besti 
Untersuchungen ftir sioh thema.tisch abl~sbar sind 
gewiesen Grenzen mag ihre ontologische Unbestimm 
nicht iLl Gewicht fallen. In der Frage naoh dem S 
des Mensohen aber kaun dieses nicht aus den tiber 
er:st wieder noch zu bestimmenden Seinsar ·ten von 
Set::le , Geist· summativ ereohnet werden.2 
Heidegger would call Kiekegaard away fr om the fa.lla 
of analyzing the starting point of philosophy .in a.ny tra 
tional theological fashion. Through man as a subjective 
di vidual is existence rea.lized and, thus, he should be 
yzed as a. 1:Jubj ect i ve 1ndi vidual. "Alle in die Substanz de 
MeDschen iat nicht der Ge ist ala die Synthese von Seele 
it 
d 
Leib, sondern die Existenz ."3 Human nature for Heidegger is 
1 . Heidegg.r , SUZ, ~g . 
2. Heideg~ x, SUZ, ~!. 
3. Heidegger, SUZ, 117; of. 212 and 314. 
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interpreted in terms of human subjectivity and not by an 
superhuman ca.te j·oriee nor subhuman material. Theology and t ch-
nology have disintegrated as havens of rest for modern 1 n, 
and he will only find substitutes that will give him pea e 
if he investigates his OV'I"'l needs and abilities by subjec ive 
aelf-exa~ i nation . 
It is this attempt to show how human valu s are 
ri1red from a totally hume.n.--in fact, a despera t e 
human--situation that make s some of the analyses 
art··e or Heidegger~ if not vat id, at least terr 
relevant to the dilemma. of those who can find no 
fo t in any creed of God or science.l 
e-
Y 
of 
bly 
com-
Thus the proper view of man is determined by e ach m n as 
he exami nes himself. To analyze 'das Man', who is 
of the common herd, is to suffer defeat before the battl be-
g i s. This self-examination is t he only approach to Sein The 
na ture of man is determined by what Dasein sees in Das e i · 
and then what it does about it. 
3. Angst and the Unconsci ous. 
Heideg~er , unlike SK, l ives i n an age in which the 
of the Uo.'1Couscioua is a· clearly stated a.nd widely used h. othesis. 
Ki erkegaard and Nietzsche discovered its importance for 
aophy i n conjunction with assigning prime importance to 
psychological dimension of philosophy, but Heide gger inh 
a generation of psychoanalytic controversy. He 
unconsolous to his thought much ·the s ame as he did psych 
indirectly. It was a necessary factor for a full analysi of 
1. Gr~ne, DF, 47. 
Dase i n into its Befindlichkeit. Heidegger considered i t s o 
diff erent from the t heory of Freud, however, that he 
away from any expl icit theory of mental processes i n te a 
of the ir non-conscious ac t ivities¥ He uses terms 
'Verdeckun_g', 'Verborgenhe i t', and 'Verstellun15' to con 
s i milar hypothesis (to Freud) in order to explain what 
16~ 
a 
be otherwise in xplicable in the fragmentariness of conscious 
human experience. 
In his essay 1as 1st Meta£hysik?, he leaves an ng 
for a,n unconscious theor·y. This is the i mportant t i on 
to this essay which Brock d i d not translate in the work xist-
md Be i ng ¥ Here he explains t hat Dasein is i n no way to e 
cons i dered a synonym f or consciousness nor a s a. class na e 
for conscious beings. 
~ eder tri't;t nur das Wort 'Da.eein' an die Stelle es 
Wo:rtes 'Bewu.ss t se i n ', noch tritt die ' Dasein' ge 
na.nnte •sa.che' on die Stelle dessen, was man b i 
Namen 'Bewusstsen' vorstellt.l 
He idegger :recognizes a.s valid the general trends o-
logy which vrork toward these same conclusi ons. Psycholog must 
irres ist:i.bly move toward that perspective "von der man i 
ganzen sagen kann, dase das Be~usstsein nur ein Teil des Feldes 
ihrer Untersuchungen ist."2 
Kuhn considers this a re al achievement of phenomoen log-
ica.l rese arch and not just an approbation by it. The phe lOm-
enol00ists called "attention to the semi-conscious a ~ s b-
1 . Heidegger, WI M, 13 . 
2. He i s s, Art., 27. 
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con scious elements which go into the maki1~ up of our c 
nitive life."1 This is not an achi vement apart from th iri-
spiration of SK, however, for from him came ·the initial con-
cept of 'hidi1g '. 
Hiding fro m or eaelf in the many forms of impera:> al 
existe lce is inspired by 'dread'. Kierke gaard hjd 
analyzed the •concept of dread ' in order to penetrate 
to tre deepest layer of human feeling, and Heideg0 er 
uses it for ·the same purpose .2 · 
The unconscious, as a clearly grou ded hypothesis, in 
both ~hilosophy and psychology may thus be seen 
inol· ·d th the exis ten~ial movement accordi.u.g to 
term-
ycho-
analysis only borrows a.s a tool 'at hand' what is inhere ~ 
and i mportan t in. existential philosophy. 
Ale i hre ersten Vertr~ter, die zugleich in volle 
Klarheit das Grundverfa.hren dieser Psychologie ent-
wickeln , erscheinen Kierkegaard und Nietzsche. J~der 
von ihnen treibt eine •uestruktive' Psychologie, J deren 
Ziel 1st, vorhan.der.~.e , bewusste und gevrusete Tatbiet de 
zu zerstOren. Daa eigentumlich§ Mittel dafftr iet das 
Aufspftren verborgener Quellen.5 
Meunier interprets Heideoger after thi s same f ashio · . He 
does ot aver that Heideg~er has a strict unconscious .ps cho-
logy, but points out that Heidegger constantly refers to real-
ities which affect ·man and never succed in crossing the · hresh-
old of consciousness. These realities are disclosed by t e 
basic St imnungen of Dasein "whose capacity for revelatio is 
superior ·l,;o the explanatory ca.pa.ci ty of the consciousnes 
l. Kuhn, E N, 138. 
2. Blackham, SET, 94 . 
3. Heiss. Art., 30. 
whi ch is to develop. them ."l "Ausgangspunkt dieser Interp et-
ation kann dann aber gerade nicht die Bewusatheit, sonde n 
nur die Unbewusstheit , die Geworfenheit und Befangenheit des 
Daseins, werden . n2 
Thus ~any affirm the fact of a theory of t he uncous i oua 
i n He idegger , but moe t, if not all , refrcdn from develop. ng 
it . Bi nswanger is a good illus tration of th e writers wh 
refer to t he unconadous in Heidegger. Shortly after the 
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above quotation in reference to che unconscious, ins t ead of 
de ·tailing any aspec ts of this concept in Heidegger, he m rely 
states that "ein ns.herea Eingehen o:uf cl i ese Fra6e wtl.rde edoch 
eine e i gene Abhandlung er:fordern ." 3 This dissertation is in-
tended, i n part, to be such an Abha.ndlung . 
As develope~ , the analytics of Dasein are of course 
consci ous , but "sie sind aber zugl eich--gem!tss der Lehre 
Heideggers vom Verfall , de r Verborgenheit und der Verdec ung--
PhAnomene, i n deren sich das Dasein verbirgt, verstellt nd 
4 
verdeckt." · The unco scious elements of Dasein, seem to b 
likened to an ice:,berg 'Nhich is mostly concealed from vi 
and wh ile its par ·ts are all the same the portioa above t e 
water depends very much on that below. This unconscious le-
ment is just as active as the consciousness. In fact, th 
consd ousness i s just a phase of the total activity of D sei~ 
1 . Meunier , EP , 21. 
2. Binswanger, Ar ·t., 70. 
3e Binswanger, Art., 7le 
4. Heiss, Art., 29. 
Hiedegger says of thi s elemen t below the t hreshold of ~ are-
ness--
Sie Schl!f t nur. Ihr Atem zi tte r t at!.ndi g durch daa 
Dasein ••• Die ursprfu1gl iche Angst kann jeden Aug n-
bl ic k im Dasein erwache11 ••• Sie i st et!.ndig auf rem 
Sprunge und kommt doch nur selten zum Springen , um 
una i n Schweben zu reissen.l 
Angs -t, or drea.d, is the basic element of Dase i n wh oh 
consti tu t1:a:s this underly ing dimension which mua t be r-
stood in order to understand man. I t i s a necessary exi tent-
i al aspect of Dasein and "nur selten durchbricht und 
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wi eder schwindet; aber auf dem Grunde des Daseins, nich i m Be-
u sstsein , ist die An~st i mmer da ."2 The expos ition of his 
important concept, which i s so closely related to SK'e on-
cept of dread, and it s i mpl ic at ions will constitute the con-
tent of this chapter . 
It is i nterest i ng to .~.ote that Jaspers and Heidebgr r 
have decidedly different perspectives as to the char actfr of 
the elements of Da.seir.~.. Jaspers ca l ls t he elements of .Il sein 
Grenzph!.norne n and re gards them as the l imi ts of man and the 
undei·stand ing of birr.. On ·t he other hand, Heidegger call them 
the Grundph!.nomen and "was f fir Jasper s e.ls e i ne l etzte renze 
ersche i nt , ist ftlr Heidegger in dem Sinne offen, daas e die 
weitere Untersuchung f ordert ." 3 
He idegger'e t heory of t he unconscious has a close ffin-
1. He idegger , WI I, 34. 
2. ~Jl.eller , EKT , 65. 
3 . He i ss, Ar t., 29. 
1 ty a t many points with t he con temp or J,ry theorie s of ps cho-
a, ,alysis. His i nterest ~~d goal, however, was so dif f r 
in its epistemolo6ica.l and metaphysical a sp ·c·cs that th 
affi nit ies ar e actually incidental 3.Ild irrelevant. The ela.-
t i onship should not be i gnored, however, esp cially sin e 
some con·t empor s.ry xistential ists (notably Sartre ) a.r 
e stecl in s. modified f orm of psychoanalysis. 
o ha t e twa j ane Paychologie, d i e man insgesamt al s 
~alytiech bezeichnen kann und der n erster kla· er 
Vertreter Freud 1st, vor Heidegger e i ne T chnik d s 
~elbstverst!ndnisses entwickelt, die grunds!tz, ch 
Ahnli chke iten mit He idegge rs Verf ahren a.ufwg ist 1 
The kinship of the two movements is important , but 
import ant fr om Heidegger's vi ewpoint is the f act that t 
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of phenomenological r e search is ~ltagoniatic to psychoa. 
procedure . The latter "detects functi onal dependencies o thought 
iu ~erested in the cognitive significance of 
not xpl icitly cognitive."2 
Dass sich dieses Suchen zumal in der Psychoa.naly 
ii-l bestimmten Richtuugen bere its wei tgehend f e st ·ef abr en 
ha t, aoll una so wen iger besch!.ftigen, a,l s der r d.i-
ka1e Unt ersche id zwi schen der al a ' das Unbewusst ' 
·oe ze ichneten und j ener 'Verbor genhei t' i m Me soh n , 
um dexen Aufdeokung Heidegger bem~ht ist, ohnehil ~uf 
off ener Hand l i egt .3 
The unconscious for He idegger is ne ce saaxy t o expla n 
Daeein . Int o the consciousness of Dase i n come different oods 
1 . Heiss~ Art., 30. 
2 • Kuhn, E TN , 13B • 
3. K~mz, Art., 52 . 
as well a.s the phenomenal expe rience of t h'El wor l d throu h 
sensory processes . ;~oodo 11 ke Angst vary in i ntensity, f ura-
t i on , ~1d fr eque cy. Heidegger bel i eves that t h best e -
planat ion of the penetr.at i on of Dase i n by these Stimmun en 
is by the postula·cion of an unco ... scious bas~, or grow1d 
up on wh ich D as~'" i n is f ounded and which is character ized by 
t he s ame psychological moods that Das e ~n experi ences . 
'l' l1is ground is not a collective organic system a s n 
the theor i e s of Kierkegaard or Jung . I t is an element o the 
i nd ividual complex of each Dasein. He idegger believes 
uncons cious to be a. direc·t i nf eren ce from phenomenologi al 
a.nalysi!3 a.nd -3. ne cessary construct in order to underst d 
the conscious l if e of Dasei n . This 'hidden' phase of D-se i n 
does not cause t he problems of conscious life, but it Joes 
afford th~ necessary unity i n the total experience of DaseL 
ri th which man may study his problema and effect their solu-
i ons . 
Si nce the ef fe ct of ~his unconscious phase is i ngly 
thrust into the stream of consciousness of Dase i n , th 
conscious is regarded a s dynamic and pressing f or admi sion 
i nto conscious l ife . This resemble s t he unconsc i ous i n von 
Hartmann as well as that of Freud and his followers. 
he ther t he term 'unco.scious' should be reserved for 
the voc bulary of the p sychoanalytic school , as Kunz e . ems 
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to i ndicate , is problemati cal , hat see!Ils to b e clear a the:li the 
g~neral concept is import ant in Heidegger's thought an is 
worthy of note. He idegger's reflect ions concerni,g Bei g is 
a very important phase of his thought but it is abstra t and 
i nscrutable without i ncluding also the "ebenso eigentl cher 
Ansatz in der unmittelbaren Erfahrung, die der Mensch n der 
Sorge~ der Angst, der Verfallenheit von sich und der W lt 
hat ."1 
4. Angst._ 
The essential character istic of Dasein is its 'In 
v1h ich i s 
Sein 1 ?-"· can under a tand and analyze this si tua. tion o 
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cause of t he peculiar Ersoh1ossenheit of Dasein. This appears 
to be identifiable with intuitive self-consciousness ir man 
which makes him unique in the or~anic world. This 'rev lati on ' 
serves as the ground for any understanding of oneself · d mus t 
r eveal all possible psychological da ta. 
The i nitial mode of Dasein which precedes 1 
supposed by the others (i.e., Verstehen and Rede), is the 
sta te of Befindlichkeit. In this condition the various rund-
stimmungen, which are the causal factors for he 
of each D,9.sein, are revealed. They are vague and 
in this mode and can be clarified only when they 
stood and :related in subsequent stages . In 
ess 
cit 
er-
u c0~s ci ~us rroce~s s ~re ~ctive ar~ t hey press to the hresh-
old of awareness. Here are the factors wh ich to make 
l. Heiss, Art., 34. 
m~n a victim of circumstances . These are the 'Given'. Here 
that which i s mysteriously 'hidden ' attempts to show itself . 
There are , perhaps , several of these di fferent psycho-
logical states in Befindlichkeit, bu t the moat basic o these 
is A·1 gst. The o·t;her moods of Befindlichkeit, t hal.gh o in 
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peripheral awareness, are a1 essentially preaen; to n-
sciouaness . Dr ead , ou the other hand, i s almost completely 
repressed and only 'breaks ' through rarely. Thi s i s th a vem.:e 
by way of which m~n can can understand himself. Dread is the 
medium of analys is. It i s not a. physiologic<W. complex. On the 
contrary, i t is purely a psychical phenomenon 
be likened in some way to a sense-perception 
"may 
a it 
possibl e for us t o perceive an objec t , or to the mi nd · hen it 
meditate a upon Being . nl DreA-d is ·the factor which sets the 
innermost aspect of Dasein so that it can view i tsel f 
from the world and , hence, to beco me aware of i ts pote 
ity in the world . "I t opens up to Dasein Da.sein as pot 
1 ty, ne,mely , as what it can be uniquely ou t of i tself 
isolat ed o e i n i solation. 112 'rhe understa.nding(Versteh 
can th n interpret the results of dread and t hen proje t Dasein 
i nto its pot ent i alitie s . 
Dr ead is not constantly manifesting i tself, but it can 
be ' a·wakened 1 in Dasein a:t any time as it appears i n so ~e emot i onal 
st at e . 
l . Brock, Art .~ 22g. 
2 . Br ock , Art ., 62. 
I "t need not be a-.va.kened by any unusual occure· ce. 
Its action corresponds in depth to the ahallo ness 
of its possible cause. It is always on the br'nk, 
yet only s eldom does i -~ take the leap and dra- us 
with it in to the s ta·te of suspense ,l 
Such a state of suspense is dramat ic and i ·t arouses 1 us a. 
sense of d3.11ger and foreboding. 
Das Drohende l~nn sioh deshalb auch nicht 
bestimmten Rich tung her ii ne rha.lb der N!h 
iner 
:rn, 
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es i st schon ' da '-- und _doch nirgends, es ist 
dass es beengs~ und e i nem den Atem verachl!gt-
o ah, 
und 
doch nirgends. 
The difficulty for Dasein is that this dread, as 't is 
rra nifest in COilS ciousness, has no basis for its 
11 ihat is dreaded is that what is threatening is 
This emptiness brings despair but it also bears 
which alone r eve ala me ·taphysical reali.ty. 
The permeation of Da-sein by nihilating modes 
havior p oi nts to t he perpetual, ever-dissimula 
manifestnees of Nothing , which ouly dread reve 
a.ll its original ity. Here, of course, ve have 
reason ~hy original dread is generally repress 
Da-sein. Dread is there, but sl eeping. All Das 
quivers with its breathing.¥ 
threat. 
n3. 
ret 
f be-
ed 
ls in 
he 
d in 
ill 
For Heidegger ~ the elucidation and clarificat i on of th a 
Nothingness which underl ies dread is the task of philo ophy ~ 
'I'his will reveal the essence of Being. This f actor wil be 
discussed later in the chapter after a fur~her conaide a.t ion 
of dread as a. IS:vchological moode 
i. Angst and Fear. 
As is th~ case with SK, Heidegger take s paine to iffer-
1. Heideg~er, ~AB, 374. 
2. He idegger , suz, lg6. 
3. Brock, Art., 61. 4. Heidegger , EAB , 37 • 
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entiate dr ead from fear. 'I'hey may be similar in tional 
response but they have quite different s Umuli. Roweve , 
either of these Stimmungen are considered by Heide gge in a 
sy chological survey. They are regarded as epistemolog c~l 
f actors ~)rima.ry to the anal ysis of Dasein which in tur is 
the key to the knowledge of Being. They are so connota ive of 
5ener al p sychological interests, however, that Reidegg 
be held i;o have included these interests and, in addi 1i 
have t ranscended these interes ·ts in an attempt to esta 
met aphysical system. 
Both phenomena are considered neither psychol o 
and psychopathological nor 1 existentially 1 n t 
view to 1iheir relevance for the actual life of 
individual, but ontologica lly with regard to t 
bearing on Da.sein as 'Being-in-the-World 1 .1 
Dread is a much more basic phenomenon than fear prior 
to it. "Die Abkehr des Verfallens grtlndet vielmehr in d r An~ t , 
2 d i e ihr rseits Furoh~ erst mOglioh maoht." Fear always has a 
definite object as 'l'l i th SK, i.7hile dread is always indef ni te. 
Dre ad is indicative of pote1 tialities while fe ar refer s t o 
r eal izattons of Da sein. 
Heidegger unterscheidet Angst von Furcht. Da s W vor 
der Furcht ist ein bestimmtea Seiendes; bei Ang t ist 
di a nicht der Fall. In der Angst wird ee dem D eein 
w1heimlich, ohne dasa es genau weiss. warum. Es h~1d­
elt sich um ine Grundetimmung, in der die ' Vel', 
d.h. , die Dinge, bei denen aich Dasein sonst im er 
so sicher ffihlt, auf einmal zu schwi den beginn n, 
d.h., als achwindende erfahren werden.3 
1. Brock, -Ar·t., 59. 
2. Heidegger, suz, 1~6. 
3. ~~lle r. EKT, 65. 
This dist inction is important in order to d i rect the D sein-
analytik toward its on-~ological goal . 
ii. The Wovor of Angst. 
In sp ite of the fact that Heidegger distinguishes dread 
as having no obje c t, he asserts ·th::tt one of t he most L port-
ant factors i n analysis is the attempt to discover and under-
stand dr(::a.d ' s object. Heidegger calls .;his ob j ect the ovor 
of Angst and it is p eculi a r in its i ndefiniteness . The e is 
an i ntui tive immed i a.cy in t he apprehension of dread tu it i s 
so vague that it i s difficult to enter into Verstehen. It is 
'"V~llig unbest i mmt '. All human activity is in r ef erenc1 t o a 
particul~~r entity of the world with ·this except i on . Al e x-
perience~ ~ven t o he analys i s of Das~ i n, has a discer ible 
It 
referent aside from Angst . Anxi ousne s s (Ang·s: ·t l ich.k1 t) and 
dread bu t. they are ontologic .~lly unhelpful for they, . s "~J ell 
as f ear , have definite ob j ects. Ne ither i s ·the object 
dread to be c ons i dered as the result of man ' s i mag i nat on for 
it is ent irely independent of hi s machinations, for he is 
he~vily deoendent u:pon i t. 
Nichts von dem, was i nr.~.e rhalb der Welt zuhande 
vorhanden is~, fungiert ale daa, wovor die Ang 
angstetv•• In der Angs t begegnet nicht dieses 
ienes, mit dem es als Bedrohlichen e ine Bewand 
ha.ben k~nnte .l 
What ie drea~ed i s some t hreateni ng situation over-
hangs l i ke the sword of Damo clea as in the case of fe a • How-
l. Heidegger , suz, lg6. 
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ever, the 'something' .t hat t hreatens 
•something '. "The 'w.h.a.t' of . dread is not of the kind~; at can 
be encouat~red in the world 'Zuhandenes ', 'Vorhandenes ', or 
the Dasein of others ."1 MOller seems to believe that A ·at 
is the 'revealer' of t he whole experience of man, but 
jects of revelat i on are still specific and yet nebulou • 
So entht1ll t die Angst das ganze einhei ·tliche G 
des Daseins. Es zeigt sioh das Wovor: der Hori 
das Niohts, die Wel t, das In-der-Welt se in as 
enheit . 2 
Thus ~t first He idegger 's analys is of the Wovor of ~A=n~~ 
appe ars oontradic cory as it pr ogresses and appears to 
very spec ific as to ~;he object of dread . 
(l). In-der-Welt-Sein as the Wovor of Dread. 
ob-
"Das wovor der Angst is t das In-der-Welt-sein ala solches."3 
Heidegger concludes that if . it is nothing i n the world that 
i nspires dreqd, then it must be the world in its t y that 
serves s.s the object. A focal i zed ent i ty cannot be dis overed 
in the exper i ence of dread . The law of causat ion would indi-
ca t9 that dread must then be gr ounded upon the general sys ·tem 
of all possible obj ects . This would be incomprehensibl to 
the mind in any state of clarity. The limits of Jasper , or 
the ' brackets' of Husserl , are still the outlines of a ecif ic 
obje cts and not incl usive enough to serve as t he objects of 
dread. The i nsp irat i on of dread must be the world itse f. It 
1. Brook, Art., 60. 
2 . MOller, EKT , 69. 
3. Heidegger, SUZ, 186 . 
1~0 
is the recog i t io n of wha;t it means "to-be-in""; the- worl , when 
I s ee th i s in ita otali ty ::tnd not , erely in the perspective 
of my particular preoccupations . n1 As nebulous as this c on-
oep t may seem to be, it still is the only solution for Heid-
e gger. It alo e can u ndergird the awfu l dread which pe 
~nd upholds Dasein . Howe ver , he ' somethirg ' of .dread 
out t o be ve ry little, if anything . 
Das Nichts von Zuhcmdenhei t 6rtuidet i~ ursprtln --lich-
sten ' Etwa.s ', in der Velt; Diese jedoch geh rt onto-
logisch ·~esenhaft zum Sein des Da.seina ale In- 'er-
elt-se in. Wenn stch demnA. ch ala da.s , ovor der Angst 
d as Nichts , da s heisst d i e Welt ale solch h r us-
. ste1l t , dann besag·t d·as: 1.~ ovor die An st sioh rp·atet , 
ist das In-der-Welt-sein_ selbst. 
( 2) • The Wovor of Dread a.s No thing. 
Nothin~ is a basic concept for Heide~ger He felt that 
the real difficul ty with Hegel and his follow 
p l ausibil ity of't heir concept of Nothing in the basic 
l ectical triad of Be i 5-Nothin5-Recoming. This Nothing hich 
s upports Lhe antithesis needs a more careful analysis , ccord-
ing t o He idegger. Nothi .clg i s anecess a ry . concept il met 
g.nd 1 t must be carefully and clearly presented in orde to 
establish a satisfa.ctory metaphysics. In -the state of 
t his ~: otl:ling is a ctually experienced for Heidegger, an this 
is the clue to reality. However, in spite of this appr aion 
of Nothing, "a discovery to which Kierkegaa.rd a eel .a to the 
onl y fore runner--Heide gger has so far done nothing mor ·han 
1 . Blackham , SET , 94. 
2 . Heidegger, SUZ, 1g7. 
1~1 
opened up t he approach to t he problem. "l Th i s falling hort 
of the metaphysical object i s suf f iciently considered n the 
pre cedi ng chapter. For Ki erkegaard t he exper ience of d ead 
was a dizziness which revealed t he possibilities 
the future . Th is is very closely assoc iated\ i t h 
po i n ·t of view, --chough some conunentators 
be the more adequate in explana·t ion. 
The He id~ggerian anguish, however, doe s not 1 
' mere possibil i t i es ', which are partial and r 
non- ent i t ies, bu t to Nothi ngnes s itsel f. Thr 
anguish e sense this Noth ingness , fro m which 
everything that is, and into which everythi ng 
ens a ·t every i nstant to crumble and collapse . 
ie i n 
sci to 
la.t ive 
E;h 
erupts 
t hre9.t-
If this No thingness i s to be considered as the W l t ala 
solohes , one must remember it ie "nioht e.lles Vorhandfne zu-
s a.mmen <il s ~umme " but i nstead . "die MOgl ichkei t von Zu,andenen 
tlberhaupt ." This may go ri gh--c by one in his ontologi ·1 quest 
if he i s too occupied wi ·t h analy zing the world of nat or 
else wi th abstract essences. The man in t he street ha a 
ke y to t he problem , thoush he is entirely una.·t1are of · t --
"dann pflegt die all t!.gliche Rede zu sagen ' es war e i e 1·tlich 
ni chts' • "4 
Thi s No thingness is no t me r ely t he future antic i ated 
in fearful app rehension. For He idegger it i s a nebuldus, bu t 
r eal , 'recepta cle ' fro m which everything is spawned ~d i nto 
whi ch everythin~ must sink int o oblivion. Thia vast ealm in 
1. Brock, Art., 227. 
2. ~'ahl , SHE , 12 . 
3 •. He i degger , suz, lS 7. 
4 Heidegger, SUZ, 187. 
•rould be forever obscured from man in his ontological uest 
if there were not some specific mood whi ch can bring a in-
dividual face to f. ace with Nothingness . '!'hie mood is ea.d . 
Consequently , those philosophers •m o do n ot u ·til ize th · s 
psycholo6ical phenomenon are forever consigned to erro and 
bl i nd .;roping. 
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'Nothingness' is encountered , in t ' e state of read, 
not as something isolated, apart from the thi n s i n 
·the world, but as one with them ••• in the at ate of 
dread, things seem to slide away, si.lk away, that 
the control over ·chings strangely loosens and le akens . 
rrhis is taken to be a functioning of the 'Noth ng' .1 
,.., 
ahlc: l i kens the origin of all things to an •ocea of 
noth i ngness • which painfully spews us out for a while, but 
which always is at hand to suck us in again, and we ar al-
ways about to sink. The sinking back into Nothingness s the 
basic source of dread for Dasein and it i s usually art cula ted 
in terms of death. The Verfallen of man, which is t he eter-
iorating factor that drags Dasein toward death from th v ry 
beginning; helps to clarify t he •something' of dre ad's objec~ : 
The i mm i nence and the immanence of de ath in Daseip. ma. es 
clearer t he ovor of dread . This is i ntegr al to man ' s xper= 
ience and i ·t reveals the i mport .snoe of the concept of read. 
"Der Tod im weitesten Sinne ist ein Phanomen des Leben ."3 
rhat makes this mo re significant for Dasein ia t he rea~ iz at im 
that de :tth is the only re al possibility for it. "So enJh'ftll t 
1 . Brock, Art., 229 . 
2. Wahl, SHE, 45. 
8. Heidegger, SUZ , 246. 
sioh der Tod ala die e i ~enste unbezft· liche, unuberhol 
M~gl1chkeit ." 1 The Being-in-the- .orld is only biding t un-
til he i1~ 'i.'Ucht-mehr-in-der-Wel t-ee in' a d this is ap , arent-
ly. the reason that Heidegger ends his essay, What is M. aics 1 
vii th the curious ques ·tion--" hy is there any Being at 
why not far r 3,ther Nothi ng?" 2 The Nothingness which is the 
goal of de this the object of dre~d for Heidegger as . ell as 
.<:~. prime f actor in hie metaphys ical quest. The fact of 
'thrownness' of Dasein as Being-in-the- world is the in 
ovor of dreadand this in turn i s further analyzed to 
to No~h i!lg as the final Wovor of dread. This comes fro the 
fact hat in the state of dread of death it becomes ob 
that "the dread of death is o arbitrary and chance 10 
the indh.,.idual, but, as a fun&. :nental It findlichkei~ o 
the d isclosure hat Dasein exis ts as che throw . tBei1g 
.9 
of 
ita-own-end 1 • 11 Dread reduces the i di vidual to 1 nich t ==-=-=~o-=:= 
rds-
oirgends ' and this Nothingness , which is the end of D j e in, 
must be the objec t of dread . Thus the object must be c aracter-
ized vaguely, ~hough it should be understood that the I ali ty 
of the object is not thereby brought i nto question. 
Dass das Bedrohende irgends iet, character1s1e t das 
Vovor der Angst ••• 'Nirbe nds 1 aber bedeutet ic t nichts, 
sondern darin liegt Gegend ftberhaupt, Erschlossenheit "' 
v~n Welt ~berhaupt fftr das weaenhaft r!umliche In-s i , · 
ince this Nothi ng i s the ' · ~el t ala solche ~ , and n 
1. Heidegger , SUZ, 250 . 
2 , Heidegger, EAB, 3!0. 
3 •• Brock, Art. , 71-72. 
4 He i degger, SUZ, lg6. 
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particular aspect of it, it is ~he limi ·ts and ground o all 
pa,rticulars. Dread, which under l ies Dasein, apprehends 
and is the key to Being, or tihe metaphysical goal for 
egger . How the transition from Nothing to Being is to 
affected was to be a future exposition in Heidegger's 
sophy and probably will not be forthcoming. Grene luci 
lates dread to its object. 
The existential ists' 'dread', by contr ast-- the 
tigo that accompanies and even constitutes eel 
ization--has no definable object within a well 
mentalized universe. It is a more ambiguous, e 
·though a profounder, uneasiness, Vh oae obj ec ·t 
·this or that within our world but in sone sene 
very limits of that world itself. It is dread 
e•~tiness--before annihilation--before Nothing 
iii. The Wo rum of Angst~ 
ver-
-real-
compart-
en 
s not 
the 
ef ore 
l 
He i degge r is not only interested in what it is th t 
dread dreads, but also 'for the sake of what', 
Dasein has these states of dread. The wovor of dread h 
s ee n to be a vague Nothingness ~hich produces and cons 
all Daselns a:. ~ 3 the r est of the wo rld. The Worum of dr how-
ever, drives Dasein to realize its po ential ity ~nd, p rha.ps, 
to pierce the veil of Nothingness which must be ring 
of Be i ng . Dread, as the stepping stone to Care, is ·the ossible 
basis for a transition from 'nichts und nirgends' to seln . 
Dread may lad to •a.uthenticity'(existing) for it leads Dasem 
to sel f interest and away from an 'unauthent ic' sta:te o inter-
est in the disclosure of the physical world. "Die Angst dage~ n 
1. Grene, DF, 52. 
halt das Dase i n aus seinem ver~lenden Aufgehen in der ' Welt ' 
zur'O.ck."l Just as for SK , for Heidegger the source of rust-
ration of Dase i n not only co,nes through dread, but ala dread 
is the basis for the relief of frustration. The ·wovor eads 
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to a revelation of the Nothingness toward which man un rringly 
dr if ts by virtue of being a Sein zum Tode.However, t he Worum 
r eveals the potent i al ! ty by which !nan can resolve his ·ate 
and utilize i f r hia · ~lf- - ~t~iz4ti0n. 
It is not for the sake of one definite mode of Being 
and one definite potentiality of Da.se1:,n that t Da.s i n 
is in dread. It is for t he sake of the ' Be ing- n-th -
world' itself or ra~ ther for the sake of its au tl .. tic 
potent i al i t y of 'Being-in~the-world '; f or the orld 
and the D~s ein together wi th others as such ca not 
offer ~nything to the Dasein in dread anymore. 
The Wovor of dread i s the f a c t of Dase in 'Da 'in t 
and the Worum of dread refer s to the same fact. "Das, 
die Angst sich !ngstet , enthilllt sioh als das, wovor- s 
!\ngstet: das In-der-Wel t - sein . n3 The difference is tha the 
forme r reflects on ·the ' thrownness 1 of Dasein in vi ew 
Verfa.lle nhe i t and conseque11t helplessness , while t he l 
is the awareness of the possibility of such a state . D 
r ev .ro • .l a to Daseil). i ts essent i al gr eatness--"dae Freisei f'O. r 
d i e Fre iheit des 8ioh-sel bst-w!hlens-und.-ergreifens."4-
f reedom can only come to attention if the state of drP. 
been experienced . Free choice for Dasein i s dependent 
l. He idegger , SUZ , 1g9. 
2 . Brook, Art., 61-62. 
3. Heidegger, SUZ , 1!8. 
4-. He i degger , SUZ , 188 . 
has 
The r~sul ting 1 authentici-ty 1 , or 
not be were it not f or the Angs t which lies beneath 
scious states and presents the Meglichkeit to ma.n. 
Die Angst benimmt so dem Dasein die Megl ichke t, 
con-
verfallend sich aus der ' Welt ' und der effent ichen 
Ausgelegtheit zu ve:rstehen. Sie wirft das Das in auf 
das zur~ck, worum es sich !ngstet, sein e i gen l iche e 
In-der-Welt-sein kannen. Die Angst vere inz elt das 
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Daae in auf sein eigenstes In-der-Welt-sein, d s r-Us 
verstehendes we senhaft a,uf MI!Sglichkei ·ten sich en t wi r f ·t; .1 
The subjectivity of Dasein as it becomes authent c i n 
the worl d is very similar to Ki erkega.ard 's subj ectivi ·y. The 
mai n difference is the ~ode of presentation, i.e., SK s 
stage s of existence. Without dread the ne ed fer this 
j ective existing would never be known, and l ikewise c 
never b e attained. The ob ject of dread and 'for sake 
1.1vha·t' Da s ei n is in dread are seen to be substa>..nt ia.lly the 
same. The object a.s 'Being-in-the - world ' refers to 
ness ' of Dasein and -c;he emptiness of Nothing. The 
'throvm-
is 
·the potentiality as Being-in-the-world authentically. 
i v • . Angst and Unhe i mlichkei t. 
There is a basic state of unrest in ·the individu l 
tvhich i :s caused ,.:;.by dread. Heidegger believes this is s-
pecially apparent in the peoples of the world now. Th need 
for decisions, the necessity of striving for a living and 
the insecurity of vvar torn nations ~md their peoples 11 
illustrate this unhe imlich (homeless ) quality of Dasei • 
1 . He idegg~r , suz, 1~1 . 
This is r elated to the despair of Kierkegaard as i t o structs 
the happ i nes s of man. To He idagger this state is that of 
ab j ct t:>rphan!3-ge , and one is i ndiscrimina.te y thr wn nt o 
the wor· dly fate. "Unh imli chke i t me i t aber dabei zu lei ch 
da.s Nicht-zuhause-sein. n1 
v. Summa ry. 
1f7e have 01/f seen. t hat dread is a complex whi ch 
use s i~ order to establish D9.eein as a metaphysical 
point bv which he hop.,s to penetra.·te to Beiu0 • Dread 
Dase i n t a place of recognizing itself as a mode of · 
which finds it s~lf in the \VorJ.d. The object of thi a 
the ' geTorf ene In-der-Welt-s•in' which appear s upon 
scrutiny to reveal Nothingness. This Nothing is 
as a feel i ng of ominous ernptin~sa through dr es,d 
ceptualized as a purely i ~1determinate object which r 
to all unrealized possibilities. This experience lea 
despair and Unha imlichke i t as Da.se i n evaluate s 1 teal 
the Vo·h&ldene of the world. The reason for which 
i n the state of dre ad is revealed by Heideg5er in a. 
idegger 
ther 
g 
iatic at tempt to evade nihilis~ in his philosophy. I is 
'In-der-We1.-t-s in-k~nnen ' of Das P. in as 1 t becomes aw 
i t s possibility of fr eedom and choice 
tion and value-attainment . This is in spite of the i 
Tod which is reve~led i n the Wovor of dread. The pro 
l . Heidegger, SUZ~ l~S . 
int egra.-
emot i om'l.l mood, of dread permeates every phase of the activity 
of Dasein ~nd establishes it a s a metaphysical princi le . "Das 
volle Ph!nomen der Angst demnach zeigt das Dasein ala fak-
tisch existier endes In-der-Welt-Sein.n1 
Heidegger is not unaware of the emphasis of cont mpor-
ary physiological psychology ru1d he says, "Oft ist di Angst 
'physiologisch' bedi,gt,n2 He believes , however, that this 
explanation coul d never be possible if Dasein did not dread 
itself in the very ground of its Being. Others have n glected 
the concept completely. However, 
precedent i n considering dread to be the ground proce a of 
man. He believes this to be basic in the history of 
theology. He cites Augustine and Luther, a s well as 
ristian 
' a.s 
having such a basic concept .3 Es ist kein Zufall tha they 
held it to be a cent ral consideration in t he anthropo ogical 
problem of discovering the nature of man . For Heidegg 
dread is the k~y to the underst anding of Dasein and a 
will enable a philosopher to penetrate the 'veil ' of 
"Alle in in der Angst liegt die MGbl ichkeit eines ausg zeich-
neten Erschliessens.n4 
Dread not only is the key to t he underst anding Dasei~ 
but it al so leads to the discovery of the ground of 1ity in 
Dasein. Heidegger r~pudiates any solid substance as 
l • He idegger, 
2. Heidegger, 
3 •• Heidegger, 4 Heidegger, 
SUZ, 191. 
SUZ, 190. 
SUZ, 190 , n. 
suz, 191 . 
of man and would take hearty exceptions to SK at this point. 
The Daeeinanalytik of Heidegger revealed aspects •s 
exper iences and activities which are to be interprete large-
l y in reference to the basic state of dread. Mor e imp 
than thEl me r e discovery of elements for Heidegger, ho . ever, 
is the fact that these eleme ts are presented i n one 
of exper ience. Dread is an experience which may expl9, 
these element s may be bu·t not how they ma.y be unified 
of man and would tak hearty exceptions to SK at t his 
The Daaeinanalyt i k of Heidegger revealed aspects 
xperiencea and a ctivi t i s which are to be interpreted 
l y in ref~rence to the basic state of dread . More i mpo 
than the mere di scovery of elements for He i degger, how 
is the f act that these eleme ts are presented i ·, oze 
of exper ience. Dread i s an experience which may expl~. L ho 
th se eleme· ta may be bu·~ not how they may be unifi ed . 
Dread is accompanied by a concern, or Care, ~hich an 
ex raise s about all the 9hases of h i s exper i ence. He idegger 
uses this co cern in a te chni cal way to give systematic 
unity to Dase in. Car6 is that experience in which He i de ge r 
sees a synth s is of t he elements of his Daseinanalytik. The 
dissertat i on wi11 ow i ncluo.e s. brief characterization f 
Care a.s the principle of unity i n man . 
5 . Care . 
A co. cept to which Heidegger gives f ew paragraphs, but 
which is c~ntxal i n the Daseinanalytik is Care . This ba ic 
concern is the unifying fac~or of the eleme .ts of D ~s 1i and 
is that ·~·hich gi ve e D!!!.eein unity and purpose. Dread is • stepp-
ing ston~' ~o Care as t he ~anif s tat ions of dread are r vealed 
in a unity of exper i ence of Daeein. The Care is ' i n 
the co·1cern that man has for himself as a be i ng in the orld. He 
is esse tially 'sich-vorw g- im- schon-se i n-in- der-Wel t' ~ e cause 
he ie nev .. r conte 1t with a present vege tati ng exi ster c e Man 
wants to know how he came and whe re he is E;Oin g . 
care f or t he ' Zuhar.dene ' and 'Vorhtmd!!_n.e ' i n the wor ld 
him and t h i mpl i ca.tion.s that they have for his i s 
c oncern is the real bei g of Dasein as i t give s to 
the whol e span of i t a activity. "Di ees Se. in e rf'ftllt d i Be-
deutung des Ti tels Sor ge , der rein outologisch-existenzi a l 
. l 6ebraucht wird." 
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This ~orge; or Ca r e , is r lated to th concept of spirit 
i n SK and is t h e synthe s i s of all the aspec t s of Dase i • It 
i s ·the "exietenzi ale Ganzhe i t c;les ontologisch~n Struktur a.nz n 
dee Dase i na .•2 Care is i mportant a.s a. link i n t he cha~ whi ch 
leads to the on t ologica.l object, Be i ng , f or 1 t is the "exist-
enzial-apriorisch 'vor' j ed e r "~ Dasein, and t hus is th p r e -
r equisite and presupposit i on of ev ery human b e i ng . Ca r i s 
ontologically 'fr'fther' than even ·the deep mood of drea~ g,nd 
i t h ,q,e a n unconscious ph~se which gives it continui t y ~rom t!B 
very beginning of each particular Dasein. Care is fire ~ appa~ 
ent to Da.se in as its being when acts or motives of Wol~en and 
1?-'ftnachen a r e noticed . These are unique to man - and revi lal his 
ess nee • . i ll ing is the drive toward uni ty in Da sein w ich re -
ve a.ls So r ge a s th e SeinkOn en, or poten t ia.l, of Dasein. By a k-
ing thought, or willi n6 , o ae Oanno t s olve all of ma.n 1 •JP roblems 
:~ ::::.::: r :e r
8
;,uu:z:, t ~ 9:~ •ever • "Das beruhi gte 1 o 11 en 1 1 nter 2. Heidegger, 192. 
1
. 
3. Heidegger , SUZ, 193 . 
I 
Ftl.hrung des Man bedeu -~ t gleichwohl l iCh t e i n Ausl~sche 
l Se i ne zum Se in k~nnen, sondern nur eine Modifikation." I 
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des 
ha t 
I the is 1 ft short of perfection is l ft to ishing which i s 
second basi c 'I'rieb of Care, and, since i t completes the [unity 
of the Daseina.nalytik, Heidegger beli ves tha-c "w'fulsche setzt 
2 
ontologisch Soi ·e voraus". [ 
He idegg r asserts ·that Care has two othe r An tri ben 
which ~· 1 ve Dasein 1 ts frustr a t i on by their ambi vale 1ce . l Ha g 
is the propens ity to f lee the world and to escape wi thi rl the 
self . Drang; opposes this drive ard , · instead , of fleeing dut 
of t he world , i s a motivati on to fl e into the orld . H~ ide~ger 
believes ·these coasequen t states a.re both 'unauthentic ' jand 
ne ed to be rem died, for i n each case the "volle Strukt~r de r 
Sorge i s t modif i zie r t. "3 These st ate' are parallel with ~he 
two extremes of objectivityjsubjectivi ·ty in the thought fof 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, however, refuses to regard them las 
e ither/or. The aesthetic stage of Dran~ , and t he passion1t • 
i nward state of Han.g are both unrealistic and of little or 
no benefit i n the r eal izat i on of Seinkennen. 
Heidegge r analyzed these aspects of Care in order o show 
·that the uni t y of Dase i n , which is Dasein' s bei .ig, is nJ simple 
ant ic ' Urelement' upon which to append a philosophy of ~eal is~. 
"Der Ausdruck 'Sorge' me i nt ein exis tenzial-ontologisch~s 
1. Heidegger , SUZ , 195. 
2. Heidegger 1 SUZ , 195 . 3. Hei degger , SUZ, 195 . 
Grundph!.nom.:on , das Gleiohwohl in ee i ne.r Struktur nicht e in-
fach ist. nl 
Car6 does not hav e the e ternal dimension hat SK 's 
sp irit possessed , It was not a.n asp~ot of God tha.t would one 
da y return to Him. Man in SK ' s vi ew was a. 1 Se i n zum Ewi lg kei t ' 
bu·t for He i dag~er Da.s e in is a 1 Se in zurn Tode.1 • Da.se i.[l is 
entirely finite and is ha steuing to i ts end. The goal of life 
i s not 'pte in the sky' 1 for ·the be i ng of Daeein i s Ca}Je 1 ani 
Care is "the s ·truc ture of the mode of exis tenc e of one · ho 
e xists by an·ticipating \!ifha ~ he wi ll. be in a world in w ich 
2 J h e is f ound &"ld to which he is bound," 
But Care no ·t only gives a unity t o man's xp erien e , 
it also furnishes a b as is for the difficulty and prob1 
1r,rh. ich man h a s t o fac e , He ide::;ger presents Verfallen e,s 
root of t.he s problems . This con cept will now be cons i 
as it is r elated to Care , 
6. Verfal.len . 
Care not only i n cl ude s t he e xistential charact~ri tics 
of Da se,i n but also ·the modes of Befindlichkei t or Gewo f en-
- I. 
heft, . the 1 thrownness 1 i to tne woi·ld, and that of Ve rfl'allen 
. I 
which is a ruru ing away from duty. As a resul·t of beir .. g 
1 f our,d 1 in t he world a.nd the aubseque~t r a.lizat i o, th1 t 
Da.sein is a b e ing-t ow~.:~.rds-death, man 1s ·tempt ed 'tO fl ee fr om 
thl a 1 wrf.t.t h to come ' • I n do i ng this he fl ee s from the J e-
1 . He idegger, SUZ , 196. 
2. Blackham, SET, 95. 
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te-n i ali y i n hi b i ug ::t d 1 - ·t·(l •iS s t.he 
s· h ·r .• t')f and t r-: t e,v .... i:y "Y h 1eh, !ox 
r , i· Lh ,. ' J t i1 of exi .... lJC . Tld "' i t h t 
-· 
.. • 
:. ... o1 r:.g re:. 1 t · ~ an 
lo · 1 t c , f in • •• IJ.o. r e 
t i t ui .. rt eb ,t .. n 0 ff£ntl ic.:.k_ · t, :te •• .r.r ... ~ • 
• g rl·e· · . ·U . wl e: 0 odg l . n 
• :. c1_.s • ie t i 
, I tl1~ · ::uc. -:c i Gz;.t) th r r1u.l ti g p ob 
1 1 !'~ .~1 1 ~::. 11 ·l- but ve r y \1 ir:· b e. I t in 
tb. q s.- l e t t SK ' 'J or!.g i. .L a oin ruld is t;.l" !: ('; 
0 • I f . h i.s nt- .. t i s v :r oomo-, t .I r. '· h r l .... 
n· • · r ·'I· .iza ~O . .. y b~ t h . v- r r 11 · . ts or 
• t r zor • f B"i n i t . ,11. J . , i tin.:. t lo 
lf th l' • r .:.lly 1 ir. ~~- s t t e ¢f !!rl.or epb 
h1 rrr') 1.~ r. 1.. to f i "' ' h1 ,11 ' l f . • i l e a e.r 1u d e 
.-:..::...:.:..::.;:...;.;;;.::. ist , · as ioh uvo · f1 d 
·er rJ nus of' Car .: , .;.d <t 
" 
"" 
t o b v n le 
m ..• t t r f cho1o 0 1C&l 
rim ob:lt ... e s -
r . of hi $ t 
1 ~ 3 • 
a. uz. 26t . 
Ve r f allenhe i t d he may b e obl ivious of i t a deleter i o~a 
e f fe cts , No one is to be blamed f or bei g i n this s ateJ bu t 
blamewor;hy if he does not transcend i t by real izi g ht s 
Se in.k~nnen , For this latter he i s wi t hout excuse f or h be -
comes aware of h i s f l i ght to 1 ev·eryd ayne s a 1 b y the a c tivi ty 
I 
of Angst and then the cla~1fying call of oo~sci ence reveals 
to h i m h i s p l i ght . 
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Man i n t he s tate of Verf.a.ll n is unauthent ic a c co di .~.g 
to He i de gger . Unau t h ent ici t y i s a.n attempt ·t o f l e f rom re -
sponsibility, an attempt to avoid one ' s dut y. He i degger lbe-
li .vee that th i s i s ·the real p:r- oblem of present civil izations . 
Men are e i ·the .I· trying to b e i nac t ive vegetables or are ne-
gle cti..g th i r personal r esponsibil i t y by hi d i ng i th •croiV'd ' 
of menki Hd. Within man , however , i s he mea.ns of r ot 1, y1lg 
this unauthent ic a · ate . Th is make s him authe-nt ic or exi stent-
i al . Hei degger f inds i consci enc e the mot iva ·t i on to aJthen-
t ici t y. 
7. Cone cience . 
The c oncept of c o~s cience is ne cessary 1 order to ex-
tricate Dase i n from i ta unau thent ici y i n Ve~f allense i • The 
que st i on remai J.ing i s "wi e v er·h!tl t e i gentliches Dase i nlsich 
zu di esem I mmer - s chon-verf al1en-se i n an Wel t a d JU t we t . "1 
I 
.A • call ' of conscience b r eaks through to co nsciousne s s ! and 
summons man to realize hi mself. 
1 . Vog t , SHK , 37. 
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I Th me ssage of conscience is 1 spe ech 1 i so far ar some-
thing is communicated , but "1 t offers no i nf orme,tion a~out 
any events nor doe s it open up a soli l oquy or an 1 ler ,nego-
ti8,tio , n1 I t is in ·this sense--nichts, The iuscruta.ble war -
i ug is i n r f erence to Dasei~ and it communi ca tes o hi ! him-
self-- "ale di eser Anruf der Aufruf de s 8elbst zu s s inl m 
Selb stse ink~nr en und dami t ~'~~ iLJ. Vorrufen des Dase i e au seine 
MOgl ichk iten. 112 / 
If t he m esage is addressed to man and is a revel~ti on 
I 
of himself, who does the call t ng ? He id gger is fl atly (l)ppos d 
to any t r;msc . ndent source of consci ence, which ould e a 
ne cessity for Ki~rkegaard, &id carefully disti .g~ishes his 
vi ~ w from the traditional theori e s of conscience. Consj i e .... ce 
is not the voice of God, Ne ither is it a 'f aculty' of Tan 
nor a corn)? inati on ba sed "auf e.ines der Seelevermegen, rstand, 
11111 oder Gef'f1hl."3 Das Gewiss en is the call of Car 
has both its ref erence ald i ts source i n m~l . "Das Dase in i st 
I der Rufer a.nd der Angeruf e e zumal."4 Th~!, call of consyi ence 
11 ha t s ei ne ontologisch _ M~gl ichkeit daria, daas das Daf .1n 
i n Grunde seines S i ns Sorge 1st. n5 Conscience appea:r:e to be 
I 
in the unconscious phas e of Da.ee in r-u.1.d on occase i o ... s f reaks 
through t o consciousness. I 
l . 
2. 
~· 
. . 
5. 
cons cience is, then, no reli gious concept t hat makes 
Brock:-Art., go . 
Heidegger , suz , 274. 
He i degger , SUZ , 271 . 
Heidsgger , SUZ , 277 • 
Heideg er , SUZ , 2 7~ . 
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m~n a,,are of t he demands upo .a. him of some t r a.ne ce lde t / B i ng . 
I 
Such s. tr'illSC ndence would viti ate a.ll possibility of approach-
ing Be i ng as f ar a s Heide gge r is co. cerned and has b eJl one 
of t he gr ea t historical f allacies, Be i ng must b e disco~ red 
by Das ir.a.analytik and consci ence is entirely subsumed ~n 
I 
the elements of t his analysis. Man must warn himself o~ the 
def ect s i n his goals. I t is of his very nature to do t~is. 
I 
The Ge.nzhai t des Stl·iiktur, which is Care, in the complex! tv I . 
I 
of its unif ica:tion i ncludes cons ci en ce. Thus wi · hinman is 
I 
I 
th immedi at, cause of a.ll his diffi culti es (Verfalledhei t) , 
I 
th. source of his mot ivat i ons ( Ang~1), and he warni g which 
I 
calls him to authent icity (Gewissen) . Dr. Vogt gives :a good 
su~ma.ry of this latter· fac tor in reference ·to Dasein: I 
o ha.t aich das Gewisaen geze i gt al e Ruf der 1orge , 
i n der e s dem Dasein urn e e eelbst geht: Das i se i ner 
Geworf enh it eioh !ngstende Dasein (Faktizit!t dee 
Schon se i n i n ) r uft eben di eses Daeein auf zu~ 1 ~e -
sten S in kennen (1£xist enzialitS.t de e Sich vo t rv: eJ 
aus der Verfallenheit i n das Man (Schou se i n be i), l 
I j 
The queet i o. r emaini .g is: I s t here t he power wi t hin 
Daaein to beco:ne authent ic? The call of. conscience pe ... et r a.tee 
I 
t hrough t he wal l of the uncor.acious deep within the s tructure 
of Da""_;ill and presents a. ei t ua.tion to llaeein. This ei : ua.tion, 
perme~ted 'Ni th guilt , sets t he stage f or a ction· t h t r'i ll 
make man au thent ic without taking him out of the worla. Th i s 
I 
action which produces au thentic ity is called 'resolvet 
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S. The Cure--Free Resolve, 
The possibility of man is revealed by conscience 'd 
guilt , A resolve , or resolute action , is needed in ordtr ·bhat 
man may become authenti c--may realize hie potentiality This 
rea.liza,tion is the Ersohlosaenh~j, ·t of Being and the r·ell clue 
to real i ty , The resolution, in German, has ~n all itera ive 
emphas is aJs it fits into the puzzle a.s the solution to the 
' hiddenness' of Dase i n in Verfaller~it as well as fur ,ish-
tng the prospeoti ve link to the philosophical goal of le i ng . 
Diese Ausgezeidhnete, im Daaein selbst duroh s in 
Gewissen bezengte eigentlioh Erschlossenheit c! e 
versohwi egeue , angstbereite Siohentwerfen auf cia.s 
t genste Sohuldigse i n--nermen wir die Entsoh.lOI1 sen-
heit,l 
This resolve is not a necessary a.o·t and many do n , t 
make 1 t. It is no part of the Grunds~];_m nen that proj eo Da.e-
ein i nto the world and . cause him ·to tremble before it. By 
this Entschlossenheit , on the contrary, he can control these 
' deep moods ' and can be the master of his fate. It is liter-
ally a fateful goal , for deo.th is the i nescapable term~nua 
of Dase_!_!!. R •. sol ve , however, enables man to make the moist of 
i mmanent death and to become authentic as an existing being 
who realizes his Seink~nnen and thereby reveals Being . 
Only in such r ecognition of my radical finitude , in 
·the . sinking dread with which I face my own anni il a-
tion, can I esoa,pe the snares of the delusive p esen.t, 
to create , in a fre~ resolve .... a genuine future 1 rom 
a genuinely historical past . ~ 
1. Heidegger , SUZ, 297. 
2. Grene, DF, 53. 
This resolute a ct is basic to the underst ~~ding o~ 
me t aphysics f or it r eveal s the ob j ect of dr ea.d--Nothinl • 
1 9~ 
The d ~,th , t o which he must ·o , b . com s apparent t o t he i n-
dividual as h': see s it is t he absorption into Nothingn as. 
A real phil osophical insight is gained by faci ng d ath and 
maki ng the mo st of it. 
The per son, arouse& by co :u.soie oe, r ecognizes ~n 
dread the nothing out of which he came and i n t b 
which he goe s and t herefore resolves hie exist~nce 
i 1to t he nothing waich it is by an act of total 
renunciation.l I 
This may appear t o ma ke a complete nihilism of He ideg~ r r's 
thought, but, a s fur t he r investigat i on rev~als, the No~hing 
s eems t o have e1 ough couten·t t o bl unt the force of thi 1 
c r i t icism. 
The fr ee resol ve which He ide gger believes will be the 
cure f or man's problems is the r e solute facing 
the subsequent creative decisions which will ensue. 
s eems t o think that for man to a ccep t the f a ct that 
appoi nted unto him once to die ' ie t he first hurdle 
is no t clear as to wha t t h creative l iving . He idegger 
to do is nt t deci s ions should be. W ha·t he is asking men 
ly se en with the e xception that ~hey should r ealize t ha t 
I 
must f ace an annihil a ting death. I 
Both Ki e rke gaard and Heidegger are ambiguous a t the 
and 
is 
easi-
they 
point of resol ution of t he problems of existence. The I a.naly-
1 
s is of man and t he ensuing a ccounts of dread ar e cl ar +n 
1 . Bla.c~~am, SET, 103-104. 
int ... nt a nd rela ·t ively clear in pr esentation. The urgi nk to 
subj e ctivi y, however, is r a ther vague . Subj ectivity p~r ae 
I -
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covers a multitude of moods and aspirat i ons. Surely SKI and 
Heidegger hav e a.cti vi ties such a s love, c.rea.ti vi ty, ana. al -
truistic effort in mind a s the characterist ics of 1 r ed~eming ' 
I 
r e solutions, or ' existen·t ial leaps'. Generic i nwardnesf 
s eems to be just as chaotic a s obje,ctive apeculatio ... o 
' everyday Leas 1 unless lihEJr e. is further clarific~tio .l• 
Having analyzed the ha.sic philosophical elements f n 
t he thought of SK and Heidegger and t he r e spective s i gp i-
1 
ficance of the psychological state of dread in these ~aly-
1 
s e e, we shall now summar ize the main observatio~e r ev laled 
i n the course of the dissertation and dra" the oonclu, i o1s 
to this research problem. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
1 . Dread in the Philosophy of SK. 
I 
The intention of Kierkegaard 1 s philosophy was to Ij'estore 
individuality . The desirability of this motive is quitJ gen-
1 
erally admitted, for if man is not a worthy entity , then 
I 
there can be little of worth in reality . SKis campai gnin g 
I 
agains t all philosophers· who write wi thout the basi c i~ter-
est of man at he a rt . In the ensuing analys i s of man, Kierke-
1 
gaard pres en t'3d a ps ychol ogics l de lineation of the s iBI;J:i. fi-
cant exper·ience s of maE . J'/Ian 1 s de fect, whi ch destroys h i s 
I 
indlviduality , as we ll as the solution for the restoration 
of this in~i vi duRlity, c omes from a leap . This lean s / a 
free , trans ratioral decision by which a human being de f erm-
ines his level of exlster..ce . Man is a Seir.. zum Ewigkelt and 
I 
his 1 l eaps ' will deter·mine the qu~lity of his eternali ~y .. 
The leap which destroys man ' s indi viduality is thr leijp 
of sin ln which man tries to resolve h i s future e i therl in 
I 
terms of time or in terms of eternity . Neither attemp t ! will 
avail, however , for he is a creature c omposed of both ltemp-
1 
oral and eternal components , The resultan t state of sin 5s 
I 
existence in the first three s t a ges of existence--aesthetic, 
ethi cal, or reli giousness A. These are characterizen by the 
I 
psychological responses of ennui, guilt, and sin- conscious -
ness, respectively. 
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The positive leap, which restores man's individuality, 
is the leap of faith, This is the decision to resolve lthe 
future in terms of Jesus Chri st who was the eternal Go~ and 
yet entered history. SK believes this will synthesize ~an's 
diverse dimensions of mortality a nd immortality. This declsion 
i s a paradox for it is a belief in the unbelievable--an in-
tellectual acceptance I of t h e unintelli g:Lble. Faith is t""le 
I 
passionate embrace of this absurdity. 
Underlying these two basic existential acts of man is 
the phenomenon of dread. Kierkegaard de l."ives this frof- an 
i ntrospect ive anal~sis ar d applies it as a co~cept to kxplain 
tbA basis for, and th0 validity of, certain theologic ~ l 
S }· __ ,..,  -co f1s cJ· ""S-doctrines . Original sin, s ubsequent sin, guilt, , & ~~ 
ness~ despair, and faith are all undergirded by dread ~s it 
move ~ the i ndividual to action. Dread explains how each of 
I 
t he s e ~ ychological states comes about and haw each leads to 
I 
the other. SK presented dread as the exp lanatory facto~ for 
the religious doctrine of original sin. This 'deep' mor d 
which is of the essence of man 's activity is t h e mediating 
. I 
factor from l Dr..ocence to e;uilt and is basic to the exulanation 
I 
of l ~ ;er actA of sin in the individual's life. Des pair is the 
emotion in the experience of recognizing a ne ga tive le;ap. 
Dread, in causing the state of guilt, puts J1l§.n in his preCiie -
ament but also sets the conditio~s for his 'salvation ' from 
it. Faith is tb.e basis for this release from the condemnation 
of sin. All of these factors are presented in a dialectical 
I 
:process . 
This psychological state of dread is the primary motiv-
1 
ation of the individual from the time of conception unpil 
I 
death. Its object in experience is vague and difficul t ! to 
I 
. . I 
conceive with clarity. It is the Nothingness, or the inde-
terminacy, of the fu t1.J.re , and· the manifold poss ibili ti
1
es 
I 
wh1.ch represent t"b.e future . 
' 
I 
I . SK 1 s psychology is comparable to phases of contempor-
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ary psychoanalysis, but t h ese similarities Rre only i n;cident-
1 
al and accidental, for KierkegaHrd 's purpose is entirely 
different from that of this school of contemporary psycho-
lo.gy . 
I 
I 
It is r-atable that Kierkegaa.rd was one of the first 
I 
thinkers to give dread a significant place in ~ychol9gicel 
I 
I 
I considera:.t:lons . 
I SK's psychology also reflects his own personality to 
I 
a large degree . His adoption of dread as the basic ps(vcho ... 
logical category is consistent with his deep-seated m~lan-
1 
I 
choly a!'1d his desponnency wh·T ch characterized his lif~e and 
thought from his childhood to his grave •. 
2. Dread in the Ph ilosophy of Heidegger . 
I 
The stated purpose of Heide gger's nhilos ophy is to take 
up and attempt to solve the ancient and persiBtent problem 
of Being . This ls a metaphysical problem and for this reason 
Heideg~er repudiates his being called an existentiP.list . 
Because of h'.s subsequent analys i s of the existing individ-
ual, and ·his .falling short of his metaphysical goql , however , 
Heide gger is properly considered a member of the contempor-
1 
ary school of existential philosophy of which SK is the 
fou.11der . 
Dase:tn is the basic category of HeldE~gger' s analysis , 
This is a ter..br..ical t e :r'm by which he consistently classifies 
the rational human being. This I is the starting point of all 
philosophy and it must underg o a phenomenological analwsis 
in the pursuit of Being . 
Phi l osophle is t u.Di versale p~ hanomenologische ,On to-
logie, ausgehend von der Bermeneutik des Daseins , 
die als Analytik oer Exlstenz das Ende des Leitfadens 
alles philosophischen B,ragens dort festgemachti hat, 
woraus ~ entspr·ingt und wohin es . Zuruckschll:!e;t.l 
Heidegger adopts Kierkegaard ' s concept of c.read as the 
basic cate g ory of his y-JSychology and it has a. similar function 
as the prime motivation u.11.derlylng and permeating the exper-
iences of Dasein . Dread , for Heide,gger , likewise has N·othin g 
I 
for itfl object . This is considered to b e one of the most 
si grdficant clues in the ques;t for Being. Nothin g is the 
antithesis of Bein g of whlcb Dasein must be the synthesis . 
He has t h.ree other categories which c omp r ise his gene r e..l 
anthropological structure since he does not have a tradit on-
al view of man nor a tl:lejsttc r eference for man . These are 
So.r ge:; or Care , which is the unifying Sein of Da sein ; Ver-
1 . Tieidegger , SUZ , 38; c f . 436 . 
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fallen, which is the essential F'lucht of man from his responsi-
bilities ; and Conscience , or Gew isAe:n, which brings manl to 
I 
awareness of this fli ght. 'J.1his sets the c ondi tlons for h i s 
I 
r e ctifying, or authenticat ing , Dasein. Dread is the siignifi -
can t cause of the plight of Das ein and this plight is Jm-
celed by tb.c 1 revelation'_ of Das ein to Dasein by a reso
1
lution 
which asserta the individuality of Dssein and separates him 
from the c rowd where he has been hiding ln nnauthenticilty as 
I daS f-1an I • 
Heide gger f ollows the phenomenological method of Husserl 
in his analysis of Dasein anct mak~~ a careful delineati1on of 
man's d i me:n3ions. His vocabulary is nni que , however , and it 
I is diffi cult to determine just how his Angst compar~ s to the 
anal ysis of anxiety , or dread, in contemporary ps ychol9gy . 
As a phi losophical concept , however , dread is employed by 
Heide gge r wi th just as much significance as it has in t 1he 
philosophy of Kierkegaar·d . Drea.d stirs man 
forces him to f a ce his fate, as Sein zum 
coura ge or cowardice. 
to decision jand 
Tode , with , ither 
Heide gge r ' s psychology was formed . while he, unlike, SK , 
hac full cognizance of the recent i nterest in psychoanalysis , 
but h~ repudiated thi~ rsychological theory . He felt that its 
interest s were entirely foreien to h is own work . He even re-
pudiated p sycholo t:;y per ~ ~ but hi s emphasl s on the e.nalysis 
ot: man could hardly skirt some consirieration of this fi1eld . 
His analysis of the Grundstimmen of Dasein reflects his con-
first World 'ffar was not yet out of mind, aud the seeds f the 
second we r·e be i ng sown. 
3. Si mi le.r ities i n SK and Heide gger. 
Heidegger seems to have obta i ned a great deal fr om hi s 
a.s socia.tion with the wor ks of Kierkegaard. Alt hough his 
quest is the me t aphysical ob j ect , Be ing, and not eternal 
happiness f or lilimself, his methodology ha.s many poiuts f 
Ct)nte,c t wi -~h that of the g:reat Danish philosopher . They both 
take the go-centr ic predicament seriously and agr ee thr t 
self -exper i ence is the onl y philosophical datum , I n the l i ght 
of t hi s agreement t hey a ·t ·t empt to analyze themselves in en-
si vely nd exhaustively. They are ·bolih existenti aJ. ists ·d 
have a s basic aspects of their thought t he exis tent i al 
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Both are i n r eac·ti on to fin ished systems of t hought and 
t rad i ·t i onal philosophical methods. "It is in objective rer ·t a i n-
ty and .s ta.bl i shed knowledge that Heidegger, l ike Ki erkega.ard , 
s ee s the grave of truth."l l 
SK ' s doctrine of the i ndividual and Heid~gge r 1 s co cept 
I 
of Dase i n are closely related. Each deplores t he view of man 
when he i s regarded as an a tom of humanity instead of as an 
I 
existing i ndividual, The concep t of dread in He idegger ~eems 
to be borrowed f rom Kie rkegaard a.nd both men use it a s ~he 
basic psychological. ground of human mot ive.-~ i on. The doci rine 
I 
of origi nal s i n that SK i s def e.1:.ding in hi s paychologic ;:~cl 
exposition ha s i ts counterpart i n Verfa.llenhe it in Heidt gger •s 
1 . Blackham , SET, 154. I 
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'Jiew. Both men present a cure for the i 11 ensuing. from rhese 
c1readful sta:tes: and both cures are dialectical 1 leaps 1 --the 
one a passionate f aith in the unintelli gible, the other1 a 
free resolve to bec ome nothing . I 
Obviously, both of t he se men have & genipus for psycho-
logi cal observation and analysis,- as we ll as a keen dialect-
ice,l skill. 
4 . Diffe rences in SK and lie ide gger. 
There are many stgnificant dif f erences between Kie rke -
' 
gaard and Heide gger in l'e gard to the state of dread. E:K' s 
philosophy is a theological system while Heide gger is agnostic, 
I 
if not athe istic. This is questioned by Bla ckham , however, 
for he says that : : 
I t is far from being true t hat Kierkegaard 1 s thbught 
is persona lly religious and Heide8~er 1 s fo rmal l y 
ph ilosophic. Behind the ri gorous formalit y of Heid-
e ~ger's treatment of peraonal e~istence it is n~t 
difficult to see a qn.asi-reltgious purpose at wrrk . l 
This purpose ap pears to the writer to be extremely 
I 
well hidden if not non-existent. SK analyzed the individual 
and four1 d God , whi l'3 Heide 15ge r ·analyzed the indivi dual and 
found Nothingness on the ' horizon ' of Being. 
The views of ~ychology of the8e tw3 r~n were different 
also . SK held psychology to be a ve~y important diRciplin'3 
and a necessary tool in the se a rch for truth. 
Ki e rke gaard und Nietzsche sind beide und abhlingi g 
1. Blackham, SET , 108 . 
voneinander in wei ter·n Partien ihres Denkens durch 
das psychologische Suchan und Spftr en b stiml t , Aha 
diesem entwickeln sie ihre Erkennt isse, dem e inen 
wi e dem andern di ent d i e Psychologie. a la I ns ·t;l.·umb.nt 
der Arbeit.l I 
HA i degge r, o the othgr na .d, hvlds p sychology as a science 
t o be merely a by-product of his phenomenological analy j i s . 
A b as ic difference r esulting f r om their divergenc on 
t he rel i gi ous question is that of their anthropologi es and 
the consequent i mpli cat ions co cerni ng the moods of psyLl~-
., 
logy . The st ate of dre ad in Kierkegaard serves a s a ia~on 
1 b t ween God and man, while all of the factors in Heideg6~r's 
etnalysis must have an effici ent a .. d fi nal ca us E: wi hin ~ he 
Sorle Dase i n itself . For i nstance, He idegger's concept of ~ 
clo sely resembles Kierkega~rd's spirit in man as an explan-
atory device . The sp i rit , however, is a divine d i me sio of 
!nan while orge must be exha.usted i n. the psychol o· ,ioal i n-
1 
terpre t ation of Dase i and i ts a cti vi ·~y. Conscieuoe i s ~ 
b Msic factor f or He i degger, whi le SK, though hold1n0 to t his 
oo~cept as the voice a.d power of God, does ~ot uti l ize it 
to a y xte t i n his psychology. Conscience is onl y ~ f a ctor 
2 0 7 
on the m rr:;,l level~ for SK while it is essential to ~..ohe !struct-
ure of Dasein for Heideg ·er. 
It is i ntere ati 1g to note that SK begins with the 1h-
ci vidual ~,nd he ul timat ly r e .ch a God, the metaphysic 1 ob-
j ect; while He i degger starts with the individual a a a stepping 
sto to the m~taphysioal object, Be ing, and finishe s wi t h 
what he atar t ed--Da ee in. 
1 . H~iss , Art ., 35. 
Ki e rkega9.rd believed man to be a Selbe ~ zum Ewi gk i ·t a _ d 
he sought to expend every effort to make choices that . auld 
expedi e such a bein6 on his journ y. On the ocher hand , 
Heide@:ger co,ld only s ee a Selbst zum Tode which mus t· r esolve 
i ·ts f ate . It is r emarkable t hat t wo such d iametr ically oppo s e d 
pre auppoei tiona could be a rticulated i n such a simi 1\r ·'lla el~. 
Both men are to be co~mended for t he earnestness and pra mat ic 
purpose that t hey had. The i r a was not a p hilosophy f or philo-
eophy ' e s ke , but, rather, s talwart att mp ts to solv the 
problema of mankind. Perh~ a they we re mistaken 1 assumi g 
th9.t th ir personal p roblems were those of every man . 
5 . Eval ua. t ion . 
Dread ha s been regarded by many psychologi sts as a aig-
n if ic.m t . otional eta te i n th f 1 eld of p ey cholo~"Y. Ki erke-
gaard and He i deoger cona i.d r this s ·~ ate to be the moat ai g-
n i f ica.n t of all human exper iences, and use it as t he key to 
atta:i nile the ir ph i losophi cal goals . Dread is a dynamic force 
in human experience and through it reality must be interpre ted . 
--;, 
Dread i s the l~ason between man s.nd his ontol ogical ground . 
•A 
I nasmuch -s.s - ~ he ir purpose is to postulate dread i n order 
to a ccm nt fo r the data of human expdrience, t he attempts of 
SK 9.!ld He i degg,er r e not basical ly defective in usin0 dread 
a s the basi c dimension of t heir philosophies . As a matte r of 
fact, they are r e c ognizinc; V"iha.t many have disregarded-- that 
r ~lity must be i n t erpreted a.r.d u nderstood through the exper-
i ence of a self. Whether such a l i mited pha s e of exper i ence 
a s drea.d i ll serve such a signific t phi losophical fun c t i cn 
is , however , to be questi oned . Both men employ dread to aid 
i n th understar,;.ding of t heir phi loBophical start i lg po i nts , 
human i ndividuals , ~ o attain their proper goals . 
K, '1 ho def i ned ma.n i n a el i - i ous perspective and as 
having - i mmortal dimension, trieo to e xplai n both rna •s 
predicament of siufulnee s ruld his r elease f rom it · h the 
use of dread as a mediating f actor. This emot i o .. al st ate de:-~ 
privea man of ete r al l ife and also e ables him to at ail 
eternal l ife . Kierkegaard hoped to reach God in hi s philo-
sophice.l quest. He atti emp ·ted to explain. how t his was o b 
done in psychological terms . 
Ki erk gaard ' s whole r eac tion agains t system, however , 
and hi s diatr i be agains t obj e ctivi t y, was blunt ed by his 
a cceptance of t he ob jective propositions of the Bi ble as 
cl ue s to t he underst anding of the metaphysical obj ect . SK 
i ngen i ous l y used hie psychological insi gh t to support his 
philosophy but t his support could not overcome the def ots ~ 
an unsya ·t ~matic sys·tem . A ph i losophy i n which t he a-bsurd i s 
presented as both the goal and th means to the goal cannot 
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b defe 1ded ra-tionally nor a ccepted by anyone 1.vho i nsists 
that reality must be at l east intell i gi ble . The proper regard 
to p sychological exper i ence i n t he a·jj arting po i nt of philo-
sophy wi ll ot cover he difficulty of i rrat ionalism. The 
solution to SK 's problem , God enter ing hi story, could no doub t 
have been more plausibly presented in continuity wi th coh r enee. 
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conc~pt of dr ead endeavors to make ·the experience of man a 
coher nt whole . His quest of Be i ng is not realized, however, 
for i n the analys is of man he finds no way to transcend. His 
ane,lysis of man as a being headed toward non-existence i n death 
is consistent with his conclusion that t he unconscious activity 
of dread in man does not go beyond man and, hence, does not 
a-.":Jprehend e.ny metaphysical pe rson. 
Heidegger did not i ntend to consider the moods of man 
psychologically. Through 'pure phenomenology' he tried iiO 
validate t he narrowness of his analys i s to basic Grunde~immen . 
The criticism of Kierkegaard in reference to the inadequacy 
of dread alone to char acterize man's esaent ial experience 
follo ws al so for Heidegger. 
Bo ·th Ki erkegaard and Heidegger made serious at·tempts to 
i nterpret reality pUrely in terms of the analysis of human ex-
per i ence. They succeeded in presenting ingenious concepts of 
dread as the presuppos ition and basis for other J:S ychological 
moods. This was a.n attempt to make man 's expe rience both ade-
quate and plausible as tie temporal · starting poi t f or their 
respective nhilosophies . This concept fails, however , to give 
sufficient coherence and verification to their stated purposes. 
SK had t o elL g i nco 1sistently to a. propositional revela tion 
in order to fi nd a. landing pla.oe for his para.doxica,l leap of 
faith, while Heidegger remained consistent to his method but 
could not, cons equently , leap f ar enough to reach his goal. 
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6. Conclus i ons to the Dissert at i on . 
The di ssertation baa come to the f ollowing conclusions : 
(1) There is a common core by which the philosophi es of exist-
ence may be charact erized. Thi s cor~ reveal s ex i stent i alism 
to be a protes·c rather t g c..n a clear-out system of philosophy. 
Existent i al ism ~mph~size a the pr i ority of exist ence over 
essence , existential .s1.cts as f:r· ee cho i ces of man , cogn i t ive 
facts :;~,s depend~nt upon a subj ect, exi stence as a. human cate-
gory, human finitude , and, fi nally, a. dn:iadful e:notioaal 
situa ti on which c onditions eva:ry ex istent ial act . 
(2) Ki erkega.$..rd 1 a philosophy holds that dread is a. state which 
is fundam ntal to th/3 e xp lanat i on of ori g i r.:..al sin, subsequ en t 
a ct s of sin , and guilt , which condi ·ti on man for ennui, d ,spai r , 
and fai t:!:l. Dread is b as ic to t he dia.le ctic3.l leap of f a. i·~h 
f or Kier kega.a rd whose theory is f ra:-ned in t he Christian r e -
l i g i on . 
(3) HAidegger 'a basic analytic concept is dread :.;J.. so . He 
takes Kierkegaard ' s concept ou t of it s relig i ous sett i ng !3-nd 
ua~s it .<:l.S the central aspect of a. pu~· e phenomenol ogical 
analysis of man . 
( '+) The dynamic charg.cttf:l'ist ics of dread in ·t h~ theories of 
Kierkegaa~rd and He idegger, and its a o1;ivity b elovv the level 
of co:1scious awareness , are points rJ f conta c t with com:; emp -
orary psychoanaly s i s . However , t h e simi lari t i es are i n cident -
al and the differences , both in s -~ruo tur . J3..nd purpos e , s e t 
the t "~.'VO theori e s i n con traat with· psychoanalysis . 
(5) Kierkegaard's concep t of dread is inadequate in his 
ph i losophy at ·two important points: 
a. As the exclusive basis for psychological proc sa 
a.nd its mot ivation , dread is used inordinately 
and become s f or Kierk gaard a psychological pana-
cea r ather than a clear l y defined element of 
phenomenological analysis. 
b~ . Dr ad may be an adequate explanat i n f or the d i a-
lectic· l tension of subjectivi ·ty, but it is i n-
adequate to support faith in t he absurd, wh ich is 
Kierk~ga.ard 1 s solution for man's problems . 
(6) He idegger•s concept of dread gives his analysis of man 
a. coherence and cogency from the perspective of a phenomeno-
logical analys is. Dread f a i ls to serve as a 'stepping sto e ' 
·to Being , however, for it only leads back to man. 
(7) The place of dread i n the philosophy of Heidegg r is 
s imilar to that of Ki erkega.ard and is conditioned by the 
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theory of the latter , f or Heidegger is iLfl uenoed by Kierke-
gaard 'a phil osophy. Dread brings t hem to diame trically oppos d 
oor clusions, however . For Kierkegaard man is preparing f or eter ity; 
for Heidegger he is prepari ng for death. 
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
The problem of th - dissertatton is to determin ~-:;he 
significance of the psychological state of dre~d in the 
exi s t ential philosophi es of 
Heidegger. 
ren Kierkegaard and Martin 
The existentialists emphas ize the priori·liy of existenc e 
over es sence , existent i al acts as free choices of men, cog-
nitive facts as dependent upon a subject, exi st nee s a 
human cat egory, human finitude, and a crit ical emotional 
experience whi ch conditions every existential act. Th se 
f a ctors are observed to be integral to the philosophie s of 
Ki erk gaard and Heidegger , in spite of the f act that th 
latter r epudia t es the exist ntia.l ist title . 
The i udividual man is t he concern of both Ki erk gaard 
and HA idecrger . Kierkegaa.rd regards t he i .~.d i vidual a.e a, tri-
chotomizad being i n accordanc ~ith a biblical anthropology . 
H i degger , on the other hand , r epudiat in both the b ibl ical 
a d Greek a thropologi ee, conceive s th i ldividual solely 
on the basis of a phenomenological analys is. Heidegger ' s 
method, after Husserl , is an attempt to analyze amd d scl.· ibe 
the conceptual meani ngs of the phenomena. of pure conscioue-
n ss in order t o discover th true metaphysical object--
Being . Ki rkegaa.rd sh~s a. simi lar 9..l a.lys is, though th con-
e ptua. m a.nings ar presuppo sed i n r el i 0 i Ous concepts,~ a.nd 
he iMter~•ts his data ac cordingly. 
226 
Both Kierkega.a.rd and H ict 6<-~. l :c , ::. l _ ..i.:. :. -~ i r 
' - ~ 
analysis of man , find dread to be oentraJ.. Dread is a sick.n-
ing dizzin as that envelope one's consciousness and moves him 
to self-consciousness. As felt, it resembles f e r d yet one 
finds no'thh g t o f ar. Kierk gaa.rd 1 s extremely mela.nohol io 
pereonal i ty may a.ooou.r.~.t in part for his t hesis that dre · 
is the basi c psychological element. Heidegger probably r -
ce ived hie interest in dread from Kierkegaaxd, Bot h ~mploy 
dre d to def end their pb.ilosophio pr supp osi -'G i ons 
Ki rke a rd 1 s i ndividual i s i ll . On t he moral plane h 
i s i n a state of r bel i ou &.J6a.inst God l!md on the phi loeophi -
-the p..-ohle.~ a..a-isit~(J frow, 
caJl level h e cannot resolve~the te111pore,11 ty of his s oul and 
the e t er .:.al ity of his spi:cit. Dread mE'.ke s him e.war of this 
illne ss and al so oreat s the condi tiona V~'hioh pr cip i te"te it . 
Drea,d , in an organic r acial sol i da.rity, i mpa:rte t o every nan 
ori ginal sin wh n he beg i n s to use hie f reedo . • Ori ·in 1 sin 
give s him ~ bent for subsequent a cts of sinning. Each sin 
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hae eJ.1. ant cedent app rehension of di·ead. The a ct of si is 
i ns crutable psy chologically, but i ·t is s een philosophically a s 
s.n eff ort. on th part of a subj Act to b e an obj e c·t. This ob-
j ec tivity is an atte~~t t o observe imp artial y 0 4 ' s t hough ts 
and a cts. It i s a fut i le att emp t to r epudiate existenc e , 
vhioh is the s l f-ooi ecioue r egard of one ' s xp r ience. 
Dread conditi ons the cure a s well ,s t h caus of the 
i ndividual 's mal i gnancy. Diead reveal s to man the fr eedom 
t hat differ nt i a t es h im from the beasts. Thi s fr eedom nabl s 
him to make leap of f a ith. Ki E\l'kega.ard f inds th soluti r.~. 
of the individual ' s pl i ght i n f aith which i s a per s is t t 
bel i ef i n an ab solute par dox--God b came a man ~ Th moral 
prob em is solved, fo r God makes an i nfin i te s acrifice of 
Hi mself as a pr op i t i at i on f or man' a ai i • The phil osophicfl.l. 
p roblem is r esolv Q.. , f or t rni ·ty is thus medi at d through 
t i me . 
Heidegger bel i ves t he bane of t he i ndividual to be hi s 
' evf:!I ydayn ss'. In this ·the i.adividual r j eta his i divid-
ual i ty. Dread is reveaJl d i n analysis a.r d serv · s t o str uc t ure 
t he i ndividual . A basic d t eri or a.t i on (Verf allenhei t) is 
d i sol sed F.lnd s&ver al xistent alj,.a a..r e discern d t hrou ,·h th 
us of dr ead as the base phenomenon . The to tal conscious pro-
cess fi nds ita unity i n e, basic preo ccupation, or Car • 
The solut i on of the p roblem of He i deg er 1 s i ndividual 
l i es i n the understanding of t he structur of man , t h re-
oogni t i on of t hi s struct ur e e.s de t er·i or at i ng , a a r -
s olute ac~ 101 to alleviate t hi s condition . H i d ~g r s ta~es , 
however , that his primary phi losophic concern is h di s-
coveri ng of Be i ng. In re sol ute a ct i on , he bel i ev s h ha.s a. 
' g i mp s ' of the 'hor izon ' of Bei ng . The nature of th re~ 
solute act, xc pt i n so f a.r a s i t is a r ealistic f a.cin_: 
of death, is Wlclear i n He idegger' s wr i ·tings. 
Dread is d .fined e,s a dynamic f actor ir the thou0 ht of 
Ki erkegaard and Heid gger. It is also fwlcti ouing b elow the 
level of conscious a.\vareness. Nei ·ther of the two philosophers 
develops an explicit psychology of ·thE.J unconscious. however. 
Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger believe that an unco~scious 
phase of drea..d is a necessary iufei·ence in order to explain 
its abrupt appearance in consciousness and also to just ify 
it as a basic mot iva,tional f orce . This ' deep mood ' is not 
a co ... struct to e:x:pedi te psychoanalytical therapy , hov;ev r, 
but rather is the key to metaphysical therapy, 
Kierk gaard and Heidegger were found to a;sree in em-
phasizing i ndividual i ty , encouragi ng subjectivi·cy, and util-
izing a phenomenological methodology which fi de dread the 
most signif icant motion of man . 
Kierkegaard differs from H idegger in his religious per-
spective , for Heidegger r fleets an athei stic tendency . Their 
anthropological presuppositions lead them aparu, Kierkegaard 
believed man to be a Sein zum Ewigkeii and he sough~ to ex-
p end every fforu to make choices hat would expedite such a. 
being on the way. On the other hand , Heid gger could see only 
a Se in ~ Tode who must rea~ize his fate. Their re speo~ive 
purposes i n philosophizing were a.lso di vexgen·t. Kierkegaard 
as se king eternal happiness, while Heidegger was in quest 
of Being . 
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It ould seem that Ki e: rkegaard ' a whoJ.e reaction a.;ai nat 
syst m, and his dia·cribe against ob j ect ivity, was blunt d by 
hie accept no of th ob j otiv · propoei tiona of the Bibl a s 
cl ue s to the underetzmding of the. mete~.physi cal ob j ec t . Ki erke-
ga.ard i ng ni ouel y used his psychological i ns i ght to support 
hie phi losophy, but this support could not overco e the d -
f ect s of a loose-jointed system . A philosophy in which the 
absurd is presented as both the goal and the mea. a to the 
goal c arillot be def nded rationally nor accept d by anyone who 
ins ist s that rea.l i ty must be a.t le ;;;.st intelli gi ble . 
Even if Kierkegaard had developed hi s philosophy as a 
cohe!.' nt syst em , however , i t i s questi ona.bl whe·tiher drsJ?.d 
wi l l serve as the basic, t.miversal , emotio J.al state f man , 
On the basis of p sychological analysis alone this seems 
doub tful . Furthermore, Kier kegaa.rd seems to have regarded h i m-
sel f, and his r a ther pessimistic perspective, as the norms of 
~.11 experi ence. He has a va.l id phi losophical protest, but the 
dust t hat he rai sed up in reaction foro d him to function as 
one who could not see , 
H idegger l ikewise f all s short in his philosophica.l 
a.tt;empt . His nalysis of Da.eein is a..dmirable , and the direct 
attempt to eystemat iz the data of xperi nee is in many ways 
more satisfactory than the paradoxical method of Kierkegaa.rd . 
In his concept of dread , He idegger tr i s to make the xp r i nee 
of man a coherent whole . His quest of Bei ng is not successful~ 
however , f or i n the analysis of man he fi nQs no way to reach 
Bei ng . 
Both Ki erkegaard and He i degger made serious attempts to 
interpr~t real i t y purely i n terms of the analysis of human 
experi ence . Th y succeeded i n present i ng c ever l y f a shion d 
concepts of dread as the preauppo si t i o~ to 
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other psychological moods . This was an ef fo rt to m~k man ' s 
experi nee both ad quate and plausibl e as t he tempor al start-
i ng pQint fo r t he i r r espective phi losophies. Thi s concept fai ls , 
however , to give suf f ici ent coher nee ~d v r ificat i on to th i r 
s tated purposes . Ki erkegaard had to cl i ng i n col ai e·ten ly to a 
p ropoai t ional r evelati on i n order -~ o have a landing place f rom 
hi s paradoxical leap of f a ith, whi le Hs i degger remai. d con-
sistent t o hi s method but could not , consequently, leap far 
noucrh to reach his goal . 
The di s sertation has come to t he f ollowi ng co1cl us i ous : 
(1 ) There i s a common core by which the philosophi es of 
existence may be character ized. This cor e reveal s xi ste Ltial -
i sm to be a protest r ather than a clear-out system of phi o-
sophy. Exis te 1t i al ism emphasizes the priol: ity of exi stence 
over essence , exi stential a cta a s free choices of man , cog-
n i t ive f a ct s as dependent upon a subject , exister o as a 
hu~an category, human finitude , and, f i nally , an experi oe 
of drea.,O_ ·which condi t i ona every exis e t i al act . 
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( 2 ) Kier .. e c; aard ' s phil os oph~r ho l d s t h.a t dread is a stat e v1 i ch 
i s fund a ,_en t a l t o the exp l anati on of orl~ inal s in, subsequent 
ac ts o f s in , a nd (m i l t , v1hich c ondi t i on man f o r ennu i , d espair , 
a n d fai t h . Dr ead is b as ic t o t h e di a l e c ti c a l leap o f _ a ith 
fo r Kierk e ,gaar d wh os e the ory is framed i n t h e Chl"' i st ian re-
l i g ion . 
( 3 ) Heide~ge r 1 s basic a nal y t i c con c e p t i s dread a l s o . He 
t a k e s Ki er k e g a a l"'d 1 s conc e p t out o !.' its r e l i '-,ious set t i n ,z and 
u s es it as t h e c ent r a l asp e c t of a pure phenomenol o6 i c a l 
a nal y s i s of man . 
( 4 ) Th e dynamic ch a r a ct e r i s ti c s of d r ead in t h e t h eorie s of 
Ki e r k egaar d and Ee i degger , and i t s a c t i vity bel ow t h e l e v e l 
of c ons c ~ ou s a wa r ene ss , are poin ts of c onta c t 1 ith con t emp -
orary psv c h oanal ys i s . Howe v e r , t he s i mila r i t i es a r e i n c i d ent -
a1 and t h e di f f e r Emc e s , b oth i n s t r u cture a nd pu1•po se, se t 
t h e t wo t h eo r ies i n c ontrast vvi t h p sy ch oa nal y si s . 
( 5) Ki e r ke gaar d 1 s c on c ept of d r ead is i n a d e qu a t e i n h i s 
philosophy a t t v10 i mp orta nt p oints : 
a . As t h e exc l u si v e b a si s for p s y ch ol o0 ic a l p r oc e ss 
a nd i t s mo -iva tion, dre a d is u sed inordina tel y 
a nd becomes for -_i e r k e gaar d a p sych olog i c a l 
pa n a c e a r a t h e r t h a n a c l e arly d e fine d e l ement 
o f phenome nol oe;ica l a n a l y s is . 
b . Dr ead may b e a n ade quat e ex p l a n a ti on for t h e d ia-
l e c ti c a l ten s j_ on o f subje c ti v i t y , bu t it is in-
adequa t e t o su pport f ai t h in t he absurd , which 
i s Lier k e p;a a rd 1 s s ol u ti on for mari 1 s p rob l ens . 
(6) H idegger 's cone pt of dread gives his analysis of man 
coherence a.."'l.d cogency from the perspective of a. phenomeno-
l ogica.l analysis. Dread, however, f ai l s to serve as a ' stE.-p -
p ing stone ' to Being, f or it only leads back to man. 
(7) The place of dr ad in the philosophy of Heidegger ie 
similar to dread in Kierkaga.ard's thought and is cottditioned 
by the theory of the latter , for Heidegger is influ need by 
Kierkegaard ' s philosophy. Dread brings them to diametricall y 
opposed conclusions, however. For Kierke.gaaxd man is a b 1ng 
preparing f or eternity; f or Heidegger he is preparing for 
d ath . 
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